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Abstract
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs developed in recent years as the business
response to social and environmental criticism of corporate operations, and are most debated in
those societies where neoliberalism emerged most prominently, the United States and the United
Kingdom. My dissertation expands these debates investigating the CSR programs of a Spanishowned multinational oil company, Repsol-YPF operating in the Ecuadorian Amazon region. It
explores CSR programs as institutions that can facilitate ongoing resource extraction, and
particular technologies of rule that serve to discipline indigenous peoples at the point of
extraction. I conducted an institutional ethnography to examine the social relationships produced
through CSR programs, and contend that the relationships formed within CSR programs enable
ongoing resource extraction. This dissertation argues that CSR programs produce entanglements
between state, corporate and indigenous actors that lead to competing and conflicting spaces of
governance in Ecuador. These entanglements reflect the Ecuadorian state's attempts to 'erase'
indigenous difference in the name of securing wealth and membership in the nation-state. In turn,
CSR programs can both contain indigenous mobilization and resistance in Ecuador, but also
highlight indigenous difference and rights and access to resources, predicated on membership in
the nation-state. To that end, the dissertation is attentive to the ambivalence and uncertainty of
indigenous actors produced through engagement with corporate capital, and suggests that
ambivalence can also be a productive space.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Returning to the northern Ecuadorian Amazon region (Orellana province) in November
of 2008 (Figure 1), I was struck by how little had changed since the first time I arrived in the
region in 2004. It was still a mix of paved and unpaved roads following a smaller series of
pipelines from oil fields to the larger trans-Andean private (Oleoducto Crudo Pesado, OCP) and
state run (Sistema de Oleoducto Transecuatoriano, SOTE) pipelines that would take oil across
the country to the refinery on the coast. Large trailers hauling pipeline segments, busses,
motorbikes and pedestrians all shared the road, weaving in and out, lurching to stops at randomly
placed speed bumps, or to pick up passengers. In 2008, I often took the bus from Coca (formally
known as Puerto Francisco de Orellana), the capital of the province of Orellana, to Pompeya, an
indigenous Kichwa1 community on the bank of the Napo River, and the end of the bus service.2
From Pompeya, only boat travel is possible. At an hour-long stop in La Joya de la Sacha3,
commonly shortened to Sacha, I had time to observe the bustle of traffic flying by, and
pedestrians darting across the two-lane road; the horizon marked by gas flares. The scene is the
epitome of a region dominated by an extractive industry since the early 1970s. Sacha, like Coca,
is a frontier-like town that developed with the oil industry. It consists of a mixture of company
employees, indigenous peoples, and internal colonists, mestizo populations migrating from the
Ecuadorian highlands to the lowlands, who moved into the region as it opened with oil

1

I use this spelling of Kichwa, rather than Quichua, to denote the non-Hispano origins of the word.
Through the dissertation I use the term indigenous as one articulated identity that is contested and negotiated
among groups of people, and does not to fix them as 'naturally' indigenous, or substitute for other aspects of identity
(see Valdivia 2005). Other terms, such as Indian, or Indio are often derogatory labels placed on native populations in
certain contexts in Ecuador, and today, within the space of the community of Pompeya, indigenous was used by
residents as a form of self-identification. However, others (see Sawyer 2004) have used the Spanish indígena as a
translation for Indian.
3
This translates as the Jewel of the Jungle. Sacha is a Kichwa word meaning jungle.
2

1

Figure 1

2

exploration in the 1970s. The infrastructure that does exist in these cities facilitates additional oil
extraction, including roads, electricity, and the pipelines. As we turned off the main road in
Sacha, we began a dusty, often muddy, but always bumpy ride on the dirt road to Pompeya.4
Pompeya serves as the entrance to Block 16, an oil block currently operated by the
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Figure 2 (Map by Joe Stoll, Syracuse Cartography Lab)

region is divided into oil blocks based on known oil reserves. Extraction rights are rented by the
state to private companies (Figure 2). NGO staff and other outsiders, including oil workers, often
refer to the area in which they work by the oil block number. This titling trumps other claims on
the land, including indigenous communities and ancestral territory. The port of entry starts at the

4

Eventually, during the 17 months I was in Ecuador, this road to Pompeya was also paved. The state provided the
funding to pave the road, allowing for more rapid access to the river, and in turn to the barges and boats to transport
oil personnel and infrastructure downriver.

3

Napo River, and workers must continue another 160 kilometers down a dirt road to reach
Repsol-YPF’s drilling platforms. Block 15, where Pompeya is located, is currently operated by
Petroamazonas, a subsidiary of Petroecuador, the state company.5 The bus to Pompeya drops
passengers on the north side of the river, in the barrio of Pompeya known as San Francisco,
where the Saturday market is held. Despite the long delays on the bus, this chaotic scenery along
the way always fascinated me.6 Arriving in Pompeya on a Saturday, market day, was especially
exciting. This was the moment that one could witness the mixing of the different individuals and
organizations in one space.
On Saturdays, Kichwa communities further downstream and the Waorani, an indigenous
group that lives deeper into the jungle to the south, some inside Yasuní National Park, arrive by
dugout canoe or oil company speedboat to buy material goods, including food and clothing, and
to partake in the freely flowing sugar cane-based alcohol, aguardiente. The Pilsener beer truck,
selling a popular Ecuadorian beer in 1-liter bottles, was a constant presence at the market. Cases
of beer were unloaded, and exchanged for the empties brought back on the dugout canoes. The
market is also where community members are able to sell agricultural products and bush meat.
Mestizo buyers come from other parts of the Amazon region to snap up the underpriced meat.
Many animals are valued for their healing properties, including snakes, armadillos, tortoises and
monkeys, and mestizos and indigenous peoples alike often consume these in soups, stews, or
even dried. Walking around the market, Kichwa and Waorani peoples are wandering along with
Repsol-YPF’s community relations personnel, nuns from the Catholic mission in Pompeya, non-

5

Block 15 was previously operated by Occidental (Oxy), an American company. In 1999, the Ecuadorian state
claimed Oxy violated the terms of its contract, and the company was pushed out of Ecuador. Signs of the company’s
presence remain however, in the multitude of communal buildings built by the company, for example (see
Kimmerling 2006).
6
The ride from Pompeya to Coca usually took about three hours in a bus. By private car it was only half this time.
Travel along the Napo River between Coca and Pompeya is even shorter.

4

governmental organization (NGO) staff from both international conservation organizations and
local, Ecuadorian organizations, and sometimes the occasional, international or national tourist.
Seemingly absent from this scene is the state. There was, and continues to be very little state
presence in Ecuador’s northern Amazon region. While I was aware of local state representatives
elected to positions in the local junta parroquial (parish council) office, based in Pompeya, these
actors played a secondary role to that of the company in the region. In fact, state representatives
are often folded into corporate projects. Yet, while everyday relationships at the local level
revolved around the company, the state continues to play a strategic role in the region that
ensures resource extraction. Indeed, this became more evident when I crossed the river to enter
Repsol-YPF’s guardhouse, and the state was visible as military presence. Companies will often
call on the state to protect their extractive interests in the region, and military personnel often
accompany extractive industries in Ecuador.
This chaotic mixing of different groups seems to belie the facilitation of oil extraction,
and yet, extraction continues. What, then, are the social relationships that emerge in the region to
facilitate additional oil extraction? I suggest that the relationships formed within corporate social
responsibility (CSR) programs, implemented at the local level in the form of development
projects enable ongoing resource extraction. While CSR programs are designed to ensure
ongoing resource extraction, they also produce certain contradictory outcomes. This dissertation
argues that CSR programs produce entanglements between state, corporate and indigenous actors
that lead to competing and conflicting spaces of governance. These entanglements reflect the
state's attempts to 'erase' indigenous difference in the name of securing wealth and membership
in the nation-state.7 In turn, CSR programs can both contain indigenous mobilization and

7

I use the term erase cognizant of long histories of policies designed to discursively eliminate indigenous difference
as a basis for membership in the nation-state. Here I am drawing on Hale (2011) to signify erasure through
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resistance, but also highlight indigenous difference and rights and access to resources, predicated
on membership in the nation-state. To that end, I am attentive to the ambivalence and uncertainty
of indigenous actors produced through engagement with corporate capital, and suggest that
ambivalence can also be a productive space, or a space “in which tensions, contradictions and
paradoxes can be negotiated fruitfully and dynamically” (Bondi 2004: 5). In the rest of the
chapter I outline my theoretical and methodological approaches to analyzing CSR programs. I
begin by discussing the rise of CSR programs within extractive industries.

CSR programs and neoliberal policies
As a special report in the The Economist (2008) indicates, CSR programs have developed
in recent years as the business response to social and environmental criticism of corporate
operations. Doane (2005: 23) defines CSR as “the efforts corporations make above and beyond
regulation to balance the needs of stakeholders with the need to make a profit.” CSR programs
can be categorized into three broad “layers” that build up, one on top of the other. The first layer
is traditional corporate philanthropy where companies allocate a small portion of their profits to
“worthy causes,” because it is deemed the “right thing to do.” However, this is often not
considered sufficient, and shareholders in particular want to know that their money is being used
appropriately. Thus, the second layer of CSR falls under risk management, and became more
dominant in the 1980s, responding to environmental disasters such as the Bhopal explosion, and
the Exxon Valdez oil spill (The Economist 2008: 4; Watts 2005). Companies established CSR
programs in response to criticisms that emerged from this type of social and environmental harm,

neoliberal/post-neoliberal paradigm that can both highlight difference, but also erase it through incorporation of
indigenous peoples into dominant development paradigms. Hale argues that we must be critical of these programs
that are rooted in difference, because this can also lead to cooptation as indigenous communities become entangled
in the very structures they intend to resist.

6

a result of their operations. Nike and Gap, for example, also came under fire for their labor
standards, including child labor, and established CSR programs to respond to these criticisms (cf.
Love and Love 2003; Doane 2005). Often belatedly, companies attempt to mange risk by talking
to NGOs and governments, establishing codes of conduct, and addressing corporate transparency
(Watts 2005). In turn, companies collaborate to set rules and standards through which they
operate, spreading the blame and influencing opinions of others. The Economist (2008: 4) also
points to a third layer, one where CSR programs can “create value.” Rather than merely ‘greenwashing’, corporations are engaged in changing their own operations to incorporate CSR
programs as part of their business strategies that contribute to their competitive advantage (Porter
and Kramer 2006). In other words, CSR programs are “embedded” in corporate operations, and
influence decision-making. My research corresponds with the second layer of CSR programs,
and considers Repsol-YPF’s programs in the context of deflecting blame, and responding to
social and environmental criticisms of corporate operations.
CSR discourse often includes the language of wanting to be a 'good neighbor,' seeking
'mutually beneficial relations between the company and society,' and 'sharing the same objectives
of economic growth, social development, and the preservation of the environment' (Repsol-YPF,
Annual Report 2008). Sadler and Lloyd (2009: 613) define CSR as “the notion that companies
should accompany the pursuit of profit with good citizenship within a wider society…” As
Doane (2005: 25) argues, though, there is often a “wide chasm between what’s good for a
company and what’s good for society as a whole.” In turn, the focus on the shifting roles of
corporations and the state in processes of neoliberalism, suggests that there is a clear relationship
between the roll out of neoliberalism in the 1990s and the rise of CSR programs (cf. Watts
2005). If neoliberal policies are premised on market-based regulations and privatization, while

7

the state’s role is reduced to that of a manager, then CSR programs are institutions that can
further these goals while shaping society in this model.
“The capitalist world stumbled toward neoliberalism” as a response to the capital
accumulation crises that emerged through the 1960s and 1970s, writes Harvey (2005: 13).
Unemployment and inflation were on the rise, which ushered in a global phase of ‘stagflation.’
No longer could the fixed exchange rate tied to gold be managed successfully due to the
movement of goods across borders, and the increasing connectedness of states through
capitalism. In 1971, fixed exchange rates were abandoned. In other words, the ‘embedded
liberalism’ that had allowed advanced capitalist countries to prosper was no longer working, and
ultimately abandoned. In response to this crisis, some countries turned to additional state control
and regulation through corporatist processes, including, in some cases, curbing labor and social
movements, additional austerity measures, and wage and price controls. This was the direction
that socialist and communist parties moved toward in Europe. Thus, divisions emerged between
those who backed social democracy and centralized planning, and those in favor of liberating
corporate and business power and re-establishing market freedoms (Harvey 2005). By the 1970s,
though, the latter group was dominant.
As Harvey (2005) asks, how is that neoliberalism emerged as the single answer to the
crisis of capital accumulation, and perhaps most coherently in the 1990s through the Washington
Consensus? Despite a convergence on neoliberalism, it remains an uneven and lopsided process,
which Harvey (2005: 13) argues is representative of the “tentativeness of neoliberal solutions”
and the political forces, histories and institutions shaped by the geographies of particular places.
In broad terms, neoliberalism is defined as an economic and political project that aims to

8

liberalize trade, privatize certain state-controlled practices, reduce the public sector, and
introduce management practices through the market (Jessop 2002).
Prior to its emergence though, the movement toward neoliberalism highlighted how
crises of capitalism in the 1970s affected everyone. Discontent emerged on a global scale and
labor movements joined other social movements leading states toward socialist alternatives.
Communist parties were advancing across Europe, and protests in the United States sought out
state reforms. Harvey writes that these social processes had clear political challenges to
economic elites and ruling classes around the world, both in advanced capitalist countries and in
developing countries. In addition to the political challenges to ruling elites, economic challenges
also emerged. Post-war settlements curbed the economic power of the ruling elites in favor of
additional distribution to labor. While this shift worked in periods of prosperity, it challenged
upper classes in periods of crisis, such as during the 1970s. Thus, as Chile moved toward
neoliberalism, the forced privatization policies demonstrated that capital could be revived, even
if the benefits were highly skewed. In other words, increased inequality is a persistent outcome
of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005). Therefore, we might interpret neoliberalism as either a “utopian
project” that can help restore international capitalism, or a “political project” that is designed to
restore the conditions for capital accumulation and the power to economic elites (Harvey 2005:
19). For Harvey (p. 19), the latter holds true and he uncovers the ways in which neoliberal
policies are often “twisted as to be unrecognizable” all in an effort to sustain the power of the
ruling elite.

9

Neoliberal natures?
Studies of environmental governance in the context of neoliberal institutional shifts focus
on market-led resource regulation, privatization and the ‘roll-back’ and ‘re-institutionalization’
of the state (Bakker 2002; Bridge and McManus 2000; Jessop 1995; Liverman 2004; McCarthy
2004; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Peck and Tickell 1992; Perreault and Martin 2005;
Prudham 2004; Robertson 2004; Tickell and Peck 1995). CSR has been most debated in those
societies where neoliberalism emerged most prominently, the United States and the United
Kingdom. These debates over CSR have entered the popular press, including The Economist
(2008), which argues, “companies are having to work harder to protect their reputation” (p. 4). In
turn, increases in voluntary international reporting standards equate CSR programs to a
company's goodwill.
Sadler and Lloyd (2009) discuss the ways in which “in-between” spaces have been
created for corporate regulations, setting new policy standards for corporations. For example, in
1997 the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and later in 2000 the UN Global Compact emerged,
along with the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES). Together these
organizations set a series of environmental standards for corporate activities. In 2001 the World
Economic Forum (WEF) established a Corporate Citizenship Initiative. A year later,
corporations pledged support for development projects, including the “New Partnership for
Africa’s Development” established at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in
Johannesburg. All of these organizations and agreements are voluntary, but set new standards for
corporate investment in social and environmental issues (cf. Watts 2005). As Sadler and Lloyd
(2009) suggest, these programs demonstrate that corporations have the ability to shape social and
environmental outcomes, including establishing 'appropriate outcomes.'

10

However, emphasizing CSR in the context of voluntary reporting standards draws
attention away from creating the legal rules that might prevent oil spills or protect human rights,
argues The Economist (2008) (see also, Watts 2005; Welker 2009). In particular, the magazine
notes the desire of firms to fill a void left by an ‘absent’ state, and the patchwork of rules that
results in its place. Moreover, critics note the obvious attention of corporations to their
shareholders, and the importance of not only increasing profits, but also focusing on social
welfare. As Porter and Kramer (2006) conclude, it is now necessary to see the 'shared value' of
CSR operations, or benefits for both business and society. In turn, companies are working with
NGOs to implement on the ground operations and to demonstrate their commitment to action.
Large firms often take on a more 'paternalistic' role providing basic services in local
communities (The Economist 2008). For example, mining corporations often operate in
communities located at the point of extraction (Himley 2010; Kirsch 2006; Rajak 2010, 2011;
Welker 2009). Porter and Kramer (2006) argue that multinational presence at the local level is
mutually beneficial when a company works directly with small farmers who source basic
commodities that the company needs. The investment in local infrastructure and the company's
“transfer of world-class knowledge and technology” leads to social benefits such as “improved
health care, better education, and economic development” (Porter and Kramer 2006: 89).
Corporate operations at the local level, however, do not take into account the impacts and effects
on local communities from these so-called improvements to livelihoods (Welker 2009). To
explore these multi-scalar impacts and effects, scholars have undertaken ethnographies of CSR
programs.
Recent ethnographies of CSR programs have focused on extractive industries (cf. Himley
2010; Welker 2006, 2009). Furthermore, Shell Oil's operations in Nigeria have provided
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important contributions to CSR literature (see Livesey and Kearins 2002; Tuodolo 2009; Zalik
2004). Indeed, Shell Oil is often cited as the first company to implement CSR programs. In the
Niger Delta, Shell Oil promotes a discourse of sustainable development in the face of
environmental and social criticisms surrounding its operations. However, more than just
discursive framing, the company also shifted its operations toward a concept of sustainability
made visible through its CSR programs (Livesey and Kearins 2002).
Other studies, however, have more critically examined CSR programs in the context of
political economic relations in the Delta (see Watts 2005, for example). Zalik (2004) outlines
Shell Oil's community development plan based on 'partnership development.' This plan relies on
social structures that exist in local communities, to promote “non-confrontational, respectful
negotiations with authority” (Zalik 2004: 409). Instead of corporate handouts, “consent-based
regulation” marked Shell Oil's community-based programs. This emphasis changed public
perceptions of the Niger Delta, and today Shell Oil receives awards for its CSR programs (Zalik
2004: 409). Zalik (2004) explores CSR discourse and projects that move communities away from
activist interventions, toward a focus on development, or the depoliticization of company
operations. Because CSR discourse focuses on solutions, rather than problems, combined with
‘helping’ infrastructure, rather than rules, this makes it more difficult for local populations to
bring legal claims against companies.
Furthermore, as corporations seek additional rights and responsibilities in resource
extraction processes, they implicitly question the state’s role in distribution of resources from
extraction (cf. Frynas 2005; Welker 2009). Indeed, corporations insist that the state’s role should
be limited in industrial regulation (Bebbington 2010). Bebbington’s (2010) analysis of CSR
programs in the context of Latin America argues for an examination of the 'institutional effects'

12

of these programs on the state. He suggests that CSR programs actually limit the productive role
between conflict and formation of a development and welfare state.
In other words, CSR programs prevent the formation of the institutions that are necessary
to avoid the resource curse effects. In brief, the resource curse (see Ross 1999, Klare 2001 and,
for a critique, Watts 2001), and in particular oil extraction is examined for its 'rentier effect' or
the way states restructure their economies to promote ongoing oil extraction, which ultimately
prevents democracy. The resource curse also includes a 'repression effect' that refers to state
control over oil extraction to fund military expenses and security forces. Finally, the
'modernization effect' is the process through which industrial and service sector jobs make states
less likely to pursue democracy. Together these effects contribute to the state’s inability to enact
economic policies, despite production of significant wealth.
Yet, literature that explores the resource curse is critiqued for its failure to examine the
resource itself, and the differences that emerge between oil, for example, and the extraction of
diamonds (LeBillon 200l; Watts 2001). LeBillon (2001) argues that we must consider the social
construction of resources, along with their material variation. Constructing a typology of
resources along different axes, such as those that are spatially diffuse vs. those that are spatially
concentrated, and those that are proximate to population centers vs. those that are distant,
LeBillon analyzes resource conflict. Yet, as others have argued we also have to consider the
ways in which meanings and identities are also produced within resource politics (Moore 2000;
Perreault and Valdivia 2010).
We might consider, then, how resource struggles reflect broader struggles of “citizenship,
the nation, rights and identity” (Perreault and Valdivia 2010: 3; Watts 2001). In turn, others have
argued that oil makes up the ‘natural body’ of the state that is linked to its political body.
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Political decisions, then, hinge on the economic performance of the oil industry (Coronil 1997;
Karl 1997). CSR programs are designed to resolve conflicts in the context of business strategies
linked to securing ongoing extraction. CSR programs, then, can link the state’s natural body to
its political body, and “cultivate less turbulent relationships with the population” (Bebbington
2010: 112).
The discourses and processes of modernization through oil resources, or the linking of a
political body to a state’s natural body (cf. Coronil 1997) through la Patria, defined as the
“conjoining of nation and nature” or a “fatherland” (cf. Martz 1987; Perreault and Valdivia 2010:
3) is made more complex by indigenous relationships to a private company that provides
‘modernization’ in the form of material resources and infrastructural improvements. Neoliberal
processes of privatization challenge state sovereignty and links between a territory and oil
resources (cf. Perreault and Valdivia 2010). My dissertation explores the ways in which oil
serves as the ‘physical body’ or territory of the state. In turn, subject identities are produced
through a sense of belonging to this physical body (Valdivia 2008).
Indigenous embodiment of the state through its physical body highlights both
membership in the nation-state through oil resources, but also an ambivalent response to that
membership. While oil extends the state’s sovereignty to its subterranean resources, indigenous
populations that are within, and make up the same space as oil extraction are also subject to its
negative, poisonous impacts. Oil produces illness within indigenous communities and bodies,
and CSR programs can only cover up that illness, but not remove it completely. My analysis,
therefore, reveals an implicit challenge regarding the duality of the state’s bodies (see Nelson
2001). I argue that embodiment of the state through indigenous populations challenges the binary
of political and economic, or social and economic. By focusing on indigenous ‘bodies’ through
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indigenous subject formation, new ways of understanding the state and its inherent
contradictions emerge. If the state emerges through a series of networks and relationships, then
“knowledge and power can be located in a time and a place” (Mountz 2010: xxv). Thus, my
dissertation aims to uncover alternative narratives of the state, through indigenous subject
formation tied to relationships with CSR programs that can challenge the self-imaginings of
Ecuador as a petro-state.
Others have argued that CSR processes produce “geographies of incorporation and
exclusion” (see Rajak 2010, 2011: 214; Himley 2010). More specifically, Himley (2010) notes
the way in which the “community” serves as project recipient; CSR programs determine who is
part of a community, but cannot account for complex social relationships within the community.
This often leads to disputes, and new patterns of development and livelihoods at the local level.
Rajak (2010) also explores the community through CSR programs, and argues that CSR
discursively constructs the corporation as benefactor, and community members as recipients. She
suggests that the geographies defined by CSR programs not only demarcate a corporation’s
responsibility, but also serve to mark its authority. In turn, these distinctions within CSR
discourses lead to structures of control and dependency. Similarly, Welker’s (2006, 2009) study
of the Newmont Mine in Indonesia describes the way in which powerful elites in local politics
called on the company to provide local development projects, exploring a discursive notion of
modernity promoted by the state. Often these petitions would involve violent responses, but they
also usually procured the aid of Newmont. In turn, local community members supported this
process, despite the uneven distribution of aid programs. Welker explores the dual notions of
dependency on these local elites – the downward dependency of village members and the upward
dependence of the corporation – as provider of goods.
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My analysis of CSR programs, then, explores the internal contradictions inherent in
neoliberal development programs revealed through the contested nature of identity, and the
ambivalent response of indigenous peoples to CSR programs. On the one hand, CSR programs
might suggest the opportunity to engage in development processes rooted in questions of selfgovernance, and to work within corporate frameworks and CSR programs. On the other hand,
though, the programs demonstrate the further entrenchment of development discourses and
professionalization in daily practices at local, regional and national levels. Thus, CSR programs
can undermine local state control over resources, while simultaneously ensuring state control
from afar through neoliberal processes of professionalization, that serves to entrench neoliberal
ideologies into the farthest corners of the state (see Bondi and Laurie 2005 and Nightingale
2005).

CSR programs as discourse and practice
My research builds on ethnographies of CSR programs to explore corporate programs
and projects that contribute to ongoing resource extraction in Ecuador. I conceptualize CSR
programs as institutions that emerge through and within the messiness of everyday practices of
state, corporate and, in the case of Ecuador, indigenous actors. In turn, I argue that CSR
programs operate as a ‘technology of rule’ to shift social relationships that govern resource
extraction in Ecuador, and challenge state sovereignty and indigenous rights and representation
in the nation-state.8
In the case of Ecuador, Repsol-YPF implements CSR projects intended to better the
socio-economic conditions of indigenous peoples living at the point of extraction, complying
with corporate norms and objectives. Corporate policies ensure that the company follows
8

In the rest of the dissertation I often use ‘Ecuadorian state’ to refer to the Ecuadorian nation-state.
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international standards set by the UN Commission for Human Rights, as well as International
Labor Organization (ILO) conventions. Repsol-YPF carefully crafts corporate discourse that
states company plans to invest in sustainable development to benefit not only the company, but
also the communities impacted by its operations. Repsol-YPF also evaluates and conducts
studies on environmental and social impacts of its operations. In particular, though, Repsol-YPF
establishes norms for its operations in indigenous communities, working with anthropologists to
conduct studies that minimize impacts in spaces of potential non-contacted indigenous groups,
and ensuring that no project will displace indigenous peoples from their ancestral territories
(www.repsol.com). In 2009, the company invested € 843,000 in social programs, in 2010 €
1,576,000 and in 2011 € 1,495,000 in Ecuador. For example, the company funds micro-credit
programs, implemented by NGOs, and designed to employ women in projects to produce and
sell chickens in local markets. Other projects have included a small sewing business, and
computers and internet for a distance learning high school.
Yet, many of these projects suffer from lack of interest on the part of people in Pompeya,
and often disintegrate after one or two years. In some cases, the corporation chooses to end
funding for projects. In Ecuador, CSR programs often include infrastructural improvements, such
as electricity and drinking water systems - things the state might normally provide. In turn,
because the company often fills a role the state might normally play, indigenous rights and
claims to citizenship at the local level are made through the company. Despite CSR project
'failures', though, most people in Pompeya continue to turn to the company for ongoing material
resources. At times, even local parroquial (parish) representatives look to the company for
additional project funding. Others have argued that the corporation “authenticates” its power and
influence through the state's development agenda (Rajak 2011).
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By exploring these relationships within CSR programs through ethnographic research
conducted in Pompeya, as well as in regional provincial capitals, Coca and Puyo, and in Quito,
the capital of Ecuador, this dissertation illuminates the way in which relationships formed within
CSR programs produce narratives that enable ongoing oil extraction. These programs are often
described as inclusionary and participatory, while in practice CSR tends to eschew questions of
distribution, rights and justice (Bridge and Perreault 2009; Rajak 2011). Mobilization and
resistance to corporate operations is often framed through the company’s own language of being
a good neighbor, as indeed indigenous cultural norms dictate that a more powerful neighbor
should distribute wealth in the form of material things. My analysis, however, also points to the
way in which CSR programs create an outward “façade” (Mountz 2007: 40), produced by
individuals and organizations engaged in the daily practices of CSR programs. I draw on Wendy
Wolford's (2010) ethnography of the MST in my analysis. She writes that a focus on social
movements as “things” with quantifiable characteristics, such as number of members,
demonstrations, and the like, risks ignoring other aspects of movements as a set of discourses, or
narratives, ways to understand social justice, and imagining change. Furthermore, an institutional
analysis questions the role of the state in an extractive regime. In what ways is corporate capital
able to dictate the relationships that form at the point of extraction? Who is impacted in this
model, and who reaps the benefits? While CSR programs offer many of the material benefits of
development, these programs do little to address, and often reproduce and reinforce relationships
of power that facilitate resource extraction, and uneven development processes tied to ongoing
capitalist expansion. CSR programs (re)produce ongoing patron-client relationships, following
years of outsider presence that continues to undermine the relationship between indigenous
citizens and a nation-state that is only partially and strategically present.
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Oil, Ecuador, and CSR
Oil was discovered in the Ecuadorian Amazon in 1967, and commercial extraction began
in 1972 with the completion of the Trans-Andean pipeline (Kimmerling 1993). At the same time
the state created the country’s first hydrocarbons law, which established the state’s legal right to
the country’s natural resources.9 The state also established a national oil company, today known
as Petroecuador (Martz 1987). About 85 percent of all extracted oil in Ecuador is exported, and
the United States receives over 50 percent of those exports (EIA 2010). In recent years, the
Ecuadorian state has relied on oil for about 50 percent of its economic revenues (Gerlach 2003;
Sawyer 2004; Valdivia 2005; EIA 2010). While a large part of the Ecuadorian population does
benefit from oil extraction, only a small proportion of oil profits remain in the Amazon region
(Perreault 2001; Fontaine 2005, 2007). Roughly 400,000 people live in Ecuador’s Amazon
region, and just over half are indigenous (Carolina Population Center 2005). There are eight
indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon - the largest are the Kichwa and Shuar peoples,
with approximately 40-60,000 people in each group (Becker 1998; Yashar 2005). The state’s
economic reliance on oil revenues, combined with the region’s low population density has
facilitated the continued extraction of oil, while ignoring infrastructural improvements and social
programs that would support indigenous populations (Kimmerling 1993; Sawyer 2004).10 This
lack of infrastructure is common to extractive industries operating in ‘frontier regions,’ like
Ecuador’s Amazon region. Extractive industries often restructure a region to facilitate additional
extraction, leading to the region’s ‘underdevelopment’ (Bunker 1985). Indeed, many indigenous
communities still lack sewage and potable water systems. Moreover, resource extraction
9

This pattern of property rights is not unique to Ecuador, but rather many states in Latin America recognize the
state as a landholder with control over natural resources. Often this leads to nationalization of extractive industries,
but in the case of Ecuador the oil industry has never been fully nationalized (Martz 1987; Coronil 1997).
10
The Amazon region is about half of Ecuador’s total landmass, while only 2.5-4% of Ecuador’s total population
lives in the region (Yashar 2005).
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programs since the 1980s, under pressure from international lending agencies, have included the
continued privatization of oil operations to increase production (Carriére 2001). These changes,
characterized by Sawyer (2004) as the neoliberalization of the oil industry’s operations, resulted
in conflicts between indigenous peoples and private multinational oil corporations.11
The environmental and social impacts of the oil industry’s operations in indigenous
territory in Ecuador have long produced national and global criticism by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and activists, and indigenous peoples themselves have participated in
these protests (Kimmerling 1993; Sawyer 2004). Of particular concern is the fact that the growth
of the oil industry in indigenous territory opened the region to colonists from other parts of
Ecuador, prompting indigenous peoples to formally claim rights to their territory as indigenous
citizens of Ecuador. In turn, an indigenous movement grew from local, community-based
organizations into regional and national indigenous federations, during the 1980s and 1990s
(Valdivia 2005). The movement organized around indigenous peoples’ political rights as citizens
of Ecuador, while also protesting the oil industry’s operations (Perreault 2003 a,b; Sawyer 2004;
Yashar 2005). Following an indigenous march from the Amazon region to Quito in 1994, the
state formally recognized indigenous territory, and indigenous peoples were granted political
representation in electoral politics in the 1990s (Sawyer 2004; Yashar 2005). Despite these
political advances for indigenous peoples, the state still maintains ownership of the sub-surface
resources beneath indigenous territory, and the rights to those resources continue to be leased to
private corporations (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996).
CSR programs emerged in Ecuador during this climate of nation-wide indigenous
marches and neoliberal shifts in the regulation of oil production as a way for oil firms to take part
11

In Ecuador, neoliberal shifts in the oil industry are associated with changes in contracts between the state and
private corporations, leasing marginal oil fields to corporations, and limiting government oversight in extraction
(Sawyer 2004).
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in, and influence resource regulation (Sawyer 2004). In Ecuador, CSR programs include, for
example, scholarships for youths, electricity and transportation. While oil companies have long
offered ‘gifts’ in exchange for extraction, CSR programs are now actively promoted by the state.
Until recently, resource extraction laws in Ecuador required that companies include CSR
programs in their operations (Fontaine 2005; Benalcázar 2006; Veintimilla 2006).12 As such,
CSR programs not only provide a positive image of oil extraction, but also serve to dampen
indigenous protests (Morales 2007). In turn, CSR programs have replaced state-led efforts as a
leading example of grassroots development in Ecuador’s Amazon region today (Kimmerling
2006). Insofar as CSR programs represent a reconfiguration of the roles of the state and private
actors in processes of local development, these programs generate new social relationships
between the Ecuadorian state, corporations, and the indigenous communities where these
projects are implemented, contributing to new forms of environmental governance.
My research is designed to address the shifting spaces of extraction in Ecuador through
the lens of CSR programs, conceptualized as institutions that link oil development with
indigenous populations and the Ecuadorian state. Through the dissertation I explore
contradictions between corporate aims to promote neoliberal tenets of ‘self-help’ through
grassroots development projects, and the everyday realities of CSR programs in the space of an
indigenous community that highlight a return to the clientelism and patronage of earlier decades
(cf. Li 2007; Rajak 2010, 2011; Zalik 2004). Indeed, my ethnography of CSR programs uncovers
uncertainty and ambivalence in indigenous populations that leads to additional corporate control,
but also highlights implicit challenges to corporate rule, and to state sovereignty. In other words,

12

With the election of Rafael Correa in 2007, the state began a process of changing laws governing resource
extraction, including eliminating CSR programs from contracts with multinationals. I explore these shifts in some
detail in Chapter 4.
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corporations facilitate global expansion of capital by linking their programs to local development
projects, and blurring the boundaries between a state and its marginalized citizens.
During a 17-month period, I studied the CSR programs of Repsol-YPF in Pompeya, an
indigenous Kichwa community of about 650 people in Ecuador’s northern Amazon region split
by the Napo River. I carried out my research in Pompeya because I had done several months of
work there from June to August 2005 for my master’s project on indigenous social movements.
Furthermore, it was a community that was easily accessible overland, rather than solely by boats
or canoes. During preliminary research in Ecuador in July 2007, I identified Repsol-YPF as a
company I might be able to study, precisely because its staff was accessible in Quito and in the
Amazon region. This also made Pompeya an ideal choice because of its location at the entrance
to Repsol-YPF’s oil block.
Repsol-YPF is a multinational corporation, composed of Repsol, a Spanish company
established in the 1980s, and YPF, an Argentine company. Repsol absorbed YPF in 1999, during
a period of rapid growth for the Spanish company (Gavaldá 2003).13 As Gavaldá (2003)
characterizes it, the majority of Repsol’s newly acquired oil concession blocks in this period
were in Latin American countries, including Block 16 in Ecuador’s Amazon region. Block 16 is
accessed via a road that runs through the community of Pompeya.
Block 16 became operational in 1973, and was initially under the control of US-based
Conoco and Maxus. In 1991, Conoco sold its interests in Block 16 to Maxus, and a year later
Maxus signed an agreement with indigenous communities within the block to construct the 160
kilometer access road. The company built schools, funded medical programs, and provided
generators and motorboat gasoline (the majority of travel in the region is by boat) in exchange
13

In May 2012, though, Argentina 'nationalized' YPF, taking back control of Repsol's holdings (Romero and Minder
2012)
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for continued oil extraction.14 Despite protests by indigenous communities, the state approved
construction of the road. In 1993, a Community Relations Agreement was signed with these
same communities, which formalized Maxus’ presence in the region. However, these agreements
were met with violent protest, and indigenous groups took over Maxus’ operations for periods of
time, slowing production (Gavaldá 2003).
In 1999, when Repsol acquired YPF, it also took formal control of Block 16. Soon
thereafter, Repsol-YPF signed an agreement with then Ecuadorian president, Jamil Mahuad, to
begin construction on a privately owned and operated pipeline (to supplement the SOTE). The
new pipeline, Oleoducto Crudo Pesado (OCP)15, was constructed between 2001 and 2002 in
conjunction with five other private companies operating in Ecuador (Gavaldá 2003). In turn,
Repsol-YPF continued its operations in Ecuador, signing a contract with the state to continue
operations in Block 16 through the year 2012 (Morales 2007).16
To begin my study of CSR programs, I had initially planned to carry out most of my
research at the local level, in the community of Pompeya. However, I quickly discovered that I
could not live in Pompeya for long periods of time (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2). I did
not feel safe, and there is no drinking water. During the initial months of my research period,
Pompeya also lacked a sewage system. I was to live alone, in a house maintained by a social and
environmental NGO, Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP), but the house was grimy
and excruciatingly lonely. I quickly realized I would not be able to sustain long visits to
Pompeya, and I had to shift my research plan. I started to conduct more interviews at the regional
14

Maxus signed accords with Waorani communities, another Amazonian indigenous group. Gavaldá does not
discuss agreements that might have also been signed with the Kichwa people in Pompeya.
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In English, this is the ‘Heavy Crude Pipeline,’ which has political significance in Ecuador. I explore this
significance in more depth in Chapter 4, but in brief, privatization policies that led to the construction of a second
pipeline challenged national identity and sovereignty (Valdivia 2008).
16
Recent shifts in production contracts abolished this contract, and Repsol-YPF signed a new contract with the state
through the year 2018 (see Chapter 4).
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and national levels to understand social relationships in CSR operations at these scales. At the
regional level I interviewed NGOs engaged in implementing CSR programs and learned that
many of their programs in local communities were funded by the company’s foundation,
Fundación Repsol. At the national level I interviewed state and company officials who signed
contracts to implement CSR programs and were tasked with overseeing projects at the local
level, even if this oversight did not occur. This expanded study of CSR programs illuminated the
institutional relations of CSR programs.

CSR programs as disciplinary institutions
My research asks about the relationship between CSR programs and indigenous
subjectivity, and the ability of corporate presence in the Amazon region to limit indigenous
resource access and control, calling into question indigenous rights and representation in
Ecuador. I conducted an ethnography of CSR programs. I conceptualize CSR programs as
institutions, rather than organizations (see Smith 1987), to investigate development and
environmental governance in Ecuador. Institutions have been defined in the environmental
governance literature as the social norms and relationships that sustain resource extraction
processes (Bakker 2007, Perreault 2006). Other studies have focused on institutions as
organizations, including conservation organizations (King 2009), indigenous organizations
(Perreault 2003a,b), and development institutions (Bebbington, et al. 2004; Goldman 2004;
Moore 2000). Still others have conceptualized the state as an institution (Mountz 2004, 2007,
2010).
It is important to understand how geographers have conducted socio-spatial analyses of
institutions. Among geographical approaches, there are perhaps two distinct spatial
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understandings of institutions. The first conceptualizes institutions as entities with clearly
defined boundaries, populations, policies, and cultures to be penetrated and interpreted by
researchers. A spatial representation of this geographical imagination would involve the
containment of an institution in a building or campus with defined boundaries and would
understand organizational charts as capturing the general structure of the institution. This first
approach generally understands researchers themselves as not part of these institutions. The
second approach understands institutions as more dispersed as networks, language, architecture,
sets of effects, policies, and daily practices (Mountz 2010) that extend into daily social bodies
and practices, well beyond the borders of the institution. This more dispersed approach has more
permeable boundaries dividing what and who lies inside and outside of the institution, and
therefore, a more inclusive and flexible understanding of membership, which may or may not
include researchers themselves (see Mountz and Billo manuscript in progress).
Scale offers a key distinguishing factor in geographical approaches to institutions (e.g.,
Brenner 2004). As Philo and Parr (2000) note, there were various forays into analyses that could
shift from larger macro-theoretical structures to empirical micro-level theories, and institutions
were deemed useful in facilitating a ‘middle way.’ Following Anthony Giddens (1984) and the
structure and agency debates of the 1980s and 1990s, institutions offered an ‘interim’ level of
social systems, or the social practices which regulate daily life.
This ‘meso-level’ approach became significant in the subdiscipline of economic
geography. Economic geographers responded to the “institutional turn” within geography with
an understanding of economic decisions as rooted in social institutions (Martin 2000).
Regulation theory served as a catalyst for this institutional approach, with the so-called “mode of
social regulation” (rules, norms, customs, for example, that regulate capitalist production) as an
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organizing concept. The institution within economic geography refers to informal norms and
customs, and more formal laws and rules or regulations. In turn, institutional arrangements
dictate economic production. Here path-dependence determines institutional arrangements, and
histories of institutional formation are crucial for understanding existing institutional
arrangements (Martin 2000).17 Philo and Parr (2000) suggest that institutional approaches
outlined within the “institutional turn” argue for a return to the notion of sociological institutions
such as kinship, religion, family and community.
These approaches triggered a focus on social aspects of capital accumulation. Regulation
theory is used to assess urban landscapes, but has also been applied recently to environmental
regulation, and the institutional configurations that overcome capitalist crises of production,
linked to continued resource extraction.18 Periodic upheavals in institutional regulation occur
because institutions are no longer effective. Certain institutions, or portions thereof are
abandoned, and new institutions are produced in their place. Thus, periods of relative stability
are usually accompanied by periods of upheaval. This process is especially relevant in the shifts
toward post-Fordist landscapes of capitalist production (Martin 2000).
For example, Erica Schoenberger (1997) focused on the cultural crisis of the firm,
examining the failure of American corporations to act in their own best interest. Her analysis
examined the firm as an institution embedded in production systems and addressed the failure of
firms to respond to changes in these systems. She examines the roles of individuals within the
firm, such as managers engaged in strategic decision-making, and historical documents to
understand emerging crises in Lockheed and the Xerox Corporation. She challenges notions of
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Institutionalism in this sense draws on sociological conceptualizations, including Granovetter (1985, 1993) to
focus on the embeddedness of institutions through social networks, given certain historical constraints. Institutions
emerge at the nexus of networks, which depend on relationships of trust.
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See for example, Bridge (2000), Bridge and McManus (2000).
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firm competition, and the “cultural crisis” of the firm as it attempts to adapt to changing external
environments.
Institutional analyses that address specific, everyday moments within and between
institutions, and their relationship to larger economic, political and cultural relationships can help
scholars understand how institutions come into being and how they complement wider
geographies (Philo and Parr 2000). Indeed, institutions have typically referred to the built
environment, or asylums, hospitals and the like, which seek to control and regulate, restrain or
treat human minds and bodies. Other approaches have focused on the geographical arrangements
within institutions. Philo and Parr (2000) argue that the geography of institutions and their
relative location to people, land uses, and resources contribute to understanding social and spatial
relationships that can challenge this disciplinary process.
As already noted, though, it is the epistemological approach that contributes to how
institutions are defined and studied.19 For Del Casino and co-authors (2000), there are three
distinct frameworks for institutional analysis: spatial science, critical realism, and poststructuralism. Each approach represents different historical moments in knowledge construction
in human geography. In spatial science, we see the belief that social relations can readily and
literally be mapped onto the landscape through a series of rules and patterns that govern and
explain human behavior. Critical realists similarly believe in the material realities and
ramifications of institutions. Post-structuralists, conversely, look beneath the surface to
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Philo and Parr (2000) question the interchangeability of organizations and institutions, noting geographers who
have focused on the organization as an institution with agency and a clearly delimited structure. Del Casino et al.
(2000) suggest that the market can be an institution and organizations are defined as business enterprises. The
authors suggest that institutions represent a “coalescing” of structural relations that emerge from innovation, or
habituation of actors that exist within “concrete organizations” (2000: 525). Alternatively, the authors explain that
other approaches have disrupted this notion of institution and organization as separate concepts. Del Casino and coauthors (2000) conclude that the debate between organization and institution is inconclusive, and the differences, if
any, between organizations and institutions remain fluid.
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understand the underlying conditions, social relations and discourses that brought such material
relations into existence (Mountz and Billo manuscript in progress).
Furthermore, so-called processes of deinstitutionalization and a Foucauldian approach
(1995, 1997) point to the entrance of mechanisms of social regulation into the realm of the social
body. Institutional processes connect people through webs of relationships, legal, medical or
social through which the landscapes of power shift outward, their power operating in more
dispersed fashion and highlighting the relationship between social and spatial relations. Drawing
on Foucault (1970) and Gibson-Graham (1996), a constructivist approach focuses on discourses,
such as economy, society and politics “that bring forth objects and events and determine their
relationship to one another” (Del Casino et al.: 526). In other words, there are no previously
existing conditions that suggest existence or conceptualization of institutions. Instead, discursive
frameworks construct them; they become objects with particular social significance (Del Casino
et al. 2000).
My dissertation develops a methodological approach (detailed in Chapter 2) that explores
CSR programs as institutions. In turn, I argue that as institutions, CSR programs also operate as a
particular technology of rule that can regulate the “relationships through which life takes place”
(Valdivia 2008: 458; Agrawal 2005; N. Rose 1999), including an examination of individual
actors and power dynamics that produce dominant discourses and practices (Bebbington 2000;
Bebbington et al.2000; King 2009; D. Smith 1987). In the case of CSR programs in Ecuador, I
examined the relationships between the state, the private multinational oil company Repsol-YPF,
and indigenous peoples in the space of the northern Amazon region. My research builds on
ethnographic approaches to understanding development processes rooted in the local level (see
Escobar 1995; Bebbington 2000; Moore 2000; Perreault 2003; Watts 2003, 2004), and argues
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that CSR programs are not autonomous bodies that “affect social relations” they are instead a set
of “daily practices” (Mountz 2010: xxiv, 2003; Herbert 2007). Holstein (2006: 293) writes that
institutions are the “coordinated and intersecting work processes and courses of action” that the
ethnographer aims to discover and describe.
Conceptualizing CSR projects in this way, rather than as monolithic practices, point to
ways in which actors engaged in CSR projects are confronted with constraints, and can begin to
challenge and change the way in which CSR projects are implemented (Rajak 2011). Indeed, it is
crucial to understand the social networks in which CSR programs are embedded in particular
places, and to locate CSR projects in a time and a place. This process enables a framework that
can challenge taken for granted narratives produced by CSR programs, or those that have
become normalized about indigenous populations, and expose inconsistencies in state and
corporate governance of oil extraction. In turn, my dissertation considers the particular spaces of
governance through which processes of resistance might emerge, and that these connections
might open the space for social change (see Ferguson 1990; Mountz 2010; Rajak 2011). My
dissertation, then, contributes to ethnographies of development by employing Smith’s (1987) use
of institutional ethnography (IE) and arguing for the formation of institutions through a series of
networks and practices. Furthermore, Smith asks where the researcher herself is in the institution.
In turn, Smith challenges the notion of the institution as something to be penetrated. She asks
who has the ability to penetrate the institution, and how is the institution bounded, and who are
the actors engaged in producing institutional discourse and practices? I also reflect on what
geography can bring to IE by arguing for a spatial analysis of institutions. Rather than flattening
the institution, a geographical approach to IE can point to the ways in which institutional
dynamics vary between the center and margins.
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Throughout the dissertation, I argue that CSR programs intervene in, and adjust
relationships of government-discipline-sovereignty, or processes of rule and interacting forms of
power explored through Foucault's (1991) concept of governmentality to understand how power
emerges within historical configurations, and in particular cultural and geographic contexts
(Agrawal 2005; Foucault 1991; Moore 2005; Rutherford 2007; Valdivia 2008). This “triad” of
government-discipline-sovereignty is constantly in motion, leading to different forms of power,
and producing different ruling relations (cf. Moore 2005: 7; Smith 1987). Sovereign power is
concerned with control over territory and the subjects that live within a territory. Discipline
refers to mechanisms of regulation that produce conformity in individuals, and shape their
awareness of their relationship to the sovereign. Government is defined by the practices,
techniques, and rationalities, or tactics that together shape behaviors, or conduct of others or
oneself, to produce a particular end goal (see Dean 1999; Valdivia 2008). These interactions of
power, sovereignty, discipline, and government, together govern the relationship between people
and things (Foucualt 1991). Things, according to Foucault (1991), refers to a complex of 'men'
(sic) imbricated with things such as wealth, resources, subsistence or territory, or men in relation
to customs, habits, irrigation, famines and death. Foucault describes this “imbrication” as the
“conduct of conduct,” or how people and things come together in the “right disposition” that
makes them “amenable to administration” (Li 2007: 9; Bridge and Perreault 2009; Foucault
1991; Moore 2005; Valdivia 2008).
In turn, Moore (2005:6) argues that governmentality can “displace” power from the state
and capital to explore how subjects participate in “projects of their own rule.” The state becomes
one of many institutions that engages in forms of power, rather than the only sovereign. This
“management of bodies in space” secures a political economy of rule (Valdivia 2008: 458).
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Indeed, following Moore (2005: 6) and others (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Li 2007; Watts
2003, 2004b), “governmentality works through the agency of subjects” - it encourages selfdiscipline that contributes to a population's wealth and security. Subjects can both sustain and
challenge forms of rule. Thus, the positioning of subjects is crucial to understand the way in
which power relations lead to subjection to government, as well as agents capable of taking
action (Agrawal 2005; Moore 2005; N. Rose 1999). As Agrawal (2005: 9) argues, attention to
the “practices of regulation” can trace connections between subjects and power, and institutions
and identity, for example. If we merely “read the politics of subject formation off the social
categories of gender, class, occupation and caste” then we risk ignoring how power works to
create the subjects who make up these categories.
Governmentality can produce new forms of rule that might expand the state's capacity,
but also allow space for a new, self-regulating process of the social. In turn, the emphasis here is
on the technologies that emerge in processes of development that lead to certain norms and
behaviors (Goldman 2004). As Li (2007: 5) argues, “government operates by educating desires
and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs.” Its goal is to “improve the economy of life by
intervening in the relationships between people, territory, and wealth” (Valdivia 2008: 458).
Practices of rule include maps, taxes, and censuses, for example (see Mitchell 2005). These
'micro-politics of power' help scholars understand ways in which rule is accomplished, or
attempted, through particular governable subjects and objects (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009;
Dean 1999; Hart 2004; Moore 2005, 1998; N. Rose 1999; Stoler 1995).
Rose (1999: 31) argued that there are certain “governable spaces” that are produced
through various processes of government, or the relation between what authorities want to
happen and existing problems and objectives. In turn, government is “territorialized” at different
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scales and through particular social practices. These processes of territorialization and
governable spaces are dependent on political economy (Rose 1999:34; Watts 2003). Drawing on
Rose (1999) and other studies (see, for example, Watts 2003, 2004b and Valdivia 2008), my
project aims to expand on considerations of petroleum as a “subterranean territory” that can
shape people's belonging to the nation-state as a particular political body, and its ties to territory,
and shape questions about who is a valuable member of such a political body. If we build on
Foucault's analysis that suggests government consists of ruling relations in multiple forms, and
power as productive force, rather than targeting things, then we might consider the ways in
which subjects, spaces, and resources are enmeshed (Moore 2005). Indeed, Moore (2005)
suggests we also have to consider how particular technologies also produce territories, and that
these territories can often overlap in the same space. For example, in the case of the space of the
northern Ecuadorian Amazon, political struggles are motivated by the desire to gain access to
petroleum rents, resulting in multiple and overlapping spaces of governance (cf. Watts 2003,
2004a,b). In turn, these overlapping spaces have different, sometimes contradictory and
contentious, practices of rule and subjection, but are all tied to the political economy of oil in
Ecuador. Thus, my dissertation draws on Moore's (2005: 7) analysis of multiple, overlapping
sovereignties that are “entangled in the single site, yet multiple spatialities” of the northern
Amazon region, a site marked by ongoing oil extraction.
This project seeks to understand the ways in which CSR programs have reshaped
development processes that center on indigenous subjectivity and identity. I argue that this focus
is especially relevant given the previous emphasis on organized, indigenous political struggle
and protest in the Amazon region by activists, academics and indigenous peoples, as a means for
indigenous peoples to insert themselves into debates over access to, and control over resources
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(Perreault 2003a; Sawyer 2004). As Li (2007:1) argues, it is the “inevitable gap between what is
attempted and what is accomplished” within processes of development that can illuminate not
only how CSR programs seek to change populations, but also the effects of CSR programs on
those populations. Understood as a macro-scale, ‘immanent’ process, development follows the
uneven expansion of capital on a global scale, producing various networks and connections
(Cowen and Shenton 1996). These networks depend on particular ‘institutional arrangements,’
such as those that regulate and govern capital expansion (Bebbington and Kothari 2006).
Development can also be understood as ‘intentional,’ where interventions might foster additional
capital growth, or ‘modify’ existing production systems at different scales (Bebbington 2002;
Cowen and Shenton 1996). Throughout the dissertation, I argue that the social relationships
produced through CSR programs result in indigenous ambivalence and uncertainty that can both
sustain and challenge ongoing CSR programs, producing multiple and overlapping spaces of
resource governance.
To explore these processes of ambivalence and uncertainty, I use Bakhtin’s (1984) notion
of the Carnival and the ‘carnivalesque’ qualities of the state and subject formation through oil
governance. Bakhtin drew on histories of the medieval carnivals, and argued that these were
moments to explore other identities, and to live without rules. In the moments of the carnival,
then, rules could be mocked, while simultaneously allowing for a process of rejuvenation. The
carnival is a “moment of sanctioned play” (Hiebert 2003: 114). It addresses the ambivalence of
subjects engaging in the carnival, or the pushing aside of institutions and rules of the state for a
moment, yet at the same time remaining self-reflexive of one’s usual participation in institutions.
The carnivalesque examines both social stability and social protest, sometimes in relation to the
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state (see also Docker 1994; Nelson 1999). In other words, the carnivalesque view can shatter
any notions of the state as stable and consensual.
The carnival is necessary precisely because of the stability produced through institutional
relationships (see Heibert 2003). The carnival world can undo the walls between classes and
cultures; there is a blending of the profane and the sacred. In turn, the carnivalesque invokes an
ambivalent quality, highlighted by its vigor and inventiveness (Docker 1994). This carnivalesque
quality weaves its way through my analysis as institutional relationships that make up the state
are challenged producing openings through which certain discourses and relationships between
the company and indigenous peoples enter, suggesting the possibility for new forms of
governance.
Repsol-YPF controls all who enter and exit the region, monitoring a territory and the
population within, including residents of Pompeya, state and NGO representatives. Indigenous
peoples are the targets of 'improvement schemes' implemented through CSR programs, and an
indigenous identity is re-articulated within this process of development. Indeed, CSR programs
depend on defining those who are in need of development, and the trustees, those who are
already developed, tasked with providing development (Cowen and Shenton 1996; Li 2007). In
the case of the Ecuadorian Amazon region, the marked, patchwork presences of the state have
pushed corporations into a state-like role. While the corporation discursively claims it does not
want to take on the role of the state, it simultaneously benefits from the state’s strategic
presences at the point of extraction. The corporation relies on state protection, sometimes in the
form of military power, “writing the rules to legitimate [its] actions” (Li 2007: 17). In this
confusion of state and corporate roles, uneven capitalist processes of expansion through oil
extraction also leave behind destruction and chaos at the local level. Following Goldman
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(2004:170), the “good of the nation and the citizen” depend on the extractive industry, and
populations must become “intelligible” to the project experts. CSR programs have the ability to
“adjudicate… the traditional and the modern, and the ecologically irrational and rational”
(Goldman 2004: 184). Oil extraction on the one hand is depoliticized, but on the other hand, the
institutionalization of new versions of environmentalism, regulation and subjectivity highlight
the ongoing politicization of resource extraction through CSR programs (Ferguson 1990;
Goldman 2004; Moore 2000; Perreault 2003b). In this dissertation, I address the daily practices
of CSR programs to explore spaces of oil governance, producing new indigenous subjectivities.
Ethnography can highlight the way in which desires are produced and whether a population has
been “redirected according to plan” (Li 2007: 282). However, this analysis can also point to the
contradictions in CSR programs and the points at which indigenous populations might be able to
redirect the spaces of rule. In the following chapters, I explore the role of the state, corporation
and indigenous populations engaged in CSR programs that are reconfiguring relationships of
governance, sovereignty, and discipline.

Outline of Chapters
In Chapter 2, “An Institutional Ethnography of CSR,” I explain my methodological
approach as institutional ethnography (IE) of CSR programs to understand the geographies of
CSR programs in the oil industry in Ecuador. In particular, I address the social relationships
between corporate, state and indigenous actors out of which CSR programs emerge. I develop
this methodology to focus on CSR programs as multiscalar processes that uncover disjunctures
between discourse and practice, and the contradictions inherent in CSR programs. In turn, I
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explore the way in which my own subjectivity is reworked through the spatial relationships of
CSR programs, and the challenges of studying CSR programs in the Ecuadorian Amazon region.
In Chapter 3, “Indigenous Subjectivity and the Space of Extraction,” I explore the
everyday politics of resistance in Pompeya, and the way in which CSR programs produce an
ambivalent response in indigenous peoples toward challenging corporate presence and the lack
of state presence at the local level. I argue that this ambivalence is linked to a long history of
outsiders in the region and cultural norms that suggest more powerful neighbors should
redistribute their wealth to the less powerful, reproduced through CSR programs. This
ambivalence disrupts the well-organized indigenous movement in the 1990s and indigeneity as a
political identity.
Chapter 4 “The Duplicitous Nature of the State” is an examination of the particular
histories of oil extraction in Ecuador, and the privatization of extraction processes that led to
CSR program implementation. In particular I explore histories of indigenous political organizing
in relation to the state. I draw on the concept la Patria to focus on oil as a particular territory of
the nation, and to question indigenous belonging in the nation-state. In response to neoliberal
policies implemented throughout the 1990s, in 2007 the state started a process of seeking
additional control over corporate operations, limiting CSR programs at the local level, and
establishing the state's right to the majority of windfall profits from extraction. I suggest that
these processes expose the multiple-sides of the petro-state, its political and economic bodies, as
well as elite and non-elite bodies, indigenous and non-indigenous bodies, reflected through
conversations with indigenous leadership in local level organizations.
In Chapter 5, “The Zone of Influence,” I examine CSR programs and the production of
the corporation's 'zone of influence' through the concept of trusteeship. I begin by exploring
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indigenous peoples as deficient subjects and targets of development projects through CSR
programs in the space of Pompeya. In the second part of the chapter, I focus on the corporation's
strategic maneuverings with the state. On the one hand, the corporation benefits from lack of
state presence, and on the other it advocates for a greater role for the state at the local level. In
doing so, the corporation ensures its continued presence, but also confirms its lack of
responsibility toward indigenous populations in terms of indigenous membership in the nationstate. I argue that this contradictory process is reflected in the company's discourse and practice
and serves as a point of intervention for indigenous populations in the governance of resources.
In the concluding chapter, I examine ambivalence and uncertainty in relation to social
mobilization. I explore narratives of resistance and alternatives to CSR programs that emerged
through an IE of CSR programs. Indeed, spaces of struggle are not always separate from sites of
domination, and these spaces emerge out of relationships between the dominant and dominated.
By examining the contradictions in CSR programs, I conclude by asking whether there are new
spaces and sites in Ecuador for indigenous peoples to generate narratives about new forms of
resource extraction and development, which might also incorporate indigenous peoples as
citizens with rights and access to resources.
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Chapter 2
An Institutional Ethnography of CSR

Introduction
In January 2009, I had been in Ecuador for a few months, and I was flying back and forth
between Coca and Quito, usually on a monthly basis. On one of these occasions, I had arrived for
my return flight to Quito, and was waiting in the small room that served as the gate area in the
Coca airport. There are only a few flights each day between Coca and Quito, and I was on the
last flight at five in the afternoon.20 I looked up to see Samuel, the Repsol-YPF community
relations officer, and Rodrigo from ENTRIX, the environmental consulting company employed
by the oil company, walk into the room.21 I had met both Samuel and Rodrigo in Quito at the
offices of Repsol-YPF. They came over to chat. Having arrived on the early morning flight from
Quito, and returning that same evening, Samuel and Rodrigo had been in Coca for a series of
meetings with indigenous groups. This pattern of targeted, quick visits into the Amazon region
characterized corporate, and many Quito based NGO visits. Meetings with indigenous
communities occurred in Coca at the request of the corporation, and indigenous representatives
had to come to the town from communities, often requiring early morning boat travel for several
hours along the Napo River. My work also took on this pattern of quick trips to the region, and I
grappled with my own privilege, as I, too, moved in and out of the Amazon region. Financially, I
was able to afford the quick flights to Coca, but it was difficult for me to show up in Pompeya
and explain that I was able to fly back and forth to Quito, let alone to the United States. I wanted

20

I had reserved this ticket several weeks in advance, hence my ability to get a seat on the normally crowded late
day flights.
21
All names in the dissertation are pseudonyms.
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to position myself differently from Quito based corporate and NGO field staff, but my actions
made this more difficult.
I always set up my base of operations in Coca at the Hotel Auca. This was a centrally
located place, where I felt safest, and where Quito oil company and NGO staff stayed. I would
often overlap with this staff and participate in their meetings organized in the hotel conference
rooms. From Coca, all travel further east into the Amazon region is by boat, along the Napo
River, or via the occasional access road, like the one that allows overland travel to Pompeya.
Repsol-YPF’s port is located in Coca, and workers are flown in from Quito on early morning
flights. They are bussed from the airport to the port and take speedboats downriver to Pompeya.
For this reason, early morning flights to Coca and evening flights back to Quito are usually fully
booked. Both private multinationals and the state company buy up blocks of tickets for their
workers.
In this chapter I outline my methodology, an ethnography of CSR programs,
conceptualized as institutions, to explore the daily practices of CSR programs, and understand
the shifting terrain of relationships between the researcher and researched. I argue that CSR
programs operate as a particular framework through which resources are extracted. In turn, my
ethnography focuses not only on those actors engaged in resisting corporate operations, but also
the ways in which certain populations become subject to corporate power (see Rajak 2010,
2011). I focus on the narratives, or stories of CSR programs that help to secure the corporation’s
presence in the Amazon region. However, rather than ignoring those discourses that seem
contradictory, my approach analyzes these conversations to examine forms of resistance and
indigenous political agency at the local level. Moreover, I am attentive to the ways in which my
analysis of CSR programs owes as much to my interpretations, as it does to those I study (cf.
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Mountz 2007). Therefore, I examine the outward discursive production of the institution in
relation to the everyday practices I observe at the community, regional and national levels. In
turn, I focus on the ways in which I also become bound up in corporate narratives, or subject to
corporate power.
The overarching objectives of my project included an examination of corporate roles in
local development initiatives and the role of indigenous peoples in the governance of oil
extraction. In turn, I designed an extensive multi-method research analysis to examine not only
the material ‘merits’ of CSR programs, but also the way in which CSR programs may also shape
local indigenous livelihoods. I aimed to answer the following questions: 1) How do indigenous
populations perceive and respond to CSR programs, and how has this response changed over
time? (2) What CSR programs does Repsol-YPF implement in indigenous communities, and how
are these selected? (3) In what ways does the state facilitate CSR programs?
I begin by discussing the way in which geographers have conducted ethnography of
institutions in particular within development ethnographies, and how I framed my own research
as an ethnography to uncover the meanings and processes of CSR programs. Next I move into a
discussion of research methods, and how my research unfolded in the community of Pompeya. In
particular, I focus on two aspects of the everyday that characterized my research experience.
First, I was confronted with the disjuncture between the field as 'out there' and my own role as a
researcher in confronting the everyday I wished to study and understand (Katz 1994; England
1994; G. Rose 1997). Second, I focus on the underlying aims of the research project, designed to
ensure indigenous peoples' access to and control over resources. I address the way in which my
own identity intersected with, and came to reflect the cultural, material, geopolitical, and
institutional aspects of CSR programs in Ecuador, and which contributed to the challenges I
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encountered in furthering the political aims of my research project (see Nagar 2002). In
attempting to uncover the daily practices of CSR programs, I recognized CSR programs were
constructed differently depending on where I was physically located, and with whom I was
speaking (see Mountz 2007, 2010). I had to reconcile the way in which my own role as a
researcher was often bound up in corporate discourse, national or regional state office discourses,
local level indigenous organization discourse, or the responses to these in an indigenous
community in the Ecuadorian Amazon region. I was bound by my own politics of wanting to
shift power relationships, where my own perceived power at the community level hindered this
process, and indigenous peoples' responses reflected a political ambivalence that underscored
their subjection to corporate power.
My research allowed me to move between corporate, state and indigenous offices at
multiple scales. While industry-produced programs and projects were identifiable at the local
level, they seemed to exacerbate social and environmental injustices in indigenous communities,
and conflicted with CSR discourse that continued to reflect the corporation's stated aims of
reducing the social and environmental harms from ongoing oil extraction. Exploring this
disconnect between discourse and practice during my field research in Ecuador provoked
feelings of failure, as my own role as an ethnographer was at times bound up within the
corporation's definition of CSR, and simultaneously challenged by my observations in Pompeya.
CSR programs were so firmly embedded in daily lives at the local level,22 it became increasingly
emotionally depressing and physically demanding, as well as logistically challenging to spend
days, let alone weeks, in Pompeya.

22

By ‘embedded in daily lives at the local level’ I am referring to indigenous peoples’ dependence on corporate
operations, and how their subjection to corporate power made it emotionally difficult for me spend long periods of
time in Pompeya. Very little changed on a daily basis there, as residents went about their day-to-day tasks of
working on fincas, and returning home in the evening.
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Getting off the plane in Coca, the capital of Orellana province, I was hit with a wall of
heat and humidity. I usually took the short, half-hour flight from Quito into the Amazon region
to avoid long, 10-12 hour bus rides on winding roads that dropped steeply from the Sierra
(highlands) to the Oriente (Amazon region). These flights were usually filled with Quito-based
oil workers, NGO staff, and researchers, like myself, those who could afford to pay the $60 oneway ticket. Of course, a flight gives one little time to adjust to the altitude in Quito, and
conversely, the heat and humidity of the Amazon region.
Coca is not a place that I ever came to enjoy. It is a frontier town that offers little more
than bars, restaurants, hotels, and oil industry services, including vast storage facilities with
pipeline segments and workers’ compounds for sub-contractors such as Halliburton. Coca’s
population includes service industry staff, local government officials, NGO employees, and
indigenous peoples who have sought employment or educational opportunities outside of their
communities. Adding to this mix, the Catholic mission's local vicariato23 is based in Coca, along
with offices for FCUNAE (Federación de Comunas Unión de Nativos de la Amazonía
Ecuatoriana), the Kichwa indigenous organization for the local region. While it was initially not
my intention to spend much time in Coca, I ultimately did spend several weeks there
interviewing NGO and local government representatives, as well as members of FCUNAE.
Moreover, indigenous organizations would sometimes hold meetings in Coca with company and
government officials, which I occasionally attended.
Back at the airport, I had only met Rodrigo (the ENTRIX representative) once before in
Samuel's office, and he asked again what my project was about. I explained that I was attempting
to conduct ethnography of CSR. He responded, “But CSR is only a discourse. How can you
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Translated as a vicariate, this is a territorial jurisdiction of the Catholic church, usually present in missionary
regions, or places where there are not sufficient numbers for a diocese.
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study it?” A brief discussion ensued, in which Samuel chimed in claiming that in fact CSR was
more than just a discourse, defending the company's CSR projects in indigenous communities.
This brief exchange with company officials reflects the maneuverings of the corporation in
promoting an 'official' CSR discourse, and the difficulty of reconciling discourse with the
material projects and programs implemented at the local level. Indeed, within the first weeks of
my work, this gap between discourse and practice was glaringly obvious to me, as neatly
described CSR projects in corporate reports had already failed at the local level due to lack of
interest in communities, changing corporate whims, or shifts in state control over corporations.
Initially, I felt that the lack of response in Pompeya was apathy toward me and my work.
Upon reflection, however, after leaving the space of Pompeya, I realized it was a powerful
ambivalence – toward challenging corporate operations and the risk of disrupting CSR programs,
combined with the historic, patchwork presences of the state in the region – and that this
ambivalence influenced indigenous populations' political agency and access to and control over
resources. As Sultana (2007) writes, rarely do researchers comment on failed collaborations, or
connections and solidarities that did not emerge during the research process. Indeed, while the
researcher might feel some burden to initiate these connections, their successes depend on
research respondents' willingness to participate. The lack of connection I experienced in
Pompeya, I argue, in part reflects both my own positionality as a white, female graduate student
based in North America, but also the cultural, geopolitical and material influences of the space of
Pompeya, a community marked by histories of oil extraction, missionary presence and other
patron-client relationships (see Chapter 3). I began to question how the knowledge I might
produce in the research process could reflect not only my interactions with community residents,
but also shape a social and political agenda to highlight indigenous peoples' rights and
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representation in Ecuador. Indeed, the iterative process of CSR programs in Pompeya led to
uncertainty and ambivalence among community members, reflected in my interactions in the
space of the community. Drawing on work by feminist geographers, and Bondi (2004: 5) in
particular, I mobilize the concept of ambivalence through the dissertation to argue that this
political response is not so much about inability to make a decision as it is about “creating spaces
in which tensions, contradictions and paradoxes can be negotiated fruitfully and dynamically.”
Furthermore, I acknowledge that this uncertainty was not only something I ‘uncovered’ within
indigenous subjects, but also a tension I encountered in my own subjectivity.
Several months into my research in Pompeya, frustrations with this perceived lack of
response and logistical challenges pushed me toward looking for CSR relationships outside the
community of Pompeya and its relationship to Repsol-YPF. While initially resistant to shifting
my proposed research plan - I was adamant that the more time I spent in Pompeya, the more I
would uncover about CSR operations, I eventually decided to pursue Repsol-YPF's relationship
with local level Waorani indigenous organizations headquartered in Puyo in the central Amazon
region. This decision was primarily based on limited connections I felt with residents of
Pompeya, and my own ability to sustain long periods of time in the community, something I
explore more fully in the rest of the chapter. Eventually, after weeks of illness, and frustration
with how my research was progressing, I shifted my focus slightly. Corporate connections to
indigenous organizations (see subsequent chapters for a full exploration of these relationships)
were more easily uncovered in the sense that corporate monies funded the indigenous
organizational programs on an annual basis. My interviews eventually included state and NGO
representatives in Coca and Tena (in the central Amazon region) who could also comment on
corporate roles in the region. Throughout the course of my fieldwork I kept up conversations
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with corporate representatives, and as much as possible, state representatives in Quito. Research
methods included participant observation and informal interviews in Pompeya, semi-structured
interviews with indigenous organizations, state representatives, and corporate officers, as well as
archival and library research on information regarding corporate contracts, histories of
indigenous peoples and resource extraction in Ecuador.24
I was building an understanding of CSR programs by studying the daily practices of
corporate, state and indigenous relationships at multiple scales, highlighting the politicization of
the corporation's attempts to depoliticize discourse and practice of CSR programs. My research
design allowed me to tack back and forth between material CSR projects at the local level and
regional and national scale discursive dynamics of resource governance. Through participant
observation in particular, I could more fully evaluate relationships of power that influenced
access to and control over resources at multiple scales, and challenges to indigenous rights and
representation in Ecuador. This ethnographic process constantly forced me to question my own
role as a researcher, to ensure I was not complicit in the corporation's aims to depoliticize
resource governance decisions. The power of the company in the space of indigenous
communities, as well as in corporate offices in Quito forced me to constantly question my own
participation in CSR programs, and the ways in which the company disciplined my own actions.
In turn, my analysis of CSR programs in this dissertation reflect attempts to remain critical of
CSR programs, challenging corporate discourse through the different spaces of governance that
emerge from the social relationships of CSR programs.

24

It is difficult to quantify my interviews at the community level because these were often informal conversations
that were not recorded. I reconstructed these interviews in my fieldnotes. I conducted about 20 interviews with state,
corporate and indigenous organization leadership. Many of these interviews included follow up conversations.
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Institutional ethnographies
I was not engaged in studying the corporation itself (cf. Schoenberger 1997) as a
development institution, but rather the specific programs that fell under the corporate rubric of
CSR, or the way in which CSR programs manifested themselves as 'ruling relations' that emerge
through social relationships to facilitate oil extraction and resource distribution (see Smith 1987,
2005, 2006). This prompted me to turn to literatures that could address understandings of the
institution as a series of networks and daily practices, as “everyday, embodied practices and
relationships,” rather than a pre-existing entity, synonymous with organization (Mountz 2007:
47). One of the challenges I found in studying CSR was my inability to “penetrate” or “get
inside” CSR programs, as other institutional ethnographies suggest (see King 2009: 411;
Bebbington et al. 2004: 34; Goldman 2004). I argue that these challenges emerge from different
conceptualizations of institutions.
I conducted an ethnography of CSR programs drawing on institutional ethnography (IE),
conceptualized by D. Smith (1987, 2005, 2006), to investigate development and resource
governance in Ecuador. Following Holstein (2006: 293), Dorothy Smith developed institutional
ethnography to understand the “everyday world,” through what she calls “ruling relations” or the
various processes of administration and governance that shape peoples’ activities in that world.
For Smith, “textually-mediated social organization” is key, and she urges institutional
ethnographers to focus on the “texts-in-use” in various settings and locations. Texts can refer to
books, or airline reservations, for example, and enable movement from the local to trans-local
(see Smith 2006). For Smith, institution refers to “coordinated and intersecting work processes
and course of action.” For example, health-care might be considered an institution, linked by the
actions and work processes of hospitals, homes, doctors’ offices, and clinics. As DeVault and
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McCoy (2002: 753) argue institutions are not studied as a whole, rather the aim is to uncover
particular strands of the “institutional complex” and note the points of connections to other
pieces. The goal of IE is to explain and identify those social processes that have “generalizing
effects.” In other words, IE is a “sociology for people not just about them” (Holstein 2006: 293).
Scholars have employed ethnography to address a variety of institutions, including
conservation organizations (King 2009), indigenous organizations (Perreault 2003a,b), and
development institutions (Bebbington, et al. 2004; Moore 2000; Goldman 2004). Other studies
have used ethnographic approaches to investigate the role of the state as institution (Gupta 1995;
Mountz 2004, 2007, 2010). Central to my investigation of CSR programs, I expand on studies
that employ ethnography to understand the internal workings of development institutions,
including examination of individual actors and power dynamics that produce dominant
discourses (Bebbington 2000; Bebbington 2004; King 2009). In particular, geographers have
used ethnography to investigate the “structures, ideas and actions of various organizations and
networks” (King 2009: 410). Within development studies, ethnography can be used to examine
organizations' engagement with theories of network and agency (King 2009; Perreault 2003a,b).
Perreault (2003a,b), for example, examines discourse production within indigenous organizations
and the way in which these discourses connect with transnational networks to at once challenge
and reproduce official understandings of citizenship and state-produced development. While my
methodological approach builds on these geographical conceptualizations of ethnographies of
institutions to uncover discourse and practice of CSR in the context of development and
environmental governance, I explore CSR programs as a set of “daily practices” (Mountz 2010:
xxiv). It is through the daily struggles of everyday life that we see the structural constraints of the
institution emerge, and the processes through which people work to challenge or subvert those
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structures. If we note, then, the points at which individuals work to subvert challenges to
institutional discourse and practice, these can also be “political breaking points” (Mountz 2010:
xxv). In turn, ethnography is not only about discourses and interviews, but also observation, and
it is through participant observation that we can document various “frustrations, subversions and
networks” that result in these breaking points, which are theorized as an “institutional
arrangement of social practices” (see Mountz 2010: xxv, Herbert 2000).
To understand these variations in the use of institution, it is helpful to return to a
historical analysis of the term institution within geographical literature. Typically, argue Philo
and Parr (2000), institution refers to hospitals, asylums and prisons – places to treat and improve
human minds and bodies. In turn, geographies of the institution emerged to study the location of
the institution in relation to towns and resources, as well as the geographies in institutions, to
understand their internal arrangement. As the movement toward deinstitutionalization challenged
the notion that certain populations had to be segregated from mainstream societies in order to be
improved, studies of institutions shifted to focus not only on one site, but also networks of
relationships and power flows (Philo and Parr 2000). With this expanded notion of institution,
studies have addressed the role of organizations, often referred to as institutions, with agency,
and clear rules, perhaps the “rules-in-use” addressed by political ecologists (see Himley 2008;
Peet and Watts 2004). Others have focused on “middle-ways” drawing on both structure and
agency (see Giddens 1979, 1981, 1984) to address institutions as social practices that become
routinized in “everyday social life” (Philo and Parr 2000: 516). Examples of this latter
conceptualization include religion and the church, for example, institutions that continue to
fascinate scholars. As Philo and Parr (2000: 517) point to, the examples of institutions outlined
above assume the institutions is a “pre-given.” They exist prior to certain relationships, and
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studies focus on the outcomes of those institutions. Thus, a third way to study institutions is to
focus on how institutions are formed, “sustained,” and “transformed” (Philo and Parr 2000: 517).
What are the geographies of these institutions themselves? How do they come into being? How
do they survive? (Philo and Parr 2000: 517). My research builds on this third conceptualization
of the institution. CSR is not necessarily a “locatable object, but a series of networks through
which governance takes place” (Mountz 2010: xxiv).
Studying the everyday can expose operations of CSR programs and projects, which
necessitates a process of ‘studying up’ (see Nadar 1972) – defined as a starting point to resist
institutional actions. IE, as explored by Dorothy Smith (1987, 2005, 2006), is one such
mechanism to begin to map out the movement from everyday life upwards toward what she calls
the relations of ruling (see also DeVault 2006). An ethnography of the institution of CSR
counters its “depoliticizing” aspects – it “demystifies its power,” and “uncovers assumptions”
(Mountz 2010: xxv, 2007). An ethnographic approach can challenge and blur the boundaries of
the institution of CSR. I draw on empirical data to analyze the social relationships between
corporate, state and indigenous actors. In turn, these relationships produce competing claims on
oil resources, and lead to overlapping questions of territory, resource access, and sovereignty in
the northern Amazon region. Relationships that form within CSR programs certainly expand
well beyond the local level, but also emerge far beyond the clearly defined projects and programs
labeled as CSR programs by the company. Assessing the way CSR permeates, and indeed
emerges out of social relationships is challenging, and as a researcher, I was never entirely sure
how my daily work would unfold. I outline these early stages of my fieldwork in Ecuador in the
remainder of the chapter. Eventually, I tried to embrace the daily unknown in my research, as I
crafted a spatial understanding of CSR.
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Following Rajak (2010, 2011), the aim of my dissertation is to focus on the production of
CSR programs through the social relationships that form in the spaces of resource extraction.
Building on other studies of CSR programs (for example, Zalik 2004; Sawyer 2004; Bebbington
2010; Himley 2008, 2010) that explore the resource curse, conflict, dispossession, and resistance,
my research contributes an ethnography of relationships that adhere within the framework of
CSR to study up networks of power, and address indigenous political agency and access to and
control over resources. In other words, CSR is much more than just a public relations campaign
that allows corporations to pursue oil and profit unhindered (Rajak 2010, 2011). Following
Mountz (2010: xxiv) I suggest CSR “does not exist outside of the people who comprise it, their
everyday work, and social embeddedness in local relationships.” As such, my analysis
challenges Rodrigo’s claims that CSR is ‘just a discourse,’ to uncover the social relationships
that allow the corporation to present CSR programs as a cohesive discourse. By theorizing CSR
programs as an “institutional arrangement of social practices” I document the various
subversions and networks that are rooted in the local level, but extend beyond the bounds of
Ecuador and an indigenous community (Mountz 2010: xxv). By rooting my analysis in everyday
processes, I can uncover why and how indigenous peoples are at times subjected to the
corporation's power, and the way in which CSR programs seem to emerge as a coherent entity. I
draw on Wolford (2010: 5) to argue that CSR programs are not “necessarily or naturally
cohesive.” Instead, they reflect the corporation's deliberate attempt to present them as such. My
dissertation therefore addresses CSR programs as a set of dynamic practices, networks and
performances that are motivated by human agency and the particular context in which they
emerge.
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CSR programs produce a framework through which resources continue to be extracted.
Thus ethnographic analysis should focus not only on those agents engaged in resisting extraction,
but also the various partnerships and processes that allow certain populations to become subject
to that power (Rajak 2010, 2011). Indeed, my analysis allows me to ask why, where, and how
CSR programs emerge, and which narratives and tales are used to secure the corporation's
presence in the region (Mountz 2007). To do so, I take a critical ethnographic approach (Hart
2004) to explore the “ethnography of the particular” (Abu-Lughod 2000: 263), one that is at once
localized and global (see Wolford 2006, 2010). Rather than ignoring or “editing out” (Wolford
2006: 339) those discourses that seem unreasonable or contradictory, my analysis brings in these
conversations to explore questions of resistance, and indigenous political agency in the space of
the northern Amazon region.
Furthermore, because my ethnography of CSR reflects the daily practices of relationships
that adhere within a framework of CSR programs, this analysis “on any given day owes as much
to the observer as to the observed” (Mountz 2007: 47). In other words, the everyday lives of the
researched also reflect the researcher's presence, both in the way in which the researcher
“mediates” the relationships she observes, and the response to the researcher's presence that
emerge through everyday lives of the researched (England 1994: 85). Moreover, as Mountz
(2007) reflects, the outward discursive production of the institution, may not match the
relationships that emerge through daily practices the researcher observes. The role of the
researcher, I argue, is to confront and locate the particular social relations that emerge through
CSR programs, which include the material implications of CSR projects at the community level,
contracts between the Ecuadorian state and multinational corporations, and between the
corporation and indigenous organizations. In addition, these relationships of CSR emerge in the
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way local indigenous identities reflect the power relations inherent in corporate discourse and
practice and strategic state presences. The researcher herself may be bound up in these
narratives, as she is located within the power of the institution, which in turn may interpret and
name her motives (Mountz 2007). “Academic and state therefore serve as both 'object' and
'subject' of ethnographic research” (Mountz 2007: 48). My work builds on Mountz’s approach to
the state in order to address CSR programs as more fluid and dynamic, and challenge the
seemingly coherent discourse of multinational corporations.
Building on five weeks of preliminary research conducted during June and July 2007, my
proposed research included two phases: 17 months of fieldwork in Ecuador, during which I
planned to spend about 60% of my time in the Kichwa community of Pompeya in Ecuador’s
northern Amazon region, and the remaining 40% split between Coca and Quito. This phase was
to be followed by four months of data analysis in Syracuse, NY. In essence, my work was to be
an ethnography of CSR programs rooted in the community of Pompeya, with occasional trips to
understand CSR at regional and national levels. Within the first week of my work, it became
clear that I could not carry out my research as I anticipated in Pompeya. Logistical challenges,
including personal safety and health, in addition to gendered relations made it difficult to live for
long periods in the community. While not abandoning my research questions completely, I had
to become flexible enough to try and engage a broader array of actors in addressing CSR. Thus,
logistical issues that often revolved around my positionality and questions of power, combined
with daily practices of CSR programs, challenged my research design and methods throughout
my fieldwork period in Ecuador. This chapter, then, speaks to the practical and logistical
challenges of exploring CSR programs as a set of daily practices, but also the meanings and
social relationships that this analysis makes possible.
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Accessing the everyday
After conducting preliminary fieldwork in Ecuador in 2007, I decided that it would be
more beneficial for the goals I had established regarding my research - a focus on competing
sovereignties tied to indigenous peoples' access and control over resources, to go directly to the
Amazon region upon my arrival in Ecuador. I knew there were various CSR projects in place at
the community level that provided the material aspects of development, including a drinking
water system, transportation, and sewing cooperatives, and thought these would be good starting
points for my ethnography of CSR programs. Over the course of my fieldwork in Ecuador, my
research plans changed considerably. I had selected the community of Pompeya as a place to
carry out my research because Repsol-YPF had CSR programs in Pompeya. Repsol-YPF was the
one multinational company with rights to an oil block in Ecuador that also agreed to talk to me
about its CSR programs during preliminary research, and seemed open to having me study its
programs upon my return to Ecuador. Pompeya serves as the entrance to the oil block where
Repsol-YPF carries out its extraction operations in Block 16. The community has the advantage
of being accessible over land (in addition to via the Napo River), and Fondo Ecuatoriano
Populorum Progressio (FEPP)25 the organization that would help me with my research logistics
in the Amazon region, maintained a house in Pompeya. While I had stayed at this house during
preliminary research, and it was rather basic, I still thought I could handle living there for an
extended period of time. I had decided, prior to my arrival in Ecuador, that I did not need an
apartment in Quito, and would instead come back to a friend’s house in the city when necessary.
However, within a week of my time in Ecuador’s northern Amazon region, it became obvious
that my logistical plans were not going to work. I was unhappy, felt unsafe, and at risk for

25

In English, the Ecuadorian Fund for People’s Progress
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parasite borne illnesses because of the lack of drinking water.26 The overwhelming loneliness I
felt upon my arrival in Pompeya was something I had not necessarily considered when writing
my proposal. In some ways fieldwork is always lonely, but living in a small, rural community in
the Amazon region magnified those feelings. I did not know anyone, or have anyone to talk to
initially. Pompeya does have cell phone reception, and I would often have long conversations
with a colleague also conducting her field research in Ecuador during this same period. We
spoke almost every night in these first few weeks in Pompeya. These conversations were
important as I reconsidered my research plan (Billo and Hiemstra 2012).
Pompeya has a clearly defined center, where I was staying, and other houses scattered
several kilometers along oil well access roads. The community center was marked by communal
houses and a medical center on the edge of a soccer field, along with individual family houses,
primarily those families who could afford to move off of their farm plots, usually employees of
the state or the company. The current geography of the community was established by
missionary presence through the 1950s and 1960s, to facilitate access to the community. Later, in
the 1980s and 1990s, corporations used these community centers as focal points for projects like
electricity provision and other services, including the medical facilities and drinking water
system. Outlying areas in Pompeya do not have electricity, or access to drinking water. On a
daily basis, residents living in the community center travel to their garden plots, or chacras, in
the surrounding landscape. A company-run bus shows up in the community center every
morning to take family members to their farms during the day. Women pile onto the bus with
buckets of chicha, a thick drink made most commonly from fermented yuca and water. This
drink is a staple of the lowland Kichwa diet, and if fermented long enough, becomes alcoholic.
Sometimes young children would be strapped to women's backs, while men would carry
26

The potable water system had worked only briefly, and was broken during the entire period of my field research.
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machetes, ready for a day's work. As people went about their daily tasks, during the day, the
center of Pompeya was mostly empty.
With help from FEPP, I was introduced to a few people in Pompeya, but I discovered
most residents were busy during the day working on their chacras outside of the community
center. In turn, I needed a community member's help getting from the center of the community to
the chacras – someone who could also introduce my project goals to community members. From
a logistical standpoint, I also needed help translating my questions from Spanish to Kichwa.
While most Pompeyans are bilingual, older residents still primarily speak Kichwa. Moreover, I
did not feel particularly safe walking around on my own. I needed to find someone reliable I
could work with as my guide and assistant. Eventually, as I pondered my next steps, a
community member, David, approached me.27 As part of the company's cacao production project
(See Chapter 5), he was used to working with outsiders, and assumed I was another in a long line
of researchers employed by the company.28 With David, I started a series of house-to-house
interviews. These early conversations with Pompeyans were challenging. It was soon clear that
most in Pompeya were aware that indeed there were corporate programs in the community, but
they could not, or did not want to assess them one way or another. Indeed, my questions about
CSR operations prompted concern in the community, I soon learned, because many assumed I
was working for the company and were wary of criticizing corporate operations.29
My research proposal included plans to hold focus groups and workshops with
Pompeyans, complete house-to-house surveys, and do in-depth interviews. Eventually, I realized
that some of these methods would have to be discarded, precisely because of the legacy of
27

David was one of several informal research assistants I employed while in Pompeya. I paid my assistants for their
time accompanying me through the community. All recorded interviews through the dissertation were transcribed by
an Ecuadorian living in Quito, and translated by me from Spanish to English.
28
This misconception about my role in the community continued through my research period.
29
The company also conducted house-to-house interviews when implementing CSR programs.
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corporate research methods and their impacts on community daily lives. Moreover, because it
was so hard to even schedule interviews, I did not want to make people overly wary by pulling
out my recorder, and instead took notes by hand in my research journal. I reconstructed these
interviews each evening. As I better understood community dynamics and needs, I also decided
that neither surveys nor workshops were realistic. Instead, participant observation became a key
research method, as I learned the most from taking part in daily activities, including work mingas
to harvest different agricultural products, and attendance at community meetings, religious
services, and on one occasion, a traditional wedding (Hyndman 2001; Herbert 2000).30
The challenges I faced in conducting research in part reflected Pompeya as a community
that is over-studied by multinational companies, as well as the state company. Residents were
tired of constant questioning and house-to-house visits that recalled similar processes the
company used to gather data on community culture and livelihoods. Most importantly, though,
community members wanted to know how they would benefit from my research (see Sundberg
2003). Rather than providing material benefits to research respondents, I could only tell potential
participants that I was trying to piece together the story of CSR, and at the very least had the
ability to travel more often to Quito and Coca and talk to people they might not necessarily be
able to access.
Sultana (2007) recounts how, during her research experience in Bangladesh, many
potential research participants walked away as she tried to engage them in conversation, refusing
to participate in yet another study. She found these responses happened more often in those
villages that had been over-studied by development NGOs, reflecting an “international donor and
NGO-driven development” history of Bangladesh (2007: 381). In Pompeya, the long history of
30

Participation in these activities occurred after several months in Pompeya, and after I slowly started to get to know
other residents who invited me to different events.
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patriarchal relationships between indigenous peoples and the church, and between the
community and oil companies, as well as patron-client relationships during the rubber industry,
marks a more telling ambivalence toward powerful actors. In the context of this history, I was
just another in a long line of outsiders invading the space of Pompeya. This ambivalence also
marked cultural responses to the presence of an outsider (whether perceived as anything from an
oil company to myself, as a white, foreign woman) and expectations that a 'new neighbor' should
distribute wealth and resources. My positionality as a white, female graduate student from North
America continued to challenge the success of my research at the local level, and informed my
understanding of the power relationships of CSR programs in the space of an indigenous
community. I reflect on my positionality and identity, including the logistics of my gender, in the
next section.

Positionality, identity, and the everyday
While in Ecuador, I found I embodied the tension between being the 'object under study'
as well as the 'rigorous social scientist' during the period of my fieldwork (Mountz 2007; Herbert
2000). I was often reminded in my work in the Amazon region that I was a foreign woman
working alone. This made me the target of unwanted attention by bored oil workers in Pompeya,
and an object of interest for community members. While I came to develop a ‘thick skin’ when
dealing with these situations, I still found myself getting increasingly frustrated. Most
community members were fascinated with my physical difference - the color of my skin, for
example, and then of course the inevitable curiosity about why I was a lone woman conducting
research in a place far from home. I did not sufficiently consider, prior to beginning my work in
Ecuador, the ways in which my own identity and positionality would be reflected back to me

57

through the daily realities I encountered not only in Pompeya, but also in regional and national
settings. In Pompeya, I often felt my difference was a liability – I stood out, and was the subject
of much questioning. As Sundberg (2003) notes, often researchers become more aware of their
whiteness, both in the sense of a source of privilege, but also as an impediment. Over time, as
people began to recognize me, the questions stopped, and I also learned to avoid situations where
I knew the interview would not be helpful. On the other hand, I was aware that my perceived
position of privilege reverberated through the community when I was mistaken as an employee
of the company, or someone who could offer financial resources to community members.
Moreover, I felt that from a practical standpoint my gender did not lend itself to making
my research progress (see Billo and Hiemstra 2012; Sundberg 2003). To some extent, I designed
my research project knowing that it would be challenging to work in Pompeya as a woman. I
thought I was up to the day-to-day challenges of life in indigenous communities, and in fact this
was part of the reason I wanted to do this work. Even among the NGOs that work in Pompeya
and the Amazon region, very few of the field staff are women. I had conducted my master’s
research there, and was aware of how difficult it was to live in rural Amazonian communities,
merely from a health standpoint. Somewhat constant stomach illnesses were a problem for me in
Pompeya, especially in the early days. Whenever I arrived at a house for an interview I was
offered a bowl of chicha. Without knowing where the water came from, and unable to refuse the
drink out of politeness and cultural custom, I gambled with how my body would react. If I was
lucky, the chicha was made using untreated rainwater, and if not, river water. While I developed
some resistance, I never knew how or when I might become ill.
Throughout my fieldwork period, I emailed my advisor, Tom Perreault, and other
committee members. These were long emails relaying everything from new information I had
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gathered, people I had spoken to, and my doubts and concerns about my work. I sent Tom an
email after I returned from my first trip to Pompeya. I explained my living situation in the
community, but that it seemed like it might be possible for me to live with nuns in the Catholic
mission. FEPP is a Catholic church-based organization and works closely with the mission in
Pompeya. With running water, showers, a safe and secure house, and other people to talk to, the
mission was an ideal situation. In early December 2008, I returned to Pompeya to live with the
nuns.
The Napo River divides Pompeya, and the nuns are on the northern side of the river. The
center of the community is on the southern side. This meant I had to cross the river in company
boats most days to do my work. The last crossing every afternoon was at 4:30pm, just as
everyone was getting back from work. In making sure I was safer and healthier, I also sacrificed
opportunities to do more interviews. Moreover, as I became part of the nuns' community, I
wanted to try and participate as much as possible, to avoid becoming a burden. As a result, on
one occasion, I had to give up the opportunity to attend a community meeting to help the nuns
get to the doctor in Limoncocha, a town about 20 minutes away. It was hard not to feel pulled in
different directions as my own subjectivity was reworked within the social relations of the
everyday of the field.
Also, as I needed to cross the river more regularly, I had additional contact with oil
workers and company guards. The guards checked everyone who entered and exited the oil
block. Initially I was asked to show my ID, but over time was recognized and received fewer
questions. But, I stood out. No matter where I went, I was an object of questions from guards
who spent all day in the heat with no one to talk to, except during scheduled crossings of trucks
and workers, about four times a day. I learned to make sure I did not arrive too early to catch a
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boat across the river, because then I was forced to engage in conversation with workers. I also
was increasingly frustrated with merely having to repeatedly describe my work and what I was
doing in Pompeya, and would answer just yes or no to their persistent questions, and try and
pretend I did not really speak Spanish.31 Indeed, these experiences also speak to the daily
realities of corporate presence in the Ecuadorian Amazon region. The control over and
monitoring of the company regarding my actions was reflected in my frustrations, and I had to
learn how to navigate company presence and power.
The focus on my gendered and raced identity by community members and oil staff alike
altered my own perception of my positionality, and was not limited to my work at the local level.
I was increasingly aware of my whiteness and positioning as a female student from the United
States in any conversation I conducted in government or corporate offices in Quito. A researcher
herself is often positioned by her age, gender, race/ethnicity, and biography, for example, all of
which contribute to the researcher's insights or inhibitions in the field (England 1994). Sultana
(2007), for example, comments on the ‘reverse power relations’ she encountered in meetings
with policy officials. In other words, she was subjected to the power of policy officials over her
access. Her position as a researcher, like mine, was 'othered' by those who were studying and
observing my role in the field.
Many of the interactions I had in Quito reflected research respondents' paternalistic and
sometimes condescending attitude toward me and my work. Almost all of the government
executives I interacted with were male, and one of the two corporate officers I came to know in
Quito was also male. Meetings with Samuel, the community relations officer for Repsol-YPF,
reflected his power over me, often reducing the time of our meetings, and refusing to answer my
31

Ironically, my own feelings about the constant questions mirror indigenous peoples' responses to my own
curiosities about their daily lives.
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questions directly, if at all. The latter I perceived to be a discursive maneuver to present CSR
programs in a consistently positive light. Samuel would sometimes keep me in his office at the
end of the day as he chatted on the phone and finished up his day's tasks. Then he would offer to
drive me home as we talked about my life in the United States and my career plans following
graduate school. During this period, Samuel was finishing a law degree, and took an extended
leave of absence from his job at Repsol-YPF to finish his thesis. In contrast, I was only able to
set up one meeting with Margo, the director of the Fundación Repsol in Quito. She refused to
answer repeated requests for a second meeting, even after I left a series of messages with her
assistant. My inability to schedule a second meeting with Margo also marked the reverse power
relations in our relationship, as Margo was able to determine my access to her and the
Fundación. Despite the seeming ‘openness’ of Samuel to meet with me, he was still able to
ensure he crafted his own discourse of CSR programs. Meanwhile, my experience with Margo
reflects a more overt power relationship, refusing to even set aside time for follow-up meetings.
Moreover, in one interaction in the regional government office of SENPLADES
(Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarollo) in Tena, in the central Amazon region, I had
what was perhaps one of my most frustrating conversations. The interview was conducted in
English, because the respondent, Eduardo, had studied in the US and wanted to practice his
English. As the following excerpt illustrates, Eduardo was not interested in listening to me, and
answering the specific questions I had outlined for the interview. I introduced my project goals in
some detail at the outset of the interview, including my work in Pompeya, and interviews I was
conducting in Coca and Quito, but Eduardo wanted to start from his own beginning, to tell his
own story, and ensure that I fully understood his agenda. The interview became a sort of political
opportunity for him, and a chance to demonstrate the state's control over indigenous populations
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and outsiders. The narrative Eduardo crafted left little space for other views, and established the
state’s power over its resources and territory. However, his narrative also speaks to the ways in
which institutional analysis can also uncover the daily practices of social relationships, which
often contradict these ‘coherent’ discourses. I wondered, too, if this interview would have
happened differently if I were an older, “more established male academic” (England 1994: 85).

Eduardo:

I would like to show you this oil block – here, for example – for example,
here is Coca. You know, Coca? Have you been there?

Emily:

I have, yes.

Eduardo:

Here is Coca, and all these black areas is where the oil companies are
working, for example. So there, we say that the reservoirs of oil, especially
in the Yasuní National Park – I don’t have a map of the blocks that
belongs to the oil companies, for example, but this part belongs to the
Kichwa and this part belongs to Andes Petroleum (a Chinese company).

Later in the interview, Eduardo asked if I had been to Pompeya, again surprising to me after I
had already explained where I was conducting my research. He was expounding on why it was
important to the state to build a series of local universities:

Eduardo:

I say here because we have a lot of rivers – a university, here, in Tena,
because there are not a lot of universities – quality universities. That’s
why our people have to go to Quito. Next to Coca – maybe you visited, I
don’t know – Pompeya.

Emily:

That’s where I do my research, yeah.

Eduardo:

Yeah, Pompeya – about one hour down the river from Pompeya, we think
we have to build international puerto for – what is the word in English?

Emily:

It’s like a port for boats.

Eduardo:

– for boats – big boats – because the proposal of our government is to be
here, for example.
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I felt at certain points that my questions were lost in translation, but at other moments it seemed
obvious that Eduardo was exercising his power over me, directing the conversation toward his
own agenda, refusing to grant me the opportunity to ask questions. My concerns stemmed from
my own observations in Pompeya and Coca, which seemed to contradict the neat and tidy plans
presented by Eduardo. Without being able to express my own opinions, though, highlighted the
differences between Eduardo’s narrative of the state and the everyday realties I encountered in
the Amazon region. Uncovering the relationships between companies and indigenous peoples,
also serves to tell a story of the state – one that is quickly subverted by bureaucrats like Eduardo
(see Chapter 5). Furthermore, the very subject of this conversation was to let me know precisely
what the government thought of foreign researchers, like myself:

Emily:

What about in the indigenous communities – in Pompeya, for example, or
the Waorani territory – will you go into the communities and work there,
or you’re mainly just working in Coca, Loreto?

Eduardo:

Also, another project that we think is very important is scientific research
center because it is not – is not just – you don’t feel offended?

Emily:

No, I don’t feel offended.32

Eduardo:

Because we have – is very sad to know that many researchers, especially
from other countries, come to Ecuador – especially to the Amazon region
– we don’t know what they are doing – what kind of research. There are
many, many researchers that – they come here, they go to the
communities, try to do a lot of – they have a lot of information and we
don’t know. I think when I was in the U.S., I do a lot of research – thesis,
dissertation, everything – is there. But we here, in Ecuador, we don’t
know – we don’t know those researchers.

32

Eduardo asked me if I was offended before actually beginning his commentary on the role of researchers. I
responded thinking he was referring to the entire interview, and something in my body language had prompted this
question.
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So we think that if we want to change our development, based in our
reality in what we really want, we have to know what we have – for
example, what kind of animal, what kind of vegetation – everything that
we have. Because it’s good that the researchers from outside come here,
but we must know what they are doing. Also, we worry about – there are
many NGOs – for example, international corporations – they come here
and they try to do a lot of proposals. But they have their own proposals
with their own objectives. They are not based in Ecuadorian objectives.
The state's desire to control and facilitate all research and development projects by foreign
researchers and organizations was disconcerting. While I hoped my research would be useful to
those I interviewed in Ecuador, I certainly did not want my research agenda manipulated by the
state. This interview speaks to the way in which institutional boundaries are blurred, as the
everyday extends beyond the immediate space of the community, as I too, became subject to the
state’s power. Indeed, I hoped my work might be most useful to indigenous communities, some
of the most marginalized populations in Ecuador, and those the state actively sought to control
through policy regulations, including CSR programs (Andolina et al. 2009).33 This interview
points to the challenges that confront researchers when studying institutions (Mountz 2007,
2010). I was wary that my research objectives and aims would be interpreted by the state and
corporation alike, and indeed bound up with these institutions' agendas. This concern was
magnified when at times I felt I had more in 'common' with those I interviewed in government
offices, because of our relative positions of privilege and access to education. I remained
conflicted by these feelings and wanting to connect with community members in Pompeya, the
everyday, material and social realities of conducting research in a place that was marked by years
of outsider presence. These everyday realities were reworked through my own subjectivity and

33

At the end of my fieldwork period, I left a brief summary of my research with key participants in the community
and in regional and national offices. I hope to publish parts of my dissertation in Spanish language journals to make
my findings accessible to those living and working in Ecuador. Eventually, I plan to return to Pompeya to conduct
follow up research in the community.
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positioning in the space of the Ecuadorian Amazon region, which ultimately determined my
access to interviewees. In the next section, I turn to ways in which my identity was rewritten
through the material and geopolitical aspects of the everyday I encountered in Ecuador.

Participant observation and power
Ethnography is more than the conduct of interviews. It involves close observations of a
group's daily activities. “Any group of persons...becomes meaningful, reasonable and normal
once you get close to it...” (Goffman 1961: ix-x quoted in Herbert 2000: 551-2). I use the
following anecdote from my fieldwork experiences to demonstrate the difficulties of
ethnography, as the ethnographer “shuttles between insider and outsider roles” (Herbert 2000:
552). Herbert (2000) suggests that the ethnographer must have a sufficient amount of empathy to
understand how the “social world...is made meaningful by its members” (p. 552). Indeed, this
understanding is impossible if the researcher enters the field with rigid categories (Herbert 2000).

Fieldnotes, April 22, 2009, Coca
This morning I learned that Don Ricardo died last night. I was really sad to hear that. I was
upset because he had been such a great support. He had just written me an email, too. I didn’t
write back because I thought I would see him first. He said he found a Kichwa grammar book for
me and I could borrow a copy of the history of the community he’d written. I don’t know if there
will be a service this weekend, but I hope there’s something. I don’t know what will become of all
his books either. I hope there’s something I can do for his family or to help keep his work alive.
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I was surprised by the sadness I felt with Don Ricardo's unexpected passing. He had been a huge
help in getting me access to former community presidents, and showing interest in my work. I
was in Coca when I received word of Don Ricardo's death. I had started to feel a close
connection with him, and he was one resident of Pompeya I felt understood my project goals and
intentions. In many ways, my relationship with Don Ricardo suggested there might be a turning
point for me in Pompeya - a way to become more engaged in the community. We had met on one
of my first days in Pompeya. Don Ricardo had come to the community center looking for a
computer, and hoped that he could use the one at FEPP's house. Don Ricardo was a prolific
writer, and advocate for his community. Having heard so much about his writing, I decided to
pay a visit to his house, about a kilometer outside the center of Pompeya. (His daughters were
involved in the women's cooperative organized by FEPP, and through these connections I
contacted Don Ricardo.)
Don Ricardo's house did not have access to electricity, and it also lacked the walls of
some of the more 'modern' houses. I was surprised by the number of books Don Ricardo had; I
rarely saw books in the other houses I visited in Pompeya. Don Ricardo had a long-standing
connection with the Catholic Church, and benefited from schooling provided by the local
mission. He and his wife made sure that their children all attended and graduated from high
school. Only one daughter still needed to finish her last two years of school. His oldest son is an
architect in Puyo. At the time of his passing, he was working on a history of the community of
Pompeya, and took advantage of the computers in the distance learning high school provided by
Repsol-YPF to begin to type up his documents. He had also recently completed an
autobiography, which was eventually published posthumously by the Capuchine Mission's
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publishing house, CICAME.34 We had made plans to do a language exchange. I would teach him
some English, and in exchange he would teach me a little Kichwa.35 His sudden passing
prevented those plans from occurring.
With a colleague at FEPP, I attended Don Ricardo's wake in Pompeya. We gathered at
the house of his youngest daughter. The casket was placed under a covered porch area as
members of the community sat and paid their respects. One community member was drunk,
voicing his memories of Don Ricardo, and in some ways providing a bit of comic relief for a
somber occasion. While I had been present in Pompeya for some months at that point, and was
generally recognized by community members, I still felt out of place. I could not really shake the
idea of my role as a researcher, observing, witnessing a community event, rather than paying my
respects to the family. Was I just an outsider gawking at a 'cultural event'?
As I questioned my own role at the wake, I began to wonder if I was just like the
community relations staff at Repsol-YPF – as community members often interpreted my role.
Indeed, a community relations field officer hovered at the wake for Don Ricardo. He greeted
Pompeyans by name, and was also on his cell phone, trying to facilitate the religious service for
Don Ricardo. At this point, the service was an hour behind schedule and the Repsol-YPF officer
was growing impatient. He wondered if anyone had a phone number for the mission. Because I
had lived with the nuns, their number was programmed into my cell phone. I passed it over, and
the corporate officer got in touch with the priest and nuns to start the service. This 'collusion'
with the corporate officer seemed to confirm my role as an outsider, and observer, rather than a
friend paying her respects. I stayed only a little while longer, as the service began in Kichwa.
34

Despite my overwhelmingly positive experience with Don Ricardo, I also heard stories about how he would easily
lapse into machismo, especially criticizing the nuns as women.
35
I taught more formal English classes at the local distance learning high school that was once under the mission's
auspices. Now the school is funded solely by the state. These classes challenged my creativity and resourcefulness,
as the students were painfully shy, and lacked self-confidence in the classroom.
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The emotions I felt, prompted by participation in this service for Don Ricardo, forced me
to rethink my role as a researcher conducting research within marginalized communities. As
England (1994: 86) writes, there “needs to be recognition that the research relationship is
inherently hierarchical...” Reflexivity, she argues, cannot do away with these power imbalances,
but it can make us more aware, as researchers, of the risks of exploitative or asymmetrical
relationships, and indeed the reverse power relations I acknowledged earlier. Thus, to approach
research, then, does not mean abandoning the project altogether, but to acknowledge the
partiality of the researcher's perspective. As D. Smith (1987) acknowledges, the researcher
herself interacts with the subjects she wishes to study, and forms part of the relationships she
wishes to understand. As my work at the local level continued to be challenged by logistical
difficulties, I remained conflicted by my stated research aims, addressing and undoing power
relations that subjected indigenous populations to corporate control, and my own access to
Pompeya. These difficulties emerged in a practical way in March 2009, when the nuns asked me
to leave their house.

Fieldnotes: March 17
The nuns kicked me out yesterday, saying they didn’t have space for me anymore. I think, though,
it's not me specifically they're annoyed at, but just internal issues amongst themselves, and
orders from the Vicariato in Coca. I'm just one person they can get rid of, which might make
their lives a little easier. However, the bad news is, they don't want me to come back again in the
future. They said they never expected I would spend the whole year there, which I don't think is
true. I'm hoping they might relent, but I think I need to find other options. I asked around in the
community if anyone knew of a place to stay, and there is one house where people have rented
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rooms, but it's under construction. I could possibly live with a family, but most families are so
big, it could be hard to have an extra person living there. I also am not entirely sure I'm ready
for that kind of living. I'm feeling really tired of moving every couple weeks or so. Also living in
the community means my stomach will probably be really unhappy most of the time. Every time I
drink chicha it's never pleasant, and I really don't want to drink more beer.

Despite pursuing options to live with families, I had exhausted all my possibilities for
places to stay. In fact, I did go back to Pompeya once more after leaving the nuns, and stayed in
a rented room without a lock on the door. I immediately got sick with a stomach illness, and felt
extremely unsafe. I left Pompeya after four days. While the comfort of the nuns’ house made it
possible for me to keep working and hope any illness passed quickly, living in one room, unable
to get up and work, was utterly depressing. During this brief stay in Pompeya, I also explored the
possibility of living in a research station in Limoncocha. I initially thought this could be a real
possibility, allowing me to live with other researchers in a seemingly secure location. However,
on a visit to the station to explore this option, I was subjected to physical harassment from local
government employees, leaving me shaken and scared. Indeed, as Mountz (2007) notes, it is
easier for me to write about these experiences without mentioning the emotional challenges they
presented. As my research moved forward, the more I dreaded spending time in Pompeya.
After these experiences in Pompeya, through conversations with committee members and
friends, I began to outline another plan for my work. I started trying to pursue other CSR
relationships in Quito and in Puyo in the southern Amazon region. Repsol-YPF gives money to
indigenous organizations, and one of these is located in Puyo. While I continued to pursue these
new directions, I remained increasingly uncertain of their relationship to my overall research
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goals. Not wishing to abandon my research in Pompeya, I set up a more limited schedule for my
work in the community. Ultimately, I was able to work out an arrangement with the nuns and
vicariato in Coca. We established a more formal plan for my time at their house, reduced to one
week of every month, and I paid the nuns a set amount for each day I stayed with them.

Fieldnotes July 25, 2009
I finally arrived in Pompeya. I’m tired of that bus ride, although the trip is tons quicker
now [because the state paved the road] from Sacha to Pompeya. I ended up spending the
afternoon with the Hermana (Hna.) Paula and it also started to rain hard. A tree had fallen on
the electric line so the [state] company came out and shut off the electricity.36 We were without
power and still are. The worst will be if we run out of water. [The nuns use an electric pump to
get water from a well that collects rainwater to a tank on the roof. The tanks feeds the kitchen
and bathrooms.] Their generator is not working either. I think the Hna. Paula is just lonely – no
one else is here.
After breakfast yesterday I finally went to cross to the other side. I definitely took my time
and it was also raining. I crossed in a Petroamazonas boat because I missed the earlier Repsol
boats. There was going to be a wedding that afternoon. The novio’s family had all arrived from
another community. I took my cell phone to charge, but it turns out the whole side of Pompeya
hadn’t had electricity for 15 days or so. The municipio had been there, but hadn’t fixed it.37
Those with generators used them. The whole wedding was with a generator.

36

Electricity only arrived at the nuns about half way through my field research period, and was provided by the state
at about the same time they started paving the road to the community. Prior to that period, the nuns used a generator
in the evening.
37
Near the end of my fieldwork period, the company had turned over electricity provision to the local municipal
government, in an attempt to reduce indigenous dependence on its operations.
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Conclusions
Borrowing this sentence from Mountz (2007: 47), she writes: “Some readers might think
this chapter is only about me, not [CSR programs]. But I would disagree.” I explore my own
relationship to CSR programs, and the challenges of studying CSR discourse and practice in
order to recount the various twists and turns of CSR programs and the micro-geographies of
institutional networks that emerge in various localities in Ecuador. I also became entangled in
corporate social responsibility and the various networks and daily practices that this
methodology uncovered. My analysis of CSR programs is contrasted with the taken for granted,
dominant frameworks of CSR produced by the corporation itself, and often reflected in popular
literature. In other words, CSR programs produce a particular framework through which
resources continue to be extracted, and my ethnographic analysis focuses not only on those
agents engaged in resisting extraction, but also the various partnerships and processes that allow
certain populations to become subject to that power. Thus it is necessary to acknowledge the
ways in which both observer and observed interact and produce CSR as a set of dynamic and
contextual performances. CSR programs are as much an “idea” as they are “material realities”
and CSR emerges from those ideas that are performed in one particular moment, in certain places
and contexts. Institutions, then, as this chapter illuminates are inherently contradictory, and
ethnography can draw attention to the performance of human nature. My project attempts to
“name” and “interpret” the power of institutions and the people within them, understanding that
narratives about CSR are often far removed from the realities of its daily practices (Mountz
2007: 48). Again, returning to my conversation with Rodrigo and Samuel in the Coca airport,
CSR is much more than a discourse as made evident by corporate presence at community
funerals, providing transportation, and until recently electricity, for example.
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While my research in Pompeya was shorter than planned, in the end I felt like I was
beginning to exhaust possibilities there. I had additional research contacts in Pompeya, but my
work was not advancing any more quickly with more time spent there. I worked with one more
research assistant (the first having abandoned me because he lost interest), and eventually
became close to a second family in Pompeya, who also helped me logistically with interviews,
and took me to community events (see Chapter 3). Moreover, I was beginning to drag my feet
once I arrived in Pompeya (see also Mountz 2007, 2010). I would leave the nuns’ house later and
later in the day to catch a boat across the river. I had interviewed all the former community
presidents, and without a daily plan, given the difficulty communicating and relative unreliability
in trying to plan ahead, it was hard to say how each day would unfold.
In many ways, the process through which my relationship ultimately unfolded with the
nuns and the mission allowed me to expand my research project. It forced me to look elsewhere
for CSR relationships, including pushing harder for interviews in government offices in Quito,
such as the Ministry of Non-renewable Resources and the Ministry of Environment. I also began
to seek out other non-profits engaged with Repsol’s foundation, and continued my work in Puyo
to try and relate CSR to collective action and an indigenous movement. I spent more time in
Coca, conducting semi-structured interviews with actors more closely tied to a movement
opposing corporate influence, as well as regional government representatives. While I wasn’t
always sure which direction these new contacts would take, I slowly began to accept that the
daily unknown was part of my research. Through conversations over email, and visits from
committee members, I realized that an institutional ethnography could still be a very crucial part
of my work. I was connecting seemingly unrelated actors and their stories to understand the daily
practices of CSR and the social relationships that sustained it not only discursively, but enabled
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its material, cultural and political impacts to emerge. My analysis points to the importance of
institutional ethnography that moves beyond the margins and boundaries of the institution itself,
and uncovers the daily practices of CSR programs, or the social relationships that facilitate
resource extraction and distribution (cf. Mountz 2007, 2010). Following Nagar (2002: 183),
given the way my research unfolded, I could instead ask, “What kinds of struggles did my
analysis make possible [for residents in Pompeya]?” Thus, my identity was grounded in a
“deeper political reflexivity” that forced me to rethink my theoretical commitments and
frameworks, and the language I used in writing up my research experiences (Nagar 2002: 183).
I continued to work in Pompeya, but realized it would not be the sole focus of my
research. Indeed, my experiences in Pompeya and observation of company projects and
programs confirmed that the gap between discourse and practice within CSR programs exposes
their crucial flaws, and the myriad opportunities and challenges in confronting corporate
operations. While dominant discourses of CSR programs define them as a series of development
projects, my analysis suggests CSR programs are part of a much larger complex of oil
governance in the Ecuador, relying on particular social, cultural, and political relationships that
facilitate access to and control over resources, exacerbating social and environmental injustices
in indigenous communities. I explore these histories of the Ecuadorian Amazon region in the
next section, and the political ambivalence that marks indigenous subjects, that can both sustain
and challenge CSR programs.
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Chapter 3
Indigenous Subjectivity and the Space of Pompeya

Introduction
When I arrived in Pompeya in November 2008, it seemed like an easy task to locate the
different CSR projects in the community and residents' active engagement with them. Instead, I
was confronted with an empty community, houses locked during the day, and no signs of
anyone. Where was the lively, bustling community corporate brochures had advertised? Unsure
of how to proceed, I wandered back to the guardhouse and entrance to Block 16.
The guardhouse is a covered structure with room for vehicles to unload and a couple of
offices where staff monitor events in the area. I walked upstairs to an office room, knocked and
went in. The room was frigid. Air conditioning was blasting, and in contrast to the heat and
humidity outside I shivered. I looked around the room at the men, as all eyes were trained on me.
Roberto, a community relations staff-person in charge of implementing and maintaining CSR
projects, had worked in the field for several years. He took me downstairs to another airconditioned office. After he quizzed me about how I arrived in the community and who gave me
permission to be there, I began to ask my own questions. Roberto quickly interrupted and
suggested we head into Pompeya where he could show me Repsol-YPF's various projects, the
ones I could not find on my own. We climbed into the pickup truck to travel the 100 yards I had
just walked, back to the community. Our first stop was the sewing facility where Roberto
introduced me to a woman from Quito in charge of organizing women from Pompeya into this
sewing program. The machines were in an unused communal building, one of several in
Pompeya, all part of earlier iterations of CSR. Yet, the fabric was housed in a locked, newly
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constructed building on the edge of the community center.38 On this day, no one was working.
Our second stop was at the agricultural high school in Pompeya. There I was shown a series of
chicken coops behind the classrooms. This project was designed with funds from the Fundación
Repsol, a non-profit foundation affiliated with the company. The Fundación is tasked with
projects that should have a wider, longer-term influence, and involves communities outside
Repsol-YPF’s oil block. This project's goal encourages students to raise the chickens and sell
them in the weekly market in Pompeya. Again, a paid non-indigenous staff-person showed me
the project. There were no students in sight. It seemed that despite corporate discourse to the
contrary, CSR projects were not necessarily designed with indigenous participation in mind.
These were top-down projects that required outsider presence in the community to cajole
indigenous people into participating. Rather than producing a bustling, vibrant community, CSR
projects in Pompeya had the opposite effect. The more time I spent in Pompeya, I understood
that these seemingly apathetic responses to corporate operations actually involved more complex
interactions between indigenous populations, the state and corporate discourses and practices.
This chapter highlights the way in which power flows through CSR programs leading to
particular indigenous subjectivities that contribute to the facilitation of resource extraction
(Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Foucault 1991; Moore 2005).
Literature in environmental governance and development draws on long-standing
interests in political ecology about subaltern resistance and mobilization, and the way indigenous
peoples have claimed access to territory and land rights (Bridge and Perreault 2009; Himley
2008; Watts and Peet 2004). In particular as an environmental justice concern, mobilization can
call attention to the uneven spatial distribution of environmental costs and benefits (Perreault

38

Most buildings in Pompeya are kept locked to prevent petty theft.
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2006). Yet, the uncertainty and ambivalence in the space of Pompeya highlights a lack of
collective action, therefore, it is also important to consider how CSR and governance processes
may actually codify inequalities, explored through ethnographies of CSR (Himley 2008). Indeed,
drawing on critical anthropologies and geographies of development, I contribute to discussions
of indigenous political subjectivities within the space of the northern Ecuadorian Amazon region.
By grounding studies of governmentality in particular places and within certain struggles
it becomes possible to view subject formation and the territories upon which these formations
emerge. Subjects' conduct can both sustain and challenge forms of rule (Agrawal 2005; Ferguson
and Gupta 2002; Li 2007; Moore 2005, 2000, 1998). Indeed, in Ecuador the strategic presences
of the state in the northern Amazon region allowed for additional corporate presence, and CSR
programs were mandated by the state to facilitate oil extraction. Thus, my focus, while
concerned with indigenous populations' participation in governance strategies, also examines the
way in which corporations challenge state sovereignty. Indigenous populations become targets in
development schemes operated through CSR programs. These programs are designed as a means
to improve indigenous populations' own welfare, but also to ensure a corporation's continued
production of wealth. In turn, arrangements of state, capital and indigenous populations resulted
in challenges to the state's sovereignty in oil governance. The particular governing technologies
of CSR programs can produce power relations that lead to indigenous “subjection to
government,” but also “subjects of action” (Moore 2005: 6). I explore possibilities for action at
the local level by examining the corporation's failure to fully incorporate indigenous populations
into resource governance decisions, and thus the space to challenge corporate operations. Indeed,
this failure highlights the corporation's pursuit of its own satisfaction, rather than others'.
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If CSR programs are understood as sites of struggle or entanglement, with differential
impacts on different groups of people, institutional approaches that investigate conflict often
assign individuals and groups an identity prior to their entry into social relations (see Peet and
Watts 1996; Agrawal 2005). Sundberg (2004: 46) argues that this process precludes the way in
which social identities are also at stake within “daily discourses, practices and performances” of
management of natural resources, struggles of access and control, and considerations of whose
environmental knowledge counts. Thus, following Sundberg (2004: 46), I explore how certain
identities and positionings are produced through the practices, discourses and performances of
social institutions. In turn, this conceptualization can confront the notion of identity as something
homogenous and fixed, and instead begins to understand it in its relational sense, or articulated
with other identities (Sundberg 2004; Nelson, D. 1999; Gibson-Graham 1996). The subject is
produced through the disciplining practices of the institution, which constantly shift and change,
but remains located in a particular time and place. Thus, repetition of particular performances
leads to the normative practices and discourses through which gendered and racialized bodies are
produced (Sundberg 2004). Identity becomes an “iterative process...produced through a recursive
relationship between power/discourse and critically reflexive, geographically embedded
subjects” (Nelson, L. 1999: 384). The “identities-in-the-making approach” can highlight the way
disciplining discourses and practices are invoked, reconstituted, enacted and subverted
(Sundberg 2004: 46). Thus, the challenge becomes one of how to locate identities in a particular
time and place. Ethnography can be one method to begin to highlight “multi-dimensional
identities,” and the way they are “produced, enacted and transformed...in articulation with
others” (Sundberg 2004: 47; Moore 1998).
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Indeed, by focusing on the “mundane” aspects of everyday life in Pompeya, my goal is to
link processes of political identity formation to state and corporate power to understand the
politics of resistance in the space of an indigenous community (Nelson 2006: 369; Wolford
2010). I examine layers and histories of domination and resistance in Pompeya, arguing that
resistance becomes more complex if we highlight its more everyday processes (see Agrawal
2005; Muratorio 1991; Ortner 1995; Scott 1985; Wolford 2010). In particular, the ambiguity of
resistance (Ortner 1995) demonstrates not only processes of domination, and the importance of
maintaining that power, but also subordinates' ambivalence as a form of resistance (cf. Muratorio
1991; Wolford 2010). Furthermore, there is never one singular or unitary subordinate, but instead
subordinates are divided along class lines, gender, age, and other forms of difference. Failure to
highlight these so-called internal divisions leads to a romantic portrayal of resistance (Agrawal
2005; Hale 2006, 2011). Thus, it is important to have a full picture of the politics of resistance,
including historical analysis (Ortner 1995) as well as a spatial analysis (Moore 1998). As Moore
(1998: 349) argues, in order to maintain the complexity of sites of struggle, we must ensure our
scholarship does not reproduce separate sites for power and resistance. Instead, by focusing on
the politics of place we can locate social actors in “multiple and shifting fields of power.”
My ethnographic research aims to make complex indigenous subjectivity in the space of
Pompeya. Indigenous peoples contended with the presence of outsiders in the region long before
the oil companies arrived. Here we can point to the rubber industry, lowland hacienda systems of
production, patron-client relationships and missionaries that essentially removed indigenous
access and rights to resources (Muratorio 1991; Whitten 1976). Indeed, oil companies are just the
latest in a long line of outside actors that sought to claim access to resources in the region,
challenging indigenous territorial sovereignty. Following this introduction, I examine the politics
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of indigenous organizing in Ecuador, to explore the way in which indigenous identity was
politicized through the 1990s responding to the roll-back of state regulation, and roll-out of
neoliberal policies. This context serves as an important backdrop for comparing and contrasting
politicization of indigenous identities in the everyday space of a Pompeya. Next, I explore a
particular history of Pompeya, one marked by the presence of outsiders, including Protestant and
Catholic missionaries, who pushed for the establishment of a community based on indigenous
rights to territory established by state law. However, the constant presence of outsiders is
reflected through indigenous customs and practices that revolve around gift giving, and the way
in which the company emerges as a powerful actor that is expected to contribute a constant flow
of material goods. To that end, in the third section of the chapter, I include a series of
observations within a women's micro-credit organization that operates with funds from the
Fundación Repsol. Within this group, I note the gendered outcomes of CSR programs in
Pompeya that influence identity production and relationships with the company. The final
section of the chapter focuses on an interview I conducted with the former president of the local
parish government that encompasses Pompeya. While not Kichwa, Doña Barbara, a resident of
Pompeya, elaborated on the challenges and opportunities within the community, the influence of
oil and her own desires to motivate the community to demand more from both the corporation
and the state. Doña Barbara's participation in local government and corporate negotiations
allowed her to develop a perspective and particular skills to challenge dominant discourse and
practices, and position herself within these programs to improve and promote local level control
over territory and production processes, reestablishing an indigenous identity rooted in
communities. Following Li (2007), Doña Barbara reflects a discourse of entitlement and political
activism that emerges through participation in corporate and government arenas. While not
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necessarily opposed to the language of improvement, Doña Barbara is embodying a form of
political consciousness that calls on (re)claiming indigenous rights and access to resources
through collective indigenous agency that might challenge corporate and state projects. At the
same time, though, Doña Barbara criticizes indigenous forms of community organization and
subsistence farming as a 'waste of time', embodying the racial tensions that still underlie attempts
to organize and control indigenous populations. This sort of ambiguity in resistance processes
lends crucial insights into understanding operations of power that often confronts subordinate
populations. In the next section I turn to histories of indigenous organizing in Ecuador, and
relationships between indigenous identity and the nation-state.

Indigenous movement organization in Ecuador
Debates about plurinacionalidad, promoted by Confederación de Nacionalidades
Indígenas del Ecuador39 (CONAIE), the national indigenous federation and other indigenous
organizations in Ecuador through the 1990s argued that Ecuador is made up of distinct
nationalities and peoples. In particular, conversations focused on indigenous territories,
citizenship, and political autonomy (Lucero 2003; Perreault 2001; Selverston-Scher 2001). The
indigenous movement in Ecuador through the 1990s reflected these concerns, and local
indigenous organizations engaged in constructing political identities within the nation,
challenging dominant views of political inclusion (Andolina 2003). In turn, in the late 1990s,
local organizations were imbricated with these discourses, linking the discursive and material
aspects of indigenous lives including territory, citizenship and nationality to other aspects of
Kichwa lives (Perreault 2001).

39

Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
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Despite constitutional reforms in the late 1990s, these did little to address power
inequalities between Ecuador's ruling elites and the masses. Elite discourse and practice were
predicated on Western models of development rooted in capitalism that ensured prosperity
through hard work and discipline (Andolina 2003). Additional protests against austerity
measures paralyzed the country in the early 2000s, challenging Ecuadorian democracy and the
role of the state in protecting its own peoples. Thus, for Perreault (2003b) the protests through
the 1990s and early 2000s demonstrated the structural inequalities that exist in Ecuador and how
different populations engage with and challenge these existing structures. In turn, analysis of
particular institutions can be important sites of negotiation and struggle, as indigenous
populations construct a sense of regional identity, rooted in territory. Yet, indigenous actors must
also operate from a “fully modern subject position,” interacting with state agencies, national and
international NGOs and other transnational networks (Perreault 2003b: 602). Furthermore,
indigenous institutions' engagement with the nation-state is not one of solely resistance.
Sometimes it has been oppositional, and at other times more accepting of the nationalist project
(Perreault 2003b; Radcliffe 1996).
Scholars have emphasized the way in which contemporary cultural and political
indigenous organizations have their roots in corporatist regimes that emerged in Ecuador in the
mid-twentieth century until the implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s
(Yashar 1998, 2005, 2007; Lucero 2003, 2008; Perreault 2001). The corporatist regimes are most
notable for their social benefits to citizens, including food and energy subsidies, as well as access
to education, welfare, and healthcare, in exchange for state approved modes of political
organization and participation. In turn, citizenship was characterized by a notion of 'homogenous'
mestizo identity, and indigenous peoples were expected to adapt to this model (Radcliffe 1996;
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Radcliffe and Westwood 1996). Indigenous identities were perceived as hindering development
processes, and in turn would prevent the formation of a “homogenous nation” (Perreault 2003b:
67). This discourse was informed by “liberal yet Orientalist ideas” about backwardness linked to
notions of indigenous culture and ongoing Spanish legacies of colonization (Andolina 2003: 732;
Yashar 2005). Access to state benefits were predicated on state-sanctioned, class-based peasant
or labor organizations. This process of organizing was promoted through the state's agrarian
reforms in 1964 and 1973, through which land and agricultural credit was distributed to those
members of peasant organizations (Perreault 2003b; Selverston-Scher 2001; Yashar 2005).
The institutions that emerged to facilitate this process of organizing included state-based
organizations, such as the Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian and Colonization Reform (IERAC)
and non-state organizations, labor unions and the Protestant and Catholic churches and their
affiliated organizations. Moreover, various indigenous and campesino organizations, including
the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI), the National Federation of Campesino Organizations
(FENOC) and the Ecuadorian Center for Class-based Organizations (CEDOC) helped to
establish indigenous communities. During this period, indigenous organizations were established
along class-based lines. The first indigenous organization to emerge in the Ecuadorian Amazon
was the Federation of Shuar Centers in 1964 (see Chapter 5). This was followed by a provincial
peasant organization Provincial Federation of Peasant Organizations of Napo (FEPOCAN),
which changed its name to Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas del Napo (FOIN)40, based
in Tena (Brysk 2000; Perreault 2001, 2003a,b; Sawyer 2004; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 1998, 2005,
2007). As Perreault (2001) has noted, the change in the organization's name explicitly notes the
movement toward an indigenous identity, rather than campesino, and a movement away from

40

Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo
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corporatist ideals. In 1976, the eastern most communities affiliated with FOIN formed their own
organization Federación de Comunas Unión de Nativos de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana41
(FCUNAE), based in Coca. Soon thereafter, in 1979, the Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de
Pastaza (OPIP)42 emerged, founded in Puyo. Each organization, writes Perreault (2003a) was
engaged in organizing community organizations and legalizing communal land claims for
affiliated communities. In turn, in 1980, Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la
Amazonia Ecuatoriana (CONFENAIE) emerged at the regional level, and in 1986 CONAIE was
established (see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of these organizations).
By the 1980s, Ecuador's corporatist model was declining due to debt crises, and the rise
of neoliberalism, as was the case in much of Latin America. A civilian government returned in
Ecuador in 1979, but its growth was slow and uneven, with resistance from labor, opposition
parties and the growing indigenous movement (Carriére 2001). Thus, as outlined in Chapter 4,
social programs were dismantled under World Bank and International Monetary Fund policy,
leading to political and social conflict. In turn, the class-based organizations of previous decades
were terminated, and could no longer support indigenous organizations. This meant that
indigenous organizations were no longer assured of accessing and influencing the state (Yashar
1998; 2005). However, increased presence of transnational NGOs and aid agencies suggested
that there were new means for advocacy networks and support for indigenous organizations to
emerge (Brysk 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998). As a result, new forms of indigenous organizing
were popularized that focused on ethnic identity and the 'glocalization' of identity politics
(Swyngedouw 1997). Drawing on conversations in geography that suggested that spatial-scale
emerged out of social relationships, and in turn these relationships could organize spatial
41
42

In English, this organization is the Federation of United Native Communities of the Ecuadorian Amazon.
Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza
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processes, Perreault (2003b) argues that identities are (re)constructed as rooted in local places,
such as communities and territories, and also globally linked by national and transnational
networks (cf. Brysk 2000; Escobar 1995; Valdivia 2005). In turn, these processes have opened
new spaces for indigenous political mobilization, and additional “cultural revalorization”
(Perreault 2003b: 100). Thus, scalar distinctions between local, regional, national, and global are
the result of interactions between social actors and structural forces. Furthermore, these scales of
analysis are produced through relationships of power, and involve struggle, compromise, and
negotiation (Perreault 2003b; Swyngedouw 1997). Empowerment, then, results from the
articulation of political mobilization tied to indigenous identity at a variety of scales. In turn, the
concept of “jumping scales” is increasingly important for indigenous organizations as they work
through particular networks (Perreault 2003b; Smith 1996).
Decentralization through neoliberal policies meant that indigenous populations had more
direct contact with local government organizations, changing the terms of citizenship for
indigenous peoples. Citizenship was connected to certain state agencies like the National
Directorate for Intercultural Bilingual Education (DINEIB), and the Council for the
Development of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE) (see Perreault 2003a).
Furthermore, World Bank funded projects like PRODEPINE (Project for the Development of
Indigenous and Black Peoples of Ecuador) funds ethno-development projects in the country
(Andolina et al. 2009). By the mid-1990s, concerns within CONAIE about representation in
Ecuador prompted the emergence of the indigenous political party Pachakutik (Andolina 2003).
Constitutional reforms in 1997-1998 expanded indigenous political rights. Furthermore, in other
Andean countries similar processes were occurring (Brysk 2000; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 1998,
2005). Thus, as scholars (see, for example, Sawyer 2004; Yashar 1998, 2005) have noted, while
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neoliberal reforms reduced social rights, they also extended political and civil rights for
indigenous populations, allowing indigenous organizations to reassert their ethnic identities in
new ways. Indeed, the space of indigenous communities has led to “semi-autonomous spaces of
political organizing, and cultural and social reproduction” (Perreault 2003b: 71).
Yet, my research comes at a period of over a decade after the well-organized movement
emerged in the 1990s in Ecuador. Indeed, the indigenous movement in Ecuador successfully
earned indigenous populations rights to territory and political rights in the state. However, in
communities like Pompeya, the presence of oil companies and CSR programs have produced
different outcomes. In particular, the roll-out of CSR programs in the 1990s emphasized the
ability of CSR to disrupt mobilization, through legally binding contracts, direct contributions to
indigenous organizations that influenced indigenous leadership, or projects and programs at the
local level that led to ambivalence and uncertainty about corporate presence within local
communities.
Contrary to literature that focuses on the organized indigenous mobilization and
institutions in Ecuador, my dissertation highlights the everyday production of uncertainty in
community spaces like Pompeya. In particular, this uncertainty emphasizes the state's presences
in the region and long histories of outsiders, including the more recent increased presence of
corporations and their material projects and programs, raising important questions about
indigenous rights and access to resources within Ecuador, and representation as indigenous
subjects. Thus, while drawing attention to both material and symbolic production of indigenous
identity, I emphasize challenges to indigenous territorial sovereignty and political agency
through ongoing CSR programs and corporate presence at the local level, explored as a set of
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daily practices rooted in the everyday spaces of the local community. I explore these histories in
the next section.

Lowland Kichwa livelihood practices
Prior to the 1940s, the Upper Napo Kichwa or Runa lived primarily in the region to the
north of the Napo River up to the border with Colombia. There were three Kichwa populations in
the region, and different groups were clustered by language dialect (Macdonald 1999; Whitten
1976).43 Since the 1960s, economic opportunities, land scarcity and other infrastructural
development have allowed the Kichwa to relocate to other parts of the Amazon. Much of this
land prior to the 1960s was a sort of patchwork of Indian territories. Kinship and land use
practices, as well as spiritual forces marked communities and their territories. There was always
movement amongst these settlements, as the Kichwa sought out new land for garden plots,
hunting and fishing (Macdonald 1999).
Prior to the late 19th Century, there was little access and encroachment on Amazonian
indigenous territories (Macdonald 1999), but just before the turn of the 20th Century this shifted,
and altered relationships between Napo-Runa and non-Indian populations. Employed by
patrones, or the 'rubber bosses’ within the rubber industry, indigenous populations essentially
worked in conditions of slavery. In turn, this led to a long history of patron-client relationships in
the region. Furthermore, argues Macdonald (1999) the Napo-Runa were slowly incorporated into
market based economic structures, impacting the socio-economic patterns outlined above.
During the last years of the 19th Century and first decade of the 20th Century, the rubber industry

43

Indeed, the Kichwa language is related to a larger language group called Quechua, which emerged from a group in
southern Peru, near Cusco. Incan expansion extended this language further south into Bolivia and north into
Ecuador. Kichwa is widely spoken in the highlands in Ecuador, and extends into the lowlands of the Oriente,
although the Kichwa in the lowlands is quite different from that which is spoken in the Sierra (Whitten 1976).
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dominated the Amazon rainforest, and Indians were the key workers exploited in this process.
By 1912, though, the rubber industry was no longer able to compete with a Malaysian rubber
boom, and production in the Amazon dropped off considerably (Macdonald 1999; Muratorio
1991).
Patron-client ties served to dominate the region in the late-19th and early-20th centuries,
and local populations often accepted these relationships because the patrón provided material
goods. A similar process was occurring in the Ecuadorian highlands. In the highlands,
indigenous peasants were bound to a system of huasipungo, where indigenous peoples worked
for a landlord in exchange for land use, wages, animals, and rights to water and food. Often
indigenous populations entered into a lifetime of indebtedness. This system, however, was
abolished with the passage of the land reform laws in 1964 and 1973, due to the hacienda's
ineffectiveness in production practices, and the inequitable distribution of wealth (Macdonald
1999; Yashar 2005). Yet, in contrast to the highlands, Amazonian populations were more
difficult to control because of the region's inaccessibility, and indigenous populations' hostility
toward outsiders, including missionaries. In turn, these geographical and cultural differences are
reflected in forms of resistance in the two regions (Muratorio 1991). Often Amazonian
indigenous populations would refuse to pay debt payments to patrones. In this period, patrones
were typically government officials (who had expelled Catholic missionaries in 1905) or other
non-Indian populations. Things like shotguns and ammunition, as well as salt and cloth were all
acquired from patrones, who could also serve as intermediaries between Indians and outside
institutions, and help solve disputes. In turn, while patrones were permanent residents in the
region, and Indian populations were structured into haciendas, indigenous peoples could still
practice their subsistence production processes. Patrones only controlled workers, and not the
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exploitation of land (MacDonald 1999). Once the rubber boom was over, though, traders and
patrones returned to the major outposts, which included the Tena-Archidona area. Following this
retreat, new hacienda settlements began to crop up in the Amazon region (Muratorio 1991).
These new haciendas took over indigenous lands, and expanded. This process only
intensified, and sometimes included cattle raising (see Perreault 2003 a,b). White patrones and
other settlers continued to use racist language that accused indigenous populations of 'savagery'
and this justified their land occupations. In turn, the haciendas developed their own production of
manioc and plantains for subsistence, as well as cash crops that included cotton, coffee and rice,
reflected in interviews I had with residents in Pompeya, discussed later in the chapter. Sugar
cane was also an important cash crop. In the Amazon region, the debt-peonage relationships
were focused mostly on trading and extractive industries, and not agriculture, as in the Sierra. In
turn, these production processes were reflected in work contracts. Extractive economies allowed
indigenous peoples to sign short-term contracts with the patrón. The haciendas in the Amazon
region were also smaller than those found in the Sierra, and patrones were never able to fully
remove indigenous populations from their land, or control their exploitation. The Napo Runa
never became permanent laborers in haciendas (Muratorio 1991; Yashar 2005).
During this period of the early to mid-20th century, there was not yet a problem of land
scarcity, and indebtedness among indigenous populations in the Amazon region is often
discussed as a coercive mechanism (cf. Macdonald 1999). Amazonian indigenous peoples were
often forced into indebtedness after being plied with alcohol by patrones, failing to notice the
price of the goods. Furthermore, many of the goods provided by patrones, such as salt, cotton
cloth, knives and axes had become essential tools in subsistence practices. Consequently, there
were both market based and cultural influences that produced these relationships with patrones,
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which continue to be reflected in relationships with oil companies today (Macdonald 1999;
Muratorio 1991).
Missionaries also dominated the region during this period, although to different levels of
success. In the 1860s, Ecuador's president, García Moreno, had signed a pact with the Catholic
Church, whereby the church set out to 'moralize' the country. Moreno assigned the Jesuits the
Amazon region. Initially, though, Jesuit missionaries were never able to dominate the region
(and were forced out in 1905). Indigenous communities were not firmly established to allow for
sufficient control and provide a disciplined labor force. Furthermore, epidemics of smallpox
broke out that prevented success of the missionaries. It was only later, by the 1920s, with early
oil explorations in the Oriente, that the missionaries became a larger presence (Macdonald 1999;
Muratorio 1991).
In the central Amazon region the Josephine mission was dominant. Its goal was to
integrate Indians into economic development through labor. The mission also pointed out the
region's vast natural resources to the state. It built schools and churches, not just in major towns,
but also in small indigenous villages. In the late 1920s, evangelical missionaries entered the
region, also emphasizing education. The Protestant mission's economic support came from
donors in the United States, and while the Josephines maintained control of their schools, the
Protestant missions turned over their schools to the state, and churches to indigenous pastors.
Yet, there was still much cooperation between Catholic and Protestant missions in transportation,
as well as economic and evangelization strategies (Muratorio 1991). At the same time, the 1920s
was a period of initial oil exploration, and through the 1930s and 1940s missionaries and oil
companies shared information on access to the region; oil companies followed missionary
constructed trails and maps (Kimmerling 1996; Sawyer 2004). Muratorio (1991) writes that both

89

Catholic and Protestant missions considered this collaboration an important part of the country's
modernization, as well as modernizing indigenous populations. Indeed, oil companies offered
much better conditions in their camps, when compared to patrones. Wages were also paid
directly to each worker. In the next section, I explore these histories through the space of
Pompeya.

The space of Pompeya
Kichwas in the north central part of Ecuador's Oriente migrated from Tena in the central
Amazon region. Don Pascual, a former community president in Pompeya, and his family came
from the area near Misahaullí. His family was drawn by the promise of access to land. Muratorio
writes that the 1970s was a time of mass colonization in the Amazon region due to oil
development in the northern Amazon region, and many Napo Runa settled further east along the
Napo River. In 1980, colonization occurred between Coca and Rocafuerte, the latter lies along
the border with Peru, in part to respond to the government's policy of “live frontiers” following a
1981 border skirmish with Peru (Muratorio 1991: 179; Yashar 2005).
The land that was promised to the Kichwas was actually inhabited by the Waorani, and
Kichwa populations encroached onto Waorani land. The Catholic mission was primarily
interested in the Waorani, ostensibly to release them from slavery, but Kichwas followed behind
the mission. The relationships between missionaries, oil companies and indigenous peoples are
complex. Muratorio (1991) suggests that the mission used Kichwa populations as “penetration
agents” to help integrate the Waorani into market economies and “white civilization.” While
there has been some inter-marriage between the Kichwa and Waorani, this was often considered
a form of reciprocity for additional access to land, and produced tensions (Muratorio 1991: 212).
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In Pompeya, the Catholic mission constructed a school, and many older residents of Pompeya,
including Don Sandro, a former community president, attended. Many residents of Pompeya
learned Spanish at this school. Don Pedro continued his schooling to become a catequist. Much
of the mission's presence was on the northern side of the river, where the mission's houses and
school still exist today. As Don Sandro says, “It was the church who warned us of the pressure of
the colonists (mestizos from the Sierra). And so, we started to work with the church to organize
ourselves.”44
With the erosion of the corporatist citizenship regime at the end of the 1970s, and
implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, the state began to encourage colonization of
the Amazon region to relieve land pressures in the highlands. This internal colonization was
reflected in Ecuador's early land reform laws, La Ley de Tierras Baldías y Colonización passed
in 1936. This was the initial state solution to the highland hacienda system, and designed to
promote flows of landless, “unproductive workers” onto land considered unoccupied
(Macdonald 1999: 66). Later, the 1964 and 1973 land and agrarian reform laws oversaw this
migration, or internal colonization. Indigenous populations did not hold title to their lands in this
period, and there was little they could do to stop this encroachment. Often cattle grazing was
used to clear land, in addition to farming. The indigenous organizations that emerged in the
1960s, including among the Shuar and Kichwa in the mid- to late-1960s were examples of
reactions to this colonization process. State presence following the discovery and extraction of
oil in 1967 and 1972, respectively, included the military government's appointment of political
officers, such as the teniente político (tasked with adjudicating conflicts in communities, while
serving the interest of the national state), police, military and judges. These state appointments
44

Fue la Iglesia quien nos advirtió de la presión de los colonos. Y así, empezamos a trabajar con la iglesia a
organizarnos.
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were designed to provide security in the region, but did not mean greater democratization. They
often discriminated against indigenous populations (Little 1992; Yashar 2005).
Between 1970 and 1975, Pompeya, which at this time only included 53 people, began a
process of claiming rights to territory, with support of the church. Many of the original founders
are still living in the community today. Following the suggestion of the Catholic priests, the
Kichwas used the acronym UNAE, which in Spanish means: Union Nativo Ecuatorianos. Today
the Kichwa organization in the region uses FCUNAE (Federación de Comunas Unión de
Nativos de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana) as its acronym. Indeed, one of the key actors in the
organizing of the community and FCUNAE was a Kichwa priest, Umberto Andi de Águilar.
Despite ongoing pressure from the patrones, who accused indigenous people of being
communists, says Don Sandro, the Kichwa continued their push for independence. During this
period, several Kichwa communities were established along the banks of the river, including
Sani Isla, San Carlos, San Jose, and Santa Teresa. Local leaders went to the Ministry of
Agriculture and Farming to gain legal rights to their territory (see also Muratorio 1991). As Don
Sandro related, “The goal was to preserve land and territory for our children, to tie them to the
area, and to prevent colonists from entering.”45 The name Pompeya actually came from
Argentine priests who happened to be missionaries during that period. The mission was known
as the Mission Pompeya, and was extended to include the entire community.
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was also oil company presence by Corporación Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE, the state company), Shell and Texaco. All the access to the region
was by helicopter in this early period, leaving little trace of company presence, and the
companies would provide work for community members. Don Sandro worked as a guide for the
45

El objetivo era preservar la tierra y el territorio para nuestros hijos, para atarlos a la zona, y para evitar la entrada
de colonos.
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companies. By the early 1990s, with the arrival of US companies Conoco and Maxus, there was
more pressure to open the region to drilling. Pompeya fought the companies' entrance, but under
pressure from the state, and unable to resist the material things the company offered, they gave in
to company demands. In 1992, the community opened to oil drilling, and Pompeya signed its
first agreement with Conoco and Maxus, however Don Sandro remembers a feeling of being
duped. Don Sandro says, “The first community relations person was a woman. She tricked us.”46
Here, I build on Nelson (2009) who argues that discourses of duping and tricking often
circulate as assumptions about how the world works, or that the world available to us “hides
another face behind it.” It forces us to question, or pushes us toward moments of “recokoning,”
suggesting that there are singular identities to uncover, for example those of perpetrator and
victim. It challenges those identities that are “assumed,” or how we can take for granted our own
identities, or those of others. For example, we can consider that subjection is a power assumed
by the subject, either through our names, sex, gender or ethnicity (cf. Butler 1997). Often these
identities can feel ‘false,’ and we can blame forces such as patriarchy, capitalism, or history for
them. Nelson (2009) queries whether it is possible to name the people behind these forces, and
suggests that some of these identities are the result of plans, networks, and end-goals. How do
we uncover which identities are the result of well-funded plans, and which are taken on and
inhabited (Nelson 2009)?47 This quandary, or the difficulty of reckoning in the midst of
duplicity, “may be the conditions of possibility for political action and knowledge in our age”
(Nelson 2009: xx).
For example, Don Sandro plays on discourses of abandonment by the state and the
offering of 'trinkets and beads,' which also mirror histories of debt-peonage relationships that

46
47

La primera relacionista comunitaria era una mujer. Ella nos engañó.
I explore this notion of ‘engañar’ (duping, tricking) further in the next chapter.
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made it hard to oppose the entrance of companies. In Pompeya, several of the same community
relations staff people who were there in this initial period still work in the region today, albeit for
different companies. All of these initial negotiations took place during the period of a military
dictatorship in Ecuador. Soon thereafter, the community of Pompeya and daily lives changed
dramatically.
“We're lazy about our customs,”48 says Don Sandro. Before all the houses were made
traditionally, out of palm. There was natural light, from a plant in the region. “Our eyes opened
when the company arrived,”49 recounted Don Sandro. Little by little people began to leave
hunting and fishing behind. Chicha was no longer shared amongst families and community
members, or left for several days to ferment. Starting in 1979, the geography of the community
shifted, and people began to move to the center. Trees were cut down and burned to open the
space.
Don Pascual says:
It was with our children that Pompeya began to grow. We looked for work and land.
Now we need to have fewer kids, because there’s no space. I only have four.50 As well,
education is important, but it’s expensive. In the 1970s we would sell corn and rice in
Coca. We would just hunt and fish, and grow yuca. There wasn’t much production
because there wasn’t transportation. Just one or two times a month were there boats to
Coca. The center of Pompeya didn’t exist like it is now, but with machetes we began
cutting [the trees].51

48

Somos vagos de nuestras costumbres.
Nuestros ojos se abrieron cuando la compañía llegó.
50
Kichwa families are typically quite large, often with 6-12 children. In part this was because children often died at
an early age, and children could also help parents in farming practices.
51
Con nuestros hijos crece la comunidadad. Buscabamos trabajo y terreno. Ahora tenemos que tener menos hijos,
porque no hay suficiente espacio. Solo tengo cuatro. La educación es importante, pero es cara. En los 1970s
vendiamos arroz y maíz en Coca. Tuvimos la cacería, pesca, yuca, pero no hubo mucha producción, porque no habia
transporte. Solo una vez, dos veces al mes fuimos a Coca, en los botes. El centro no existía como ahora, pero con
machetes empezemos a cortar.
49
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During this period, there was some tension between the Kichwa and Waorani. Don Sandro said
that as the community began clearing their land, some Kichwas kept guard out of fear the
Waorani would attack them. Eventually, formal meetings were held with Waorani leaders to
establish official territory delineation. In 1983, community leaders returned to the Ministry of
Agriculture and Farming to establish new territorial boundaries. The Kichwa maintain their
territory until the Tiputini River, and these are the boundaries that exist today.
In the early 1990s, Conoco began construction on roads to access oil blocks in Pompeya.
All the roads through the community were finished in 16 days, using sand that was dredged from
within the community. During this initial entrance of the companies there was some negotiation
between CONFENIAE and FCUNAE and private multinationals. CONFENIAE asked for
$200,000 from the company to split amongst all the indigenous communities in the region. In
return Conoco offered $50,000, which was rejected by the community. Eventually, the
community succumbed to the pressures of community relations officers. Soon thereafter,
following the signing of a formal agreement with the community, Conoco left control of the
operations to Maxus and the agreement was transferred to that company.
As community president between 2006-2007, Don Pascual was engaged in signing
agreements with the companies in Block 15, currently operated by Petroamazonas, a subsidiary
of Petroecuador. He makes the distinction between the state company, which today provides
subsistence type projects, including pools for fish, and other agricultural projects, and Occidental
(Oxy), the private multinational that operated in Block 15 prior to Petroamazonas, and worked to
provide infrastructural improvements to communities within the Block. He says:
Convenios (agreements) with Oxy were hard. We had to talk with them all day and all
night. Everything we do is with the company. There are a lot of budgets. There’s very
little help from the state. The junta parroquial only recently arrived and it works in six
communities. There’s little coordination. FCUNAE helped us more in organizing
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ourselves. The mission is just interested in evangelization. Now there are conflicts with
the state and company. The state knows the company is here, so doesn’t want to give
certain things.52
Meanwhile, community culture and customs continue to change. Don Sandro says:
Now we keep living more or less the same way, but before we didn’t know how to grow
café or cacao or aves (poultry). Now there are more pools for fish rather than in the river.
There aren’t any fruits. Now we ask for projects from the company in the agreements.
The latest idea is tourism. Before the fincas were to grow food to live – now it’s just food
from outside. Before everyone spoke Kichwa, and now it’s different. No one greets the
others either. No one knows artesanía except the older people and no one practices it.
Before we would work on this. Now beer has influenced everything. Before we just used
traps, and now it’s rifles. The capacitación projects teach us new things, but it’s nothing
we did before.53
Don Luis concurs:
Before we would have music – like drums and flutes, but we’ve left those customs
behind. Only those with money live in the center of the community. We have products,
but nowhere to sell them. Café, cacao, piscinas (pools for fish farming), aves all arrived
with Petroamazonas. We did already know how to cultivate café, but once
Petroamazonas arrived, it became more important. Before we would sell products in
Coca. It would take two days to get there. We have chickens, but mostly for parties.
There’s no work with the company, but with Maxus there was and they gave us
everything – like Papá Noel (Santa Claus).54

52

Los convenios con Oxy fueron muy duros. Tuvimos que hablar todo el día y la noche. Todo lo que hacemos es
con la compañía. Hay tantos prespuestos. Hay poco apoyo del estado. La junta parroquial recien llegó y trabaja en
seis comunidades. No hay coordinación. FCUNAE nos apoyó en organizacion. La misión solo tiene interes en
evangelización. Ahora hay conflictos con el estado y la compañía. El estado sabe que la compañía esta aquí y no da
ciertas cosas.
53
Ahora vivimos mas o menos en la misma manera, pero antes no conociamos cacao ni cafe, ni los aves. Ahora hay
mas piscinas para pescas que en el río. No hay frutas. Ahora estamos pidiendo proyectos a través de convenios. El
ultimó es turismo. Antes las fincas eran para alimentación – ahora es comida de afuera. Antes todos hablaban
kichwa, y ahora es diferente. Nadie saluda, antes era así. Nadie sabe artesanía, solo los mayores. Antes dedicamos a
este trabajo. Con la cerveza todo cambió. Antes solo era trampas, no había escopetas. Los proyectos de capacitación
nos enseñan nuevas cosas, pero no hemos sabido.
54
Antes, teníamos musica - tambores, flautas, pero dejamos los costumbres atrás. Solo los que tienen dinero viven
en el centro. Tenemos productos, pero no tenemos comercios. Cafe, cacao, piscinas, aves – todo llego con
Petroamazonas. Antes sabiamos trabajar en cafe, pero poco. Antes vendimos en Coca, pero duró 2 dias para llegar.
Tenemo aves, pero para las fiestas. No hay trabajo con la compania, pero con Maxus, si, había trabajo. Nos regaló
todo – como Papá Noel.
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While my conversations with residents of Pompeya seemed to mark the moment of loss of
indigenous traditions and customs with the arrival of companies, the history of the Amazon
region points to much longer historical processes of encroachment and influence by outsiders, as
outlined in the first part of this section. The historical processes of patron-client relationships
constructed a hierarchical system through which patrons could be called on for material goods.
Indeed, the gift giving tied to corporations through CSR programs seemed to establish the
company as the latest patron in the region, firmly rooting the corporation in the region. As
Wilson (2010) states, within Amazonian cultures, gift giving also has important social
relationships, and hierarchical leadership patterns are often marked by a leader's generosity.
Drawing on Michael Uzendoski (2005), Wilson suggests that for the Napo Runa when
commodities are turned into gifts this actually creates social value and produces identities and
relationships between individuals. One learns more about oneself through these acts of gift
giving. It becomes a moral obligation for the more powerful to give gifts, and can “soothe social
tensions that may actually emerge from the inequality itself” (Wilson 2010: 229). In turn,
discourse at the community level often differentiates between those who collaborate, and those
who work for personal gains, and often contributes to evaluations of leadership. Community
social relationships with the company through CSR programs reflects this social process of gift
giving leading to patriarchal relationships in the community that reflect corporate presence (see
Rajak 2011). In the next two sections I turn to a discussion of daily lives in Pompeya through
CSR programs to reflect on the ambivalence of indigenous peoples' engagement with CSR
programs, and the contradictory outcomes of corporate presence that reproduce gendered and
racialized dimensions of Kichwa identities.
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Daily lives in Pompeya
In March of 2009, following the recommendation of one of the Repsol-YPF bus drivers, I
contacted Luisa, a resident of Pompeya to help me with my interviews and community
participation. Many of my interactions in Pompeya were with the extended family of Luisa. In
part, this is because her family had more experience with outsiders, and was involved in much of
the leadership of Pompeya. Luisa is 26 with two young children. Her husband initially operated
the Repsol-YPF boats that run oil workers, and sometimes community members, to and from
Coca, the capital of Orellana province where Pompeya is located, on the Napo River.55 Later in
my fieldwork period, Luisa's husband took a job as a Repsol-YPF guard. This new job allowed
him to sleep at home every night. It became available when another community member showed
up drunk to work, something not tolerated by the company. This resulted in a series of
confrontations between Luisa's family and the fired worker. Her grandmother, Doña María, was
the only Kichwa woman who still wore traditional clothing, and walked barefoot. She lived alone
on the outskirts of the community. I was curious to know about Doña María's perspective on life
in Pompeya, and the changes over the years. My other conversations with community elders
were all with men.
On a day in early March, following a series of postponements due to scheduling conflicts,
and my early exit from Pompeya because of stomach illnesses, Luisa had confirmed with her
grandmother that she would be waiting for us in the afternoon. We had made plans to go in the
morning, but word came that parents needed to pick up their state school vouchers (for lower
income residents of Ecuador), now up to $30/month from $15/month. Instead, we hopped on the
1pm Repsol-YPF bus out to her grandmother's house, near the Petroamazonas well, but Doña
55

These jobs in transportation or working as guards for the company are offered to male residents of indigenous
communities. There is no other regular employment with the company for community members.
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María was not waiting for us. Without a cell phone, there was no way to know where she was.
We walked around a bit exploring her farm, but she did not appear. Luisa knew her family was
working on clearing the Petroamazonas pipeline from tall brush, and so we entered the clearing
in the trees and began following the pipeline until we came across her aunt and uncle, Doña
Ingrid and Don Pedro. This type of work was offered by the companies every now and then to
residents, in exchange for a little cash. Doña Ingrid and Don Pedro were finishing up their work,
and we followed a trail through the forest back to their farm plot. Along the way, Don Pedro, a
boastful, talkative person pointed out different plants, including wild cacao, which he claimed
was good for curing snakebites. He also noted tapir tracks. Soon we arrived in a clearing where
Luisa's mother, Doña Mercedes, was holding a minga (a collective work day) to harvest rice. We
arrived just as the food was being served, and ate chicken soup. The chicha and beer were
offered around. Soon Don Pedro began a monologue about his relationship with the company,
boasting of his long and close ties to Repsol-YPF.
Don Pedro claimed he had worked in a guide capacity for companies that operated in the
region before Repsol-YPF, including the state company and Maxus. He acknowledged his
relationship with Repsol-YPF stating that it was right that he had spoken at the opening
ceremony of the Centro de Acopio, an agricultural drying facility funded by the corporation (see
chapter 6). Don Pedro claimed he had been offered additional work with the company during the
1990s, but had turned it down because he felt he had roots in Pompeya and on his farm. I tried to
probe further into Don Pedro's life, but he wanted to fill me in on medicinal properties of
Amazonian plants and trees. Don Pedro's mother, Doña María, had been a good dancer, he said,
but he quickly ended his own practice of indigenous traditions out of embarrassment. He told me
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people used to laugh at him. The conversation continued, but I had to catch a boat back to the
Catholic mission on the other side of the river.
I finally met Doña María in late July 2009. I traveled with Luisa on the community bus,
along with her children, sister and niece. It was a family gathering, and we ate many products
Doña María had gathered from her land, including bananas, cacao, and yuca. Doña María does
not speak Spanish, and much of the conversation had to be translated from Kichwa for my
benefit. I learned she never sleeps in the center of the community, even though both her
granddaughters have houses there. Her house was more traditional, with open walls to the jungle,
but with a metal roof. Her kitchen included an open fireplace for cooking, but she also had a
modern stove and gas. Luisa told me her grandmother only uses the latter when she's sick. Doña
María showed me the traditional light she uses, produced by burning a seed found in the jungle.
Through Luisa, I asked a few questions about changes in the community, and Doña
María's life. She came to Pompeya as a girl from a town along the border with Peru. Her family
became part of the mission, although initially was under rule of the patrones. In contrast to the
men I interviewed, Doña María did not learn Spanish in the mission, perhaps because girls were
not encouraged to attend school. At age fourteen she married, and a year later had her first child.
She moved to the south side of the river, and started to work the land, which was really Waorani
territory. Doña María recounted stories of the Waorani taking their things when they were
working on the farms. Community meetings were called by the president of the comuna
(community) on a conch. Doña María noted how people used to work together on farms. One
woman would cook, one would serve chicha, while others worked. When the companies entered,
everything changed, she said. The companies bought off the dirigentes (community leadership),
and “nothing was the same.”
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The space of Pompeya is marked by these complex productions and negotiations of
identity that reflect a long history of social injustices due to outsider presence, including patrons,
corporations and missionaries, and the marked absence of the state. Indeed, indigenous peoples
engage with these negotiations with outsiders on a daily basis, which is reflected in indigenous
knowledge production and outsiders' often racialized interpretations of this knowledge. The
iterative process of 'identities in the making' leads to certain norms about indigenous populations
reflected in subject formation in the space of Pompeya (Sundberg 2004). Furthermore, today the
sense of inclusiveness and participation that marks market-based employment offered by the
company produces certain 'privileged' indigenous subjects in Pompeya. In turn, though, these socalled modernizing practices introduced by corporations also raise questions about disciplining
practices of multinationals. In the next section I turn to a specific company funded micro-credit
project that explores the production of power that flows through CSR programs, producing
hierarchical relationships among indigenous populations.

Micro-credit project
In this section, I focus on a women's micro-credit organization to explore how particular
gendered and racialized norms are produced through CSR practices and discourses. This
organization was formed by FEPP, an Ecuadorian NGO, with funds from the Fundación Repsol.
Monthly meetings were held the second Sunday of the month, following community meetings on
the first Sunday of each month. However, if the community meeting was postponed, so too was
the women's organization meeting. This was the case during the initial months I spent in
Pompeya, but finally a scheduled meeting did take place. Loans were made to group members to
invest in individual purchases of chickens to raise and sell in local markets, or to invest in
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agricultural products like corn, also for sale at the weekly market or in Coca. The profits would
be distributed to members of the group. The planting and harvesting of agricultural products
occurred in mingas, organized through the women's group. Husbands of the members usually
engaged in these workdays, and two men were present at this month's meeting, including Don
Pedro.
On the appointed meeting day, women slowly trickled into FEPP's house in Pompeya,
which FEPP had turned over to the women's group for its meetings. I arrived, along with two
nuns from the Catholic mission, who ran a similar organization with women from the community
living on the other side of the river. This division between the micro-credit groups was often a
point of contention, and the women of Pompeya-Sur (whose meeting I was attending) wondered
why they could not join forces. The nuns were hesitant to do so, given the disorganization in
Pompeya-Sur, although this was not disclosed to group members. Much of the meeting was
conducted in Kichwa. Members of the group held officer positions, and each spoke in turn. Doña
Ingrid was president, Doña Celeste treasurer, and Doña Martha secretary. Eleven women were
present, despite 30 official members.
The meeting got under way about an hour after it was scheduled, and was designed to
breathe life into the organization, which was suffering because of members' debts. Moreover, the
former president had spent much of the group's profits and initial loans made by FEPP in parties.
I was informed that $3000 was originally deposited in the group's account by FEPP, and the
organization was $1600 in debt. Many women owed the group between $200 and $400, amounts
that had accumulated over the five to six years of the organization's existence. The two men
present, including Doña Ingrid's husband, Don Pedro, dominated this meeting, and suggested
that the organization was in disarray because there had not been a meeting for three months. “It's
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the fault of the secretary and treasurer,”56 said Don Pedro, with no qualms about insulting Doña
Celeste and Doña Martha, who were both present.57 Also discussed was land that had been set
aside for the women to raise chickens, which had recently been repossessed by the community.
“Who sold the land? Who authorized it? No one signed [the sale],”58 stated Don Pedro. Much of
the blame was placed on Doña Barbara, a community member and politically active resident
through the local state government and often the subject of much envy by other residents,
although no one knew for sure who had sold this land. There was also a brief discussion of why
the FEPP representative was not present at this meeting. Apparently, he was supposed to be
there, but had not shown up for several months. He had proposed that the women's organization
ask the company for broadband Internet connection, but no one was really sure what the Internet
would be used for. Moreover, monthly regional meetings are held in Coca at FEPP offices with
various representatives from micro-credit organizations in indigenous communities along the
Napo River, and someone from Pompeya should be present at each meeting. Because of
transportation issues and childcare, no one willingly attended these meetings. After several
hours, this month's meeting concluded with few decisions.
However, the group continued to exist despite halting steps. A month later, on February
22nd, I attended the next meeting. In this meeting, a decision was made to mail letters to
outstanding debtors obligating them to pay back the loans. Once again, Don Pedro was present,
pushing the women to organize themselves and send the letters. However, once Don Pedro left
the meeting the women began to say how tired they were of the group. Doña Ingrid said, “My
husband is always saying that I should do things with the organization. But, I also have to wash
56

Es la culpa de la secretaria y la tesorera.
I didn't tape this meeting, but instead recorded the meeting in my fieldnotes, noting where there were direct quotes
(See also Sundberg 2004; Emerson et al. 1995).
58
¿Quien vendió el terreno? ¿ Quién lo autorizó? Nadie lo firmó.
57
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the clothes and do things in the house.”59 There is little motivation on the part of the women to
continue in the group, despite FEPP agreeing to deposit another $10,000 in the organization's
account. Indeed, FEPP also has to demonstrate to Repsol-YPF that its programs are successful.
The microcredit organizations in Kichwa communities are a cornerstone of its programs with the
Fundación, and the organization receives a large portion of its finances from the Fundación. By
the end of my fieldwork period in 2010, FEPP was no longer the recipient of funds from the
Fundación, and had to let some of its employees go.
What I want to highlight from these encounters with the women's organization is the way
in which the narratives and performances enacted in the meeting “(re)configure gender and race
in contradictory ways” (Sundberg 2004: 50). Indeed, as Sundberg (2004) notes in her account of
a women's organization in Guatemala, this meeting in Pompeya also reproduces male
superiority. Despite a female leadership council that runs the organization, Don Pedro ignores
these women and chooses to run the meeting himself, telling women how they need to behave in
order to keep the organization active. Much of Don Pedro's feelings of superiority and identity
stem from his role with the company, and he often reverted to stories about his relationship with
Samuel, the head of community relations in Quito, recounting how he was selected to fly to
Quito for meetings. Indeed, while there is not mention of the role of women in securing their
own access to wealth, the organization was established with corporate and NGO goals to
improve the role for women in a male dominated Kichwa society. Instead, Don Pedro's role in
the meeting reproduces a patriarchal corporate narrative that disciplines women's gendered
behavior under the guise of providing new opportunities for women outside of the home. CSR
programs shift debates at the community level to focus on maintaining corporate presence, rather
59

Siempre mi marido está diciendo que tengo que hacer cosas con la organización. También tengo que limpiar la
ropa, y hacer las cosas en la casa.
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than engaging with inequalities that emerge in resource access and control. Furthermore,
community discussions revolve around CSR programs rather than the ongoing social and
environmental injustices that are linked to resource extraction and ongoing corporate presence in
indigenous territory. Discourse and practice are tied to ensuring the constant flow of projects
from the company.
Yet, as Doña Ingrid states, she's tired of the organization, and finds it difficult to balance
her participation there with work at home, something her family also expects her to do. This
paradoxical positioning of a gendered and racialized identity emerges through the top-down
process of governance and development. The women are encouraged by male community
members to perform particular tasks that show they are organized and engaged in the microcredit process, to ensure continued support of the company and FEPP within the community.
Rather than producing a role for women as independent decision-makers, this group (re)produces
an indigenous identity tied to women's inferiority in the community. In other words, CSR
programs, despite their inclusionary and participatory appearance, lead to unequal outcomes in
resource governance decisions, and specifically women's participation in discussions about
livelihoods and making a living, as well as access to and distribution of resources. In turn, I
argue that the micro-credit organization produces ambivalence and uncertainty that fails to create
the space for women to claim control over their own daily lives in the space of the community.

Development, politics and CSR programs
In this section, I address flows of power through new conjunctures of state, corporate and
indigenous relationships and the production of politics in relation to development in the space of
Pompeya, drawing on a conversation I had with a community resident, and at the time, president
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of the junta parroquial, Doña Barbara. It is significant that Doña Barbara is not Kichwa; she
acknowledges that this gives her a different perspective on life, and possibilities for the future.
Implicit in her own positioning is the production of an indigenous identity tied to a long history
of racism and oppression. Doña Barbara arrived in Pompeya in 1972, migrating with her family
from the city of Ambato located in the south-central Andes mountains in Ecuador, as the
community and Amazon region began to be opened to outsiders. Her husband is Kichwa from
Pompeya. As corporate presence persists in the region, Doña Barbara uses her interactions with
the company and local state actors to argue that there might be a different way forward for
Pompeya. While still focused on improvement, she suggests that this vision should also include
democratic citizenship (Li 2007).
When I arrived in Ecuador in 2008, Doña Barbara was serving as the president of the
junta parroquial (parish government). She had her finger on the pulse of the community, and its
relationship to state and corporate politics. Because Doña Barbara was so vocal, and perhaps not
afraid to challenge authority and certain hierarchical and gender norms in the community, she
also had her share of enemies in the community, including Don Pedro.60 She never sat still,
running from one meeting to the next in Coca or Quito, and traveling downriver to the
communities of the parish. Eventually, I was able to catch her for a brief interview. We talked
about her vision for the community, and her frustrations. Indeed, Doña Barbara lamented the fact
that she was president of the parish when Pompeya needed a leader in the community. When her
term as parish president ended, she was elected to the position of community President in 2010.
She says,

60

Doña Barbara was usually the subject of much jealous gossip in the region. Many accused her of taking state
funds for personal gain, reflecting these social relationships of gift giving, and uneven distribution of wealth (even if
incorrect). Furthermore, this jealousy or “envidia” emerges when goods are unevenly divided, argues Hutchins
(2010).
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Well, years ago, when I came [to Pompeya], a company was already here. In this period
it was called CEPE (the state company). I came in 1972, and I married… Sure, the
visions at that time, they [the companies] were motivating the people, but we were all
natos, we never imagined what was going to happen…not only with us, but with the
people already living here, natives from here. I remember in 1982, when they established
the community as it is today, they worked with fist and the efforts of all the natives from
here, the old people, many of whom are no longer alive, they made this community. I
remember in 1993, the company Repsol came. Today there is Petroamazonas, which at
that time was Oxy. And, during this period, the people knew nothing about negotiations,
until almost today, they still don't know very well. But, little by little, it has turned
toward those who speak the most, but they don't want to listen.61
Indeed, the space of Pompeya has always been one of competing claims, including missionaries,
internal colonists, oil companies, and indigenous peoples themselves. Commenting on
development, and the movement within CSR programs from material gifts toward formal
programs, Doña Barbara argues that gifts are the root of the community's inability to move
forward. “Yes, people are more interested in gifts, or, because of gifts everything falls apart,
even if it's because of the presence of outsiders, the community falls apart. They (community
members) can't see anything positive in themselves, and the company doesn't either.”62 When
companies first arrived, they initially offered work to local people, and would pay community
members for damages to their land and property from oil spills and infrastructural development.
Eventually the company began to offer material gifts, which were often lost or damaged. As
Doña Barbara says,
61

Bueno, hace años atrás yo cuando vine ya estaba una compañía, esa época le decían CEPE yo vine en el año 1972
vine...me casé...Claro las visiones en esa época ellos iban incentivando pero siempre fuimos natos y no imaginamos
lo que iba a suceder, lo que sucedía y lo que iba a suceder y eso ocurría no solo en nosotros...sino en la gente actual,
nativa de aquí mismo, y cuando nosotros me acuerdo que en el año de 1982 que se hizo la, la actual Pompeya que es
esta, que se trabajó con puño y fuerzas de toda la gente nativa de, los antiguos, que ya ahora actualmente ya no
existen, hay poquitos se hizo esta comunidad se formó, me acuerdo que en el año de 1993 vino la petrolera
REPSOL. Hoy actualmente los que son ha, los de Petroamazonas que esa época era OXI en este año, y que esa
época pues la gente no sabía nada de negociaciones pues hasta casi actualmente todavía no se sabe bien, pero medio,
medio que horita poquito a poquito se le ha ido al que más habla pues no le quieren escuchar.
62
Si más es los regalos que más les interesa, o sea el, por el regalo lo caen, aunque sea a golpe pero lo caen, pero de
hay no hay algo positivo en ellos mismo y, y la compañía también no se hasta ahora.
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“Yes, yes, and those programs (CSR programs) – I remember that first they came to offer
work...they would also pay for any damages in the form of projects. They (the company)
gave a lot of things. They've invested a lot of money in this community, but… In
actuality, there were few projects – it was more material things we didn't think about how
long these things would last. It's like saying: I gave it to you, and you threw it in the river,
so you don't have it anymore.”63
In other words, the community was often blamed for its inability to manage the gifts it
received from the company. Here Doña Barbara is reflecting on this corporate process that
establishes powerful relationships between the corporation and the community through gift
giving. She makes the distinction between these earlier CSR projects and development, noting
that the various gifts were all things the community could have gotten for itself: “We haven't had
much development, to be able to maintain it, we only received things, insignificant material
things, I say. The computers, boat motors, little canoes, these are all things the community itself
could get, but these were the most comment things given by the company.”64
For Doña Barbara, development is about community participation, and actually
requesting certain things. It is not a process of gift giving. She notes one particular project that
was in place when I arrived in Pompeya. It was a sewing cooperative organized by the
community relations department of Repsol-YPF. Doña Barbara states that this particular project
was the only one designed to concensuarse (build consensus) of all the projects offered by the
company. In other words, for Doña Barbara, this project might have helped to remove ownership
from the company. Indeed, if CSR programs are often premised on gift-giving, much of the

63

Si, si y esos programas me acuerdo que primero vinieron a ofrecer trabajo, ofrecieron o dieron trabajo también,
ofrecieron indemnizaciones pagaron en obras, dieron muchas cosas han invertido harto dinero en esta comunidad
pero...En obras pocas y más en otros materiales que casi no ha tenido un buen sentido duradero, o sea es como decir,
diste y le botaste al agua pues no tiene.
64
No ha tenido una gran, un gran desarrollo para poder mantener, solo habido cosas, materiales insignificantes digo
yo, las computadoras, una, los motores, las canoitas, que eso usted sabe eso hasta la misma comunidad puede
conseguir pero eso es lo que habido más.
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project's control remains with the company (Rajak 2011). In Pompeya, this sewing project soon
disappeared, as the company began to reduce its programs at the local level, highlighting
corporate control over CSR projects. A company employee from Quito organized the project,
and when Repsol-YPF ended her salary, few women were motivated to continue.
Development is about a sense of entitlement, she argues, and how local people must learn
to intervene, and make demands of the company rather than merely accept gifts. By juxtaposing
gift-giving with entitlement, Doña Barbara essentially highlights the role of the company as a
paternalistic institution (Rajak 2011). She says:
“A plan has to be made with the people from here. One can't make one that's
implemented from above. Instead, it has to begin from below, and we should move up.
So, our objective [in the junta parroquial] is to work with the communities, with
assemblies, outlining how it will happen, and ensuring they [the communities] know
everything.65
Doña Barbara believes that all of these problems can be traced to the history of the
community, and its relationship with the mission, which gave the Pompeya everything. This
paternalistic role was later passed onto the company. Now no one can get rid of this mentality
that it's the community's right to get everything as a constant flow of gifts. She believes that no
one in Pompeya has any responsibilities. Work on the farm is just to pass the time. As she points
out, a family can spend one day on the farm harvesting a crop to sell, and then there's nothing to
do during the rest of the week. This language reflects the sort of disorder that outsiders seek to
correct. Traditional farming practices are not really a way to make a living, and instead there
needs to also be some sort of outsider regulation, argues Doña Barbara. Yet, this discourse

65

Las personas que claro, el un plan se tiene que hacer justamente con las personas de aquí, no se puede hacer desde
arriba hacia abajo, sino que desde abajo deberíamos ir para arriba, entonces nuestro objetivo es trabajar con las
comunidades, con asambleas, detallando dando a conocer todo.
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reinforces racist ideologies and problems of modernity and progress that remain inscribed on
indigenous bodies (see Wilson 2008).
Doña Barbara describes community meetings where only the leaders (all men) discuss
projects with the company, as they are the ones approached by community relations staff.
Ultimately, though, the company has the last word, deciding which projects will be implemented
that year, or over the next three years. The community president does not know how to
communicate the process with companies to the rest of the community. She says, “The trouble is,
no one seems interested [in changing the system]. I have to figure out how to change that. Of
course, alcohol influences everything here.”66 Here, Doña Barbara is reflecting on long histories
of debt-peonage relationships, where indigenous populations were co-opted by alcohol, and
indebted to the patrones.
I attended one community meeting in December 2008. These meetings should be held
once a month, on the first Sunday of each month. Due to various scheduling conflicts, and lack
of participation, this was the first meeting the community had attempted to hold in some time.
All registered community members are required to attend, and participate in the community-wide
minga to clean up the community center. If not, one has to pay a $1 fine. In a community of 650
people, there are at least 200 socios (community members), but on this morning only about 40
people showed up. The president was not in attendance. The community guidelines state that the
president must be present to have an official meeting, and so a discussion ensued as to whether it
was even possible to hold the meeting. Doña Barbara was vocal in attempting to convince people
that the meeting should not hinge on the president's attendance. Eventually a decision was made
to reschedule the meeting for the following Wednesday, and after a couple hours, people
66

El problema es que nadie parece interesado. Tengo que encontrar la manera de cambiar eso. Por supuesto, el
alcohol influye en todo lo de aquí.
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dispersed. Indeed, during my entire fieldwork period, community meetings continued to be
postponed, and I never attended another one. The company implements projects in an attempt to
monitor and control indigenous populations, while also criticizing the so-called disorderly
process of indigenous communities and kinship ties. Indeed, the social disorganization
highlighted by Doña Barbara through CSR programs points to enduring processes of racism in
Ecuador, and the attempts by a corporation to exercise control and authority over indigenous
subjects in the space of indigenous territory. In the next section I explore the impacts of this long
history of gift-giving through CSR programs, to reflect on relationships between corporations
and ongoing indigenous marginalization in the nation-state.67

Understanding deficiency, moving toward rights
My conversation with Doña Barbara took place just as the state was engaged in rewriting
the Ecuadorian constitution, ostensibly promoting indigenous rights, and shifting contracts with
private multinationals to ensure the state received the majority of windfall profits from ongoing
extraction (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the state started to have more presence in the northern
Amazon region: roads into Pompeya-Norte were paved, and the municipal government
constructed a sewer system in the center of Pompeya, which included latrines for households.
These material shifts prompted new discourses at the local level suggesting that perhaps the state
had not forgotten the region, and the shifting conjunctures of state, corporate and indigenous
relationships opened the space for Doña Barbara to begin to question the role of the company in
the community. She asked whether there is also space for indigenous people to make collective
rights-based claims within the state. Indeed, Doña Barbara seems to embody this ambivalence at
67

As Rajak (2011: 212) writes, gift-giving can be interpreted as “on the one hand, personal commitment, passion
and warmth; on the other paternalism, patronage, control, and crucially, exclusion.” This distinction again reflects
the duplicitous nature of CSR programs.
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the local level, highlighting racialized processes of development, while also suggesting
indigenous populations use their collective difference to ensure ongoing development. Doña
Barbara asks whether it is possible to separate this long history of a racialized indigenous
identity from questions of self-esteem (or the marked uncertainty and ambivalence in the space
of Pompeya), and that this intervention might be the crux of opening a conversation that revolves
around collective rights based claims. She says, “Yes, here we basically have to talk about the
theme of personal self-esteem. I have realized, or even I have been a part of this - we didn't
believe in ourselves, men equally as much as women, we didn't place value in who we are.”68
For Doña Barbara, her work as a local level politician is to get people to actually confront their
lack of self-esteem. For her, this is a process that must be taught, through interaction, and cannot
be something given to people to read about. She says:
[If] we would start to talk about that (self-esteem), and afterwards we could begin, how I
said, to move little by little to discuss the theme of leadership, collective rights,
knowledge that these people have rights, and this right has to be taught. Because, if I give
someone a paper, they're not going to read it, they're going to leave it piled up. That is
what one aims for, and there's a lot, as they say, there's a lot that is important to me.69
Here Doña Barbara is reflecting on the damage of ongoing corporate presence (and other
outsiders) to an indigenous identity, wondering if there is a way for indigenous people to reclaim
their difference from racialized language of CSR programs. Indeed, this lack of self-esteem
reflects the long history of outsider presence that positioned indigenous populations as deficient
subjects and receptacles for CSR projects (See Chapter 5). Designed within discourse and

68

Sí aquí lo que netamente hay que hablar el tema del autoestima personal, me he dado cuenta, o hasta yo he sido
parte de eso de que no nos estimamos a nosotras mismas, tanto el hombre como la mujer no nos estimamos a
nosotros mismos y nos valorizamos lo que somos.
69
Arrancando hablaríamos de eso, luego empezaríamos como decía ir poco a poco hablando del tema de liderazgo,
de, de derechos colectivos, saber de que esta gente tiene un derecho, y ese derecho que tenemos que enseñar, por
que también si le doy un papel tampoco me van a leer lo van a dejar arrumado. Eso es, a eso es lo que uno se solicita
y hay mucho como dicen, y hay mucho que me importa muchísimo.
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practice of development, these programs merely served to prevent any local level challenges to
corporate and state oil extraction operations. Within this conjuncture, Doña Barbara asks whether
it might be possible to shift the terms of the debate, exploring a new role for indigenous peoples
in development processes through the state.

The politics of CSR
Despite the aims of corporate and state programs that position indigenous people as
deficient subjects, Doña Barbara's positioning as a resident of Pompeya reflects her participation
in local politics, and her contacts with both state and corporate actors and ideas. Doña Barbara
aims to instruct people in the practice of politics. She, too, is engaged in the will to improve and
empower, and her vision includes active engagement with indigenous rights and responsibilities.
Yet, Doña Barbara suggests that it is an indigenous right to claim projects not only from the
company, but also from the state. Her goal is to organize local people into committees, to work
collectively to ensure communities' ongoing development. This new conjuncture of state,
indigenous and corporate actors opened a gap in companies' long dominance in the region, and
for Doña Barbara to pursue another avenue of community based organizing, one that is perhaps
out from under the gaze of CSR programs. She says,
Here we lack depth – a person that can really guide the community, and who can really
let them know things they don’t know yet. Because, to be the president [of the junta
parroquial] is a lot of work – it's more project development than to be working with
people, organizing, motivating them, helping them know the law, all their rights. So,
there's not really that time for a president to do all that. But, when one is part of a
committee, or becomes a member, well, he or she can work continually with the people,
training them, helping them to know a lot of things people here don't know. The people
here don't even know their collective rights! They don't know collective rights of
indigenous people!70
70

[A]quí falta profundizar que haya una persona quien les guíe de verdad, y les de a conocer, por que el estar en la
presidencia es mucho trabajo, es más gestión que estar juntamente con la gente organizando, haciéndoles incentivar,
dándoles a conocer leyes, derechos en todo campo, entonces no hay ese tiempo para una per, para un presidente,
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The challenge, though, is to engage people over the long term. The company has also
conditioned local people to expect immediate, tangible results.
[Yet], they're only interested for a moment in something – in the theme of money, they
come, but when you say collaborate, participate, let's do that, no…But, when they [the
companies] say, we're going to give you this, or there's food, there, yes, the whole world
moves.71
She was looking forward to the end of her term in April 2009, when she might be able to spend
more time in Pompeya, to become a real community presence. Doña Barbara maintains a critical
view of the role of the company, and what it is doing to the community, yet she advocates for a
more savvy relationship with corporations, rather than ending corporate support altogether. She
suggests that the community just needs a few people who are interested in development, without
losing indigenous traditions:
I don't see anything positive for the people here. For those who recognize this, and here
we have about 200 community members, [of which] we are 10 who think that this
community has to develop, to better day to day, without forgetting tradition or culture that is the principle. But, we always have to have a development mentality, because if we
weren't to have that…72
There is hope that the community take control of its own development, because it has its own
indigenous identity, albeit one that must be reclaimed:
Yes, there's hope that the community also views its own development, as a community,
because they also have their own identity, their own needs, their own culture, language,
so for all these reasons, they should…we should begin this year to make a communal

pero cuando se está en una vocalía o se llega a ser algún miembro pues se puede llegar a estar con la gente
continuamente capacitando, dándoles a conocer muchas cosas que la gente aquí no conoce, ni los mismos derechos
colectivos la gente aquí no conoce! No saben que son los derechos colectivos del propio indígena!
71
Solo les interesa el ratito de algo, en el tema del dinero lo ven, pero ya así cuando le dice colaboración,
participación, hagamos esto, hagamos, no, pero cuando dicen van a regalar esto o hay comida, esto, hay si todo
mundo arrancaron por que arrancaron.
72
Yo tampoco no veo algo positivo aquí para la gente. Pero para los que miramos y que habemos de unos 200,
habemos unos 10 que pensamos de que este pueblo tiene que desarrollar, ser mejor día a día sin, sin olvidarse la
tradición ni la cultura por que eso es lo principal pero siempre ha, tenemos que tener siempre una mentalidad de
desarrollo por que si no se tuviera eso de que, de que...
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plan. And, those of us in the junta parroquial, with the current budget, we can maintain
parish board plans with all the communities.73
As my fieldwork neared its end in May 2010, Doña Barbara was elected community
president. It was the first time a woman was president of Pompeya, and she essentially took the
job because no one else wanted to do it. Following the brief presidency of Manuel, the youngest
President Pompeya has had to date, who viewed his job as negotiating with the companies for
new projects, Doña Barbara was taking concrete action to begin to restructure Pompeya, for
better or worse. She organized a committee that would be in charge of collecting electricity
payments from households in the community center. Similarly, she attempted to revamp the
potable water committee to get it up and running again (see Chapter 5). It still remains to be seen
what new conjunctures will emerge as the corporation's role shifts in the community of
Pompeya, and whether indigenous peoples can begin to direct development processes in their
community. Doña Barbara's discourse and actions point to the ambivalence and uncertainty in
resisting powerful actors in the region, especially given the state’s patchwork presence. She
urges collective action rooted in 'traditional' indigenous identity production, which raises
important questions about monitoring and controlling indigenous populations, indigenous
sovereignty and identity, and her own role as a non-indigenous community leader with close ties
to both state and corporate actors.

73

Si hay una esperanza de que también la comunidad vea su propio desarrollo como comunidad, porque ellos
también tienen su, su propia identidad, su propia necesidad, su propia cultura, su idioma entonces por lo mismo
siempre deberían estar, deberíamos estar ya de este año empezar a someternos a un plan comunal y nosotros la junta
parroquial pues ya con el presupuesto actualmente vamos a mantener estos planes parroquiales con todas las
comunidades….
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Conclusion
This chapter explores indigenous subjectivity and identity in the space of the northern
Amazon region, and the community of Pompeya in order to investigate indigenous political
agency tied to relations of rule and sovereignty. Indeed, by exploring the conduct of conduct, and
relationships of self-discipline that are linked to improvement regimes like CSR programs, we
can understand more fully the ebbs and flows of forms of rule through the space of the northern
Amazon region, and the production of both a space of rule and the subjects within. I attempt to
explore the production of power, subjects, and territory by examining the way in which
indigenous peoples articulate 'selective sovereignties' in the space of their community (Moore
2005: 221). The chapter takes a historical perspective in an attempt to point to earlier iterations
of indigenous subject formation tied to daily struggles grounded in particular places, which are
then reflected in the space of the community today. In designing the chapter in this fashion, I
place politics alongside development, exploring how local people are incorporated into, and
come to understand development as both subjects of action, as well as the way in which power
relations lead to subjection to government (cf. Li 2007; Moore 2000, 2005).
Local populations acknowledge their own complicity in CSR programs, but are unsure
whether or how to undo these practices. Indeed, the corporation represents a powerful actor
engaged in a history of gift giving following cultural norms and histories in the region. In
essence, this chapter calls attention to the spatial inequalities defined by a patchwork state
presence in the region, and CSR programs that serve to subject indigenous populations to
corporate presence. By highlighting the difference between entitlement and gift giving, though,
Doña Barbara calls attention to corporate control over development processes. The everyday
practices and daily struggles that emerge through CSR programs help to illuminate the
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unevenness of ruling relations in the space of an indigenous community. Indeed, CSR programs
grant local people a sense of legitimacy in the space of their community, drawing on symbolic
and practical aspects of an indigenous identity rooted in gift giving. In turn, though, CSR
programs also call into question indigenous sovereign control over their own territory in the
space of their community. The uncertainty and ambivalence produced through participation in
CSR programs, on the one hand, highlights the lack of collective action in Pompeya, and
inability to call attention to their rights and access to resources. On the other hand, though, it also
masks indigenous peoples' resistance to full incorporation into CSR programs as corporate
subjects. Ambiguity can reflect the ways in which people try and reconcile their personal
circumstances with a view of how the world ought to work (Wolford 2006). The multiple and
overlapping spaces of sovereignty in the space of Pompeya that are at once selective and situated
suggests community members' ability to draw on specific social relationships when it is most
beneficial to them, or situating their struggles amid “modes of power and practices of subjection”
(Moore 2005: 280). In the next chapter, I turn to the state's interpretation of CSR programs, and
relationships between oil resources and modernization that challenges indigenous citizenship and
rights in the state, but also the state's sovereignty.
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Chapter 4
The Duplicitous Nature of the State
While oil is considered a national priority, the people who live in zones of exploitation,
well, we’re going to be the most vulnerable in terms of our rights, because, in addition to
extraction, we don’t have anyone to turn to.
It’s the same government that is handing out the (oil) camps, that is telling private
companies to do what they want - there is no contamination, that is in charge of
controlling (extraction), that is following environmental interests, while at the same time
other government officials, including the president, have an extractive vision like no
other government before.74
Personal Interview, President, Oficina de Derecho Ambiental75, NGO, Coca, 2009

Introduction
When I arrived in Ecuador in October 2008, Repsol-YPF was close to being forced out of
the country over contract disputes with the state (El Comercio 6 November, 2008). So-called
production contracts had dictated a 50-50 split between the state and private companies for
windfall profits from extraction; the state, in the midst of restructuring its oil extraction
processes, was seeking to take 99% of those profits, leaving private companies with 1%. RepsolYPF was still reeling from the state's political stance against the company when I met with
Samuel, the community relations officer, at Repsol-YPF's offices in Quito on November 8, 2008.
Samuel immediately showed me a copy of El Comercio, a national newspaper in Ecuador, from
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Entonces, mientras el petróleo esté considerado de prioridad nacional, la gente que vivimos en zonas de, de
explotación hidrocarburíferas pues vamos a ser vulnerados nuestros derechos, por que encima de eso no tenemos a
quien acudir, por que es el mismo gobierno el que está entregando los campos, el que está diciendo vayan, no hay
contaminación, es el mismo que se encarga de vigilar, el mismo ministro entrega los campos petroleros el mismo
ministro también, he, controla a la, a la institución de que vela por los intereses ambientales, aunque sea otros
ministro está dirigido por el mismo gobierno el mismo presidente, está puesto por un mismo presidente y que
especialmente este presidente a, a, tiene una visión extractivista como ningún otro...
75
Office of Environmental Rights
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a few days prior. On November 4, 2008 NAWE (Nacionalidad Waorani del Ecuador)76 the
Waorani indigenous organization had written a quarter-page declaration (Manifiesto de la
Nacionalidad Waorani del Ecuador – NAWE – Al Gobierno Ecuatoriano y a la Opinión Pública)
pressing the state to prevent Repsol-YPF from leaving. NAWE cited the company's help through
corporate social responsibility programs in local communities, and stated that without that help
the Waorani people could not survive.
Indigenous groups’ seeming support for Repsol-YPF, or rationalization of their rights
through a private corporation, raises questions about indigenous agency and political
participation in the Ecuadorian state against the backdrop of ongoing oil extraction. Following
Nelson (2009), I ask why indigenous peoples need CSR programs to make these claims on the
state. What is the authority that thinks it can grant these claims? How do indigenous
organizations (and the communities they claim to represent) make a living in “a world structured
in dominance…” (Nelson 2009: 158)?
In turn, I argue that CSR programs, and neoliberal shifts more broadly, led to the
entanglement of indigenous populations within neoliberal policies (cf. Andolina, et al. 2009;
Bakker 2010; Hale 2011; Moore 2005). The roll-out of neoliberal reforms in Ecuador both
created the space for indigenous organizations to claim collective rights to territory following a
sustained indigenous movement through the 1990s. Yet, neoliberal policies and programs also
circumscribed the terms of debates about rights and cultural difference by containing political
participation to the local level, and limiting indigenous participation in questions of resource
governance, and membership in the nation-state (cf. Hale 2011; Sawyer 2004).
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In English, this organization is the Waorani Nationality of Ecuador. When the organization was founded in 1990,
it was the Organization of Huaorani Nationalities of Amazonian Ecuador (ONHAE). The new spelling of Waorani
reflects the shift toward non-Hispano origins of the name of the indigenous group.
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Globally, the transnational indigenous social movements of the 1990s called into question
the impacts of oil extraction on indigenous populations, while also challenging indigenous
citizenship, and meanings of the nation in Ecuador (cf. Fontaine 2003; Sawyer 2004). In turn,
neoliberal ideologies challenged the state’s control over oil resources and modernization (cf.
Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia 2008). The discourses and processes of modernization
through oil resources, or the linking of a political body to a state’s natural body (cf. Coronil
1997) through la Patria (cf. Martz 1987; Perreault and Valdivia 2010) is made more complex by
indigenous relationships to a private company that provides ‘modernization’ in the form of
material resources and infrastructural improvements. Neoliberal processes of privatization
challenge state sovereignty and links between a territory and oil resources (cf. Perreault and
Valdivia 2010). Thus, state sovereignty is threatened by both the possibility of indigenous
organizing, as well as ongoing neoliberal policies that redistribute oil wealth removing the state’s
control over its sub-surface resources. The Ecuadorian state operates under the fear of being
“dispossessed from both within and without” (Nelson 2009: 210). How does it reconcile these
encroachments?
I contend that the recent shifts in the state that ostensibly promote indigenous
participation in political-economic debates, including the drafting of a new constitution, also
expose the state’s strategic and duplicitous interests in oil governance and relationships to
indigenous and other marginalized populations in Ecuador. In Chapter 3, indigenous peoples
claimed they were duped by the company (cf. Nelson 2009). Here I suggest the state also
engages in duping, leaving those populations at the point of extraction to the ‘control’ of
multinational corporations (even if it claims oversight of corporate operations).
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To be duped, argues Nelson (2009: 12) “is different from claiming ignorance.” It is a way
to avoid taking full responsibility. But, duping can also be “world shattering. Trust is deceived,
betrayed…At the moment of becoming conscious of the duplicity the self splits into the pre-self
that didn’t know and the new self that is in the know.” People become uncertain. It forces one to
question how to act after such revelations. And, yet, Nelson cautions, the person, or institution
who claims to be duped could still be avoiding responsibility. How might we know?
The state’s attempts to undo neoliberal policies, and the formal end of CSR programs,
also exposes its duplicitous nature – and continues to challenge notions of Ecuador as a petrostate. The Ecuadorian state suffers from crises of legitimacy that stem from extraction of oil. As
is typical for petro-states, the so-called resource curse effect argues that while the state generates
significant resources it lacks the authority and autonomy to enact economic policies, and often
postpones much needed reforms. In the case of Ecuador, the state becomes predatory, and CSR
programs tend to exacerbate these processes (Bebbington 2010; Bridge 2004).
While Correa claims that the state was also ‘duped’ by private companies, and responds
by signing new contracts with multinationals to capture more of the rents from oil resources, this
earlier process of turning over zones of resource extraction to private companies was also
strategic. It was a plan that could allow the state to extract yet more oil. In turn, by publically
challenging corporate presence in Ecuador, the state outwardly feigns ignorance in these twofaced processes (of capitalism). Yet, behind the scenes (cf. Nelson 2009), the duplicitous nature
of the state emerges, as Claudia, the president of FCUNAE, and other indigenous leaders make
clear. Local indigenous organizations refuse to be duped by the state.
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Outline of the chapter
In order to develop my argument about indigenous entanglement in neoliberal policies
and the state’s duplicitous nature, I begin by examining the resource curse, state sovereignty, and
subject formation in the space of Ecuador. Next, I turn to histories of oil extraction, and the
political economy of petroleum, including neoliberal policies that restructured state institutions
and shaped citizen-subject formation. I follow this section with an exploration of indigenous
social movements that emerged through the 1990s to challenge oil extraction and its negative
impacts, and also grant indigenous peoples rights to territory and representation in electoral
politics. Despite the achievements of the indigenous movement through the 1990s, the marches
also “inadvertently circumscribed the terrain...upon which future struggles among state, national
elite, corporate, and indigenous actors would take place” (Sawyer 2004: 30).
In the latter half of the chapter, I focus on recent shifts in contracts between
multinationals and the Ecuadorian state to explore new forms of access to resource rents, and
responses by indigenous leaders. Close ties between indigenous organizations and corporations
through CSR programs produced confusion and ambivalence within indigenous leadership, but
also allowed the space for more productive questioning of the state. I conclude by examining a
'new' model of development in Ecuador, one in which the state claims more of the rents from oil
extraction leading Ecuador toward renewed goals of modernization and development.
In other words, the state has reached its moment of ‘reckoning,’ throwing off the
‘wizard’s’ mantle of neoliberalism (Nelson 2009) (at least discursively) and moving into
something that some scholars are critically examining as post-neoliberal (cf. Bebbington and
Bebbington 2010; Escobar 2010; Macdonald and Ruckert 2009; Peck et al. 2009). Yet, Ecuador
remains a petro-state, and continues to struggle with control over sovereign territory and state
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control over resource extraction and distribution. It is forced to reckon with its political and
economic roles as it shifts the terms of extraction (cf. Coronil 1997; Nelson 2009).

Petro-states
In this section I explore the governable space of the nation (cf. Watts 2004a), produced
through petro-capitalism, a space that is subject to conflict given the presence of multinational
oil companies (see, for example, Watts 2003, 2004a,b; Zalik 2004). I examine this space in the
context of the state’s national patrimony tied to its subterranean oil resources (see Valdivia 2008;
Perreault and Valdivia 2010). I build on geographical literature (see inter alia Bebbington and
Bebbington 2010; Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Bebbington 2009; LeBillon 2001; Valdivia 2008;
Watts 2001; Moore 2000) that calls for analyses of resource conflict that are attentive not only to
political economies that structure resource access and control, but also attention to ‘meanings
and social identities’ that emerge from within resource politics.
Terry Karl (1997: 15) argues that because mining states “own the center of
accumulation,” rely so heavily on profits from extractive industries, and provide the means
through which these rents enter the economy, the states themselves become the object of rent
seeking behavior, even from their own institutions. It is not easy, then, to separate economic
‘rationality’ from political behavior, as Coronil (1997) also suggests in linking the natural body
of the state to its political body (see below). In turn, political decisions hinge on the economic
performance of the extractive industry. In petro-states or oil states, Karl (1997) argues, these
processes are even more firmly entrenched, because of the extraordinary nature of oil rents there is little need for further investment in order to continue capturing income. This allows the
state to expand its jurisdiction, but at the same time weakens its authority by increasing
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opportunities for both public and private actors to engage in rent seeking behavior (cf. Watts
2001, 2004a,b). Therefore, these other public and private institutions can have a direct impact on
the decision-making processes of the state. In moments of extremely high profits, these features
that are unique to oil states can become exaggerated (Karl 1997).
LeBillon (2001) argues that the windfall rents in oil-rich states provide little incentive for
the production of rules to develop a diversified economy. This prevents possibilities for
alternative forms of economic power. Furthermore, on the one hand “domestic political
competition” can be stymied by devolving the resource sector to foreign firms, as Ecuador did
throughout the 1990s, but on the other hand this move satisfies international financial
institutions. In petro-states (cf. Coronil 1997; Karl 1997; Nelson 2009), wealth and power are
usually concentrated in the hands of elites, leaving marginalized groups frustrated. Often, argues
LeBillon (2001), political change is the only way for the marginalized to voice their grievances.
Sometimes this leads to violent outcomes (cf. Watts 2004a,b). In Ecuador, political protest was
muted by the state’s mandate to require CSR programs linked to privatization policies, and these
CSR institutions often served to erase, or blur the boundaries between state elites, and
marginalized indigenous populations, as I argue throughout the dissertation.
Building on discussions of petro-states (cf. Coronil 1997; Karl 1997; Watts 2005), I ask
what the removal of CSR programs exposes or uncovers about the state and its relationship to
indigenous populations and oil wealth. Others have considered the ‘magic of the state’ that arises
from political and economic processes. Fernando Coronil (1997: 4) argues that the petro-state is
magical because of its subsoil resources, its natural body, and a second body, the political body,
that together make up the state as a single agent that could “remake the nation.” Diane Nelson
(2009: 217) finds that Guatemala’s “magic is less potent,” relying on agro-export industries and

124

increasingly on mineral resources. In the case of Guatemala, if the state defends the interests of
the elites, it looks strong, but in the post-war era in Guatemala it also claims to represent the
poor, and here it looks weak. Nelson (2009: 218) argues that elites drain the state of resources so
it looks “anemic” or “incompetent and corrupt.” Continuing, she suggests that a state can often
split – wondering which face to show. This forces us to ask if the state is weak, unable to harness
the wealth of oil, “pathetically” letting others do it? “Or is [the state engaging in a] brilliant ploy
to get off the hook of having to provide for people, a neoliberal dream in which they eagerly
privatize themselves?” (p. 255). I suggest a neoliberal/post-neoliberal moment following the
election of Rafael Correa in 2007 in Ecuador that calls for renewed attention to these questions
of rentier-effects, and petro-states in particular is also a moment of ‘reckoning’ to continue to
explore the ways in which “petroleum is the body through which state and citizen meet”
(Valdivia 2008: 460). My analysis contributes to these arguments to suggest that reflection on
the multiple bodies of the state complicates analysis of subject formation and challenges state
sovereignty.
Building on Coronil’s (1998) arguments linking sub-surface resources to the political
body that makes up the nation, others have also examined petroleum as a “‘thing’ through which
actors represent and enforce the conduct of government” (Valdivia 2008: 459). In turn, subject
identities, or territorialities are produced through a sense of belonging to this “physical body.”
Valdivia’s (2008) analysis builds on Foucauldian relationships between ‘humans and things’ as
the art of governing, or ‘conduct of conduct,’ but she suggests that we have to understand the
quality of the ‘thing’ through which governance takes place. In the case of Ecuador, oil’s
physical qualities are important to understanding the economic and political relationships of oil
production. Furthermore, the particular technologies of production, including pipelines and
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pumping stations, are also shaped by petroleum’s material qualities. These are also the sites at
which oil-workers stopped production, leading to political processes that can challenge how oil is
governed. In other words, these protests form the sites through which “acts of citizenship” are
made visible (Valdivia 2008).
My analysis of CSR programs, indigenous peoples, and the state focuses on the way in
which the physical body of oil produces pollution and physically harms indigenous populations.
CSR programs can cover up those risks, but not eliminate them. How, then, I ask, can indigenous
peoples make up the body-politic of the state, if it literally makes them sick? The production of
the territory of the nation-state is also dependent on masking these negative externalities that are
simultaneously produced in the body of the nation and the bodies of indigenous citizens.
Sovereignty, then, is produced through CSR programs and disciplinary techniques, forcing the
state to reconcile its multiple bodies. If indigenous protests through the 1990s called attention to
these health impacts, CSR programs mask the social injustices that are tied to oil extraction. In
the next section I turn to oil extraction in Ecuador, and state and corporate maneuvering to gain
control over oil rents.

Ecuador’s political economy of oil
As the global importance of petroleum grew through the 20th Century, companies sought
out new spaces and frontiers for the expansion of global capital. Some of this expansion
happened in the Ecuadorian Amazon region. In turn, the Ecuadorian government, aiming to
capitalize on these explorations opened large areas of the region to foreign exploration and
investment - what some have called entreguismo – or the selling out of the country’s interests
(see Valdivia 2008). During this period contracts were signed on a concessionary basis – through
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renting or leasing – and there were few regulations placed on corporations. In this way, argues
Valdivia (2008: 460), the state could increase its wealth, and in turn the “well-being of its
citizens.” Yet, exploration efforts were largely unsuccessful. Ecuador’s crude was difficult to
access and of low quality, and some companies returned their concessions (Martz 1986; Valdivia
2008).
Oil extraction began in earnest with the discovery of productive wells by Texaco
Petroleum and Gulf in 1967.77 In 1963 a large oil field was uncovered in the neighboring
Putumayo region in Colombia, and companies hoped to find more deposits across the border in
Ecuador. Soon thereafter, the Ecuadorian government signed a contract with Texaco-Gulf
(Gerlach 2003). Because of the incipient nature of Ecuador's oil industry, along with
entreguismo, and rent seeking behavior to accrue profits, investments favored private oil
companies, as the state sought rent from oil extraction. After successful findings in the field
along the border, other fields were discovered by Texaco-Gulf. Ecuador soon received additional
requests to open the Amazon region to additional explorations by foreign companies. About 30
concessions were granted by 1970, encompassing 10 million hectares and involving several
companies that invested in exploration and production (Fontaine 2003; Gerlach 2003; Martz
1984; Valdivia 2008).
Following these discoveries, a former Minister of Natural and Energy Resources,
Gustavo Jarrín Ampudia, announced that oil was the “inalienable Patrimony of the State” and the
constitution reflected this, establishing ownership through the Ecuadorian population (quoted in
Valdivia 2008: 460-1). Furthermore, the government would be the only administrator of the
resource. In 1971, a military coup nationalized sub-surface resources, and established the
77

Although foreign oil companies, including Shell Oil, arrived in the Amazon region in the 1920s (geologic studies
suggested the possibility of petroleum in the Amazon region), exploration efforts were largely unproductive and
many private companies returned their concessions in 1948 (Sawyer 2004, Valdivia 2008).
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country’s first hydrocarbons law (la Ley de Hidrocarburos), which allowed the state to retain
rights to the subsoil in the Amazon region. It also laid the groundwork for a national company, la
Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE), although the company itself wasn’t
established until the following year. (In 1989, CEPE changed its name to Petroecuador, and was
restructured, explained in-depth below.) Many of these institutional shifts sought to regain state
control over oil rents and private investments (Gerlach 2003).
The hydrocarbons law is most notable for establishing the government’s sovereignty in
the region, by retaining state rights to the subsoil, and ending the earlier “system of concessions”
to foreign oil interests.78 These changes essentially meant that CEPE was granted full exploration
and exploitation rights in the region, and transportation and refining would also be state
controlled. Foreign companies that were interested in the region would have to sign a series of
agreements with CEPE to extract oil, and CEPE controlled all the pricing (Martz 1987).79 In
1972 Texaco finished construction on the Sistema de Oleoducto Transecuatoriano (SOTE)
pipeline from the northern Amazon region to the coast, and plans were established to construct a
refinery on the coast (Martz 1987). During this period of the 1960s and 1970s, Ecuador’s
military government put together a series of plans that were to end the country’s social and
economic contradictions (Sawyer 2004). As Martz (1987) suggests, it soon became clear that the
country’s oil resources would aid the government in these plans. Specifically, a restructuring of
the state’s economic and social services, subsidized by oil revenues, marked the 1970s.
The hydrocarbons law developed petroleum as a public resource used to finance
development of the nation. In other words, the state is framed as a one that “cares” for a
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This retention of state sovereignty is not unique to Ecuador, and in fact is quite common in most Latin American
states. See for example, Coronil (1997).
79
Martz (1987) suggests that in reality, this law was quite weak, and did little to protect the economic interests of
the state.

128

population's well-being, that finances public projects, all dependent on ongoing resource
extraction (Valdivia 2008: 462; Coronil 1998). During this period CEPE became the most
important state institution as it managed and distributed the wealth from oil extraction.
Redistribution of wealth, coupled with low prices on many basic goods due to state subsidies, led
to the increased purchasing power of the population. Yet, as the international price for oil began
to decline in the 1980s, so did Ecuador’s socio-political stability (Gerlach 2003).
In the 1970s, Ecuador had entered into a program of moderate foreign indebtedness,
which it continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In committing to these foreign indebtedness
policies, Ecuador tried to instigate a series of reforms that eliminated a role for the state (Martz
1987). Ecuador joined OPEC in 1973, but left again in 1992 when global oil prices plummeted.
(In 2008, Ecuador rejoined the cartel under current President Correa.) Oil continues to finance
infrastructural improvement in the country, especially in the major cities. In the 1970s and
1980s, roads and airports were built in the Amazon region to facilitate access, and immigration
from the highlands to the lowlands intensified. Oil was equated with modernization and progress
(Valdivia 2005; Gerlach 2003). At the same time, the Amazon region was devastated socially
and environmentally by extraction, especially the northern Amazonian provinces of Orellana and
Sucumbíos.80 Texaco (today Chevron) is implicated in much of this devastation, as one of the
first companies to begin extraction (Kimmerling 1993).81
Throughout the 1980s, the government sought out loans from the International Monetary
Fund, Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank that would fund exploration and
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These two provinces did not exist when oil extraction began in Ecuador. Instead, they were cleaved from Napo –
Sucumbios in 1989, and Orellana in 2000 – to help administer oil development and capture additional rents.
81
A longstanding lawsuit brought against Chevron by Ecuadorian plaintiffs, including some indigenous populations
was recently decided in an Ecuadorian court in Lago Agrio, in the northern Amazon region. The plaintiffs received
an $18 billion settlement in January 2012 to pay for health and environmental damages following Texaco’s
operations in Ecuador. (See Keefe 2012 for more information on the history of the case and the recent decision, as
well as Sawyer 2002, 2006, 2009a,b and Valdivia 2007 for a more critical analysis of the lawsuit, corporate
sovereignty, and indigenous rights.)
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development of oil, anticipating that increased oil production would also increase state revenue.
Petroleum prices continued to fall and the government instituted structural adjustment policies.
International lending institutions pushed for the privatization of oil operations to re-finance
Ecuador's growing debt (Valdivia 2008; Sawyer 2004). In turn, the government approved
changes to the hydrocarbons law. CEPE was the first institution to undergo restructuring because
it was viewed as inefficient and corrupt. Its name was changed to Petroecuador, and although it
remained a state company it was divided into several affiliated, independent branches. Each
branch addressed a different piece of extraction, including exploration, distribution, and
production, designed to make oil extraction in Ecuador more efficient. Furthermore, the industry
opened to foreign investment, to expand infrastructure, increase production and spur economic
growth (Valdivia 2008).
State controlled oil fields were leased to foreign multinational companies, or sometimes
operated under a joint venture. Oil production in Ecuador boomed in the 1990s when the country
exited OPEC under President Durán Ballén. International investors and institutions were in favor
of these policies, to increase Ecuador's economic stature on a global scale. The new
hydrocarbons law, drafted with the World Bank, was designed to reduce the state's control over
extraction. Private corporations began to extract oil in so-called “marginal fields” and they were
also granted permission to begin expansion of the SOTE pipeline. In 2003 the OCP (Oleoducto
de Crudo Pesado) pipeline was constructed with financial backing from several private
companies, including Repsol-YPF (Sawyer 2004).
The SOTE pipeline initially transported oil from all the fields in the Oriente, including
the higher quality extracted by Petroecuador, and the lower quality extracted by private
companies, resulting in a type of oil known as the ‘Oriente Blend’. The blended oil is discounted
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in international markets accounting for differences in quality. In turn, the reduction of value in
oil from Petroecuador’s oil fields was interpreted as an attack on national identity, and threatened
national sovereignty (see Valdivia 2008). This sentiment, combined with policies that favored
increases in private extraction, led to the proposed construction of the OCP pipeline, ostensibly
to alleviate pressure on the older SOTE pipeline. In turn, opposition movements, including
Petroecuador workers, critiqued construction of this pipeline on the grounds that it would reduce
Ecuador’s oil reserves more rapidly, and it threatened the social and environmental health of the
localities it passed through. Despite these protests, the pipeline was put into production in 2003.
The OCP pipeline could transport crudes of higher density, while the SOTE was left for
Petroecuador’s oil fields. Separating the two crudes could increase prices for Ecuador’s Oriente
Blend, and the pipeline became a particular ‘technology of rule’ through which the state could
“rationalize the participation of private companies in petroleum extraction as beneficial for the
Ecuadorian people” (Valdivia 2008: 472).
At the same time, new contracts with multinationals were established. Previous contracts
were “risk-service contracts” where foreign companies granted services to the Ecuadorian
government in return for a portion of profits from discovered oil. Oil exploration was at the
multinational's own risk. If oil was discovered, the state would reimburse the company for its
exploration costs. If oil was not found, the state had no obligations. These agreements were
signed with Petroecuador, and theoretically it monitored all foreign multinational activity
(Sawyer 2004; Martz 1987). In the 1990s, production-sharing contracts were introduced, and
control over multinational operations disappeared. Contracts were given to companies that
committed to investing the most capital, with the most involved exploration plans, and those that
offered the state the best production-sharing agreement. Because there was no reimbursement,
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there was no need for Petroecuador to monitor investments and corporate activity. The
Ecuadorian state used these contracts to boost investment from foreign multinationals. A
required piece of these contracts were CSR programs. With little state monitoring, however,
there was no oversight in corporate operations and corporations often implemented programs that
should have been the state's responsibility.
Building on others (see Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia 2008; Watts 2001), I
examine this history of a nationalist development project through oil extraction in Ecuador
arguing that it contributes to, and constitutes a sense of community, with and through oil
Subterranean resources and hydrocarbons production correspond to the territoriality of the
nation-state (Watts 2004, 2001; Perreault and Valdivia 2010). The “ideological construction” of
the nation is linked in the term “la Patria” (Perreault and Valdivia 2010: 3; Sawyer 2004).
Following Perreault and Valdivia (2010), la Patria is understood both in the sense of a
“government and citizens,” and a “natural body” of nature and territory, the basis of the economy
(see also Coronil 1997). In turn, petroleum in Ecuador becomes the “patrimonio nacional or
inheritance of the nation and its citizens,” linking oil extraction to modernization and growth of
the state (Perreault and Valdivia 2010: 691; Watts 2001). Perreault and Valdivia (2010), argue
that the “imagined hydrocarbon communities” they study produce implications for citizenship
and national belonging, and impact and influence resource struggles. Thus, by linking la Patria
to natural resources, scholars have argued that contestation over resource extraction policies
frame the governance of subjects and in turn, subjects also shape technologies that discipline
citizen life (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Moore 2005, 2000, 1998; Perreault 2006).
There are numerous studies that have explored relationships between citizenship and state
power (see inter alia Secor 2004; Watts 2001; Perreault 2006; Sawyer 2004; Valdivia 2008). In
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the context of the Ecuadorian nation, Valdivia (2008: 458) explored “petro-citizenship” as a way
to understand how “life ought to be conducted” in Ecuador, tied explicitly to the governance of
oil. Citizenship hinges on inclusion and exclusion, and emerges in everyday life (Secor 2004;
Valdivia 2008). It allows us to question an individual's or group's relationship to a territory, or
political body, and who is worthy of being a member (Painter and Philo 1995). As Sawyer
(2004) argues, la Patria is about possession, and patriarchal processes of a white, male elite
(despite being a feminine noun in Spanish). “La Patria is the right of conquest” (Sawyer 2004:
221). In turn, indigenous populations in Ecuador have positioned themselves against the state by
using the language of “the nation” to challenge discourses of la Patria. The nation becomes a
chosen site of struggle, and a process of creating a collective sense of belonging. I turn to these
struggles in the next section, and the production of an indigenous social movement throughout
the 1990s.

Development, indigenous peoples, and oil
As explored in the previous chapter, beginning in the 1960s, the state began a process of
“agricultural colonization” in the Amazon region to make the land more productive. In 1964,
Ecuador enacted its first agrarian reform law, which also coincided with US-related ‘concerns’
regarding social inequalities in Latin America that might result in another Cuban-style
revolution. Furthermore, this law did away with the “feudal system of serfdom” that led to the
expropriation of hacienda and former Church lands in the highlands (Sawyer 2004: 44). In the
Amazon region, the discourse surrounding passage of the law included a notion of tierras
baldías or “underworked lands” that were in need of development, despite existence of
indigenous populations in the region. These agrarian reforms were used to promote the Amazon
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region within the nation-state, especially during a period of conflict with Peru, and to present it
as a “release valve” for population pressures in the highlands (Macdonald 1999; Yashar 2005;
Valdivia 2005; Sawyer 2004). (During the same period oil exploration and extraction was
beginning in Ecuador, as outlined above, and in the previous chapter.)
As conflicts emerged between indigenous populations and internal colonists, indigeneity
was identified with preventing progress of a modern nation-state. The modern-nation state was
linked to petroleum revenues, and progress was tied to programs that furthered health, education
and urbanization, but also notions of welfare, and taking care of a population. The central
government provided subsidies for populations, kept taxes low, and offered credit for industrial
investment (Carriere 2001; Gerlach 2003; Perreault and Valdivia 2011). National policies were
designed to incorporate indigenous populations into the 'civilized state', calling for an end to
subsistence practices and cultural norms that marked indigenous difference from mestizo
populations (Valdivia 2005; Muratorio 1994; Radcliffe and Westwood 1996).
Indigenous peoples organized to collectively respond to these land grabs instituted by the
state, defending their land and collective autonomy (Yashar 2005). The state had essentially
turned over the Amazon region to missionaries prior to the 1960s, because it was unable to
control and tame the so-called 'savages' (Yashar 2005). Missionaries had started a process of
'civilizing' indigenous peoples through Christianity. These missionary groups initially included
the Jesuits and later the Catholic Josephines and Salesians. At about the same time, though,
Evangelical Protestants also entered the region. This often resulted in conflict between Catholics
and Protestants, although both ultimately wanted to see capitalist development in the Amazon
region (Muratorio 1991). Many missionary programs, including attending schools and church
services, were promoted through a process of gift giving in an attempt to persuade Kichwa
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communities to give up their cultural traditions (Muratorio 1991). The Summer Institute of
Linguistics, a Protestant group, focused on ways to draw indigenous peoples into “productive
society,” as rational, national subjects, or “peasant citizens” (Valdivia 2005: 288). Following
attempts to settle indigenous groups by building schools, churches and health facilities,
indigenous populations became dependent on church based development programs. Missionaries
also provided Spanish language skills, allowing indigenous groups to communicate among and
across each other, and ultimately this allowed indigenous Amazonian groups the local autonomy
they needed to demand rights to territory (Sawyer 2004).
Furthermore, progressive missionaries introduced ideas of 'liberation theology' whereby
indigenous populations were exposed to ideas about 'dependency theory' and notions of 'coreperiphery' power relationships through trade of raw materials (Muratorio 1991). Indeed, this
prompted indigenous populations to question development banks and multinational corporations.
Several indigenous Amazonian groups emerged in this period, including the Federación de
Centros Shuar, formed with the help of Salesian priests influenced by liberation theology
(Macdonald 1999). Other lowland Kichwa organizations include FOIN – also aided to some
extent by the Josephines – and OPIP (see Perreault 2003a,b and Sawyer 2004, respectively, for
in-depth discussions of the histories and politics of these organizations in Ecuador.)
Following these models, highland and lowland indigenous groups organized at local,
regional and national levels. At the regional level, the following indigenous organizations
emerged: CONFENAIE (est. 1980) in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Ecuador Runacunapac
Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI) (est. 1972) in the highlands, and Coordinadora de las
Organizaciones Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana (COICE) on the coast. (Today COICE is the
Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas y Negras de la Costa Ecuatoriana or CONICE.)
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CONFENAIE represents eight indigenous nationalities: Kichwa, Shuar, Achuar Shiwiar, Siona,
Secoya, Cofan and Waorani (Sawyer 2004). It not only sought to defend indigenous land and
cultures, but also demanded a percentage of proceeds from oil and mining companies (Yashar
2005). CONFENAIE remains a fraught organization as it seeks to balance territorial claims with
participation in oil wealth, and local level organizations have often surpassed the role of
CONFENAIE. Yet, these regional organizations decided it was necessary to establish a national
indigenous organization. CONAIE was founded in 1986 and is the national umbrella
organization for indigenous organizations in Ecuador. It negotiates indigenous demands, not only
within the state, but also beyond its borders (Sawyer 2004).
During the economic crisis of the 1980s in Ecuador that resulted from falling oil prices,
which led to the subsequent adoption of neoliberal policies promoted by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, NGOs and church organizations began to take on the role of the
state, using the language of autodesarollo and capacitación as a means to develop indigenous
people as productive individuals in society. In turn, processes promoted by the state and NGOs
that aimed to privatize the agricultural industry in the Amazon region, threatened its cultural
integrity. As a result, some indigenous groups saw this incorporation into society as one way to
gain legitimacy within the state, and to claim rights to territory and access to resources. Others,
though, saw this process of incorporation as one that highlighted the inferiority of indigeneity to
mestizo practices, and many indigenous groups used their difference as a means to gain rights in
the state (Valdivia 2005; Yashar 2005; Lucero 2008; Sawyer 2004).
In 1992, OPIP organized a march to Quito with support from CONAIE and
CONFENAIE, along with indigenous rights organizations in the United States and Europe. The
march was designed to call attention to agrarian reform laws of the 1960s that led to colonization
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of the Amazon region, and worries that additional oil exploration would devastate indigenous
territory in the southern Amazon region. The mobilization also aimed to defend and gain legal
title to indigenous peoples’ lands (Yashar 2005; Sawyer 2004). Moreover, in 1990, CONAIE led
a 10-day mobilization to obstruct the workings of the Ecuadorian state; roadblocks, boycotts,
local government office occupations and land repossessions paralyzed the country. The marches
called attention to indigenous demands for rights to territory, but indigenous groups were
characterized by the state as subversive, and accused of aiming to form a state within a state
(Sawyer 2004).
If the earlier marches in 1990 and 1992 demonstrated the power of CONAIE (and OPIP)
to organize an uprising, a third mobilization in 1994 spoke to CONAIE's ability to debate,
protest, and renegotiate the agrarian reform law (Macdonald 1999; Yashar 2005; Sawyer 2004).
In 1994, indigenous peoples in Ecuador mobilized again, and marched from the Amazon region
to the capital, closing highways and stopping oil production (Yashar 2005; Valdivia 2005;
Sawyer 2004). This public outcry forced demands for equality and participation to be met at the
national level. CONAIE successfully renegotiated the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law, calling
for increased control by indigenous peoples over territory and resources. While Sawyer (2004)
argues that the central neoliberal tenets of the law remained in place, the uprising and subsequent
dialogue demonstrated the state's weaknesses in controlling its indigenous citizens - no longer
could indigenous groups be excluded from these national debates.
Yet, indigenous demands were not solely limited to national level participation;
transnational spaces also allowed for indigenous mobilization, including through the United
Nations and the International Labor Organization (ILO). By the 1990s, the Ecuadorian state
legally recognized its pluricultural population in the ILO Convention 169 as well as in
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constitutional reforms in 1998. Cultural difference and marginalization of indigenous peoples in
the Ecuadorian state marked the agendas of indigenous organizations, and linked indigeneity to
socially just, ecologically sound ways of life. As a result, indigenous organizations used “socially
recognized difference” to improve livelihoods and communities (Lucero 2008; Valdivia 2005:
290).
Neoliberalism presented the opportunity to use indigenous difference, and produce a new
subject who can act as a “global, rational being with needs and rights” (Valdivia 2005: 290).
Despite the relative 'success' of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, the state still maintains its
rights to the oil beneath indigenous territory. Furthermore, while recognition of indigenous rights
at the national level represented significant progress for indigenous populations in Ecuador,
lowland indigenous populations remain impacted by ongoing oil extraction. Indeed, oil
extraction seems to depend upon marking boundaries between those who can carry on
“Ecuador's destiny” and those who are “racially inferior” (Sawyer 2004: 105). Those members of
the ruling regime could claim that additional oil operations would “invigorate la Patria,” but
only if pollution and subjectivities of Amazonian peoples were ignored. In other words, oil
development can also excoriate human life in the name of securing it (Stoler 1995 in Sawyer
2004: 105).
Indigenous protests focused on the ways in which “race, class, and gender informed
notions of citizenship and property” (Sawyer 2004: 107). When companies entered the Amazon
region, they were trespassing on indigenous territory, argued indigenous leaders. In response, the
government claimed that public space belonged to the state, removing claims to citizenship for
indigenous peoples. Neoliberal reforms relied on marking the boundaries that could exclude
certain populations, whose claims to property, citizenship and rights were not worthy of
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recognition. Thus, state institutions were “disavowing their responsibility” leading to
“hyperexploitation” (Sawyer 2004: 107). At the same time, argues Sawyer (2004), protestors
disrupted flows of capital in and out of the country, occupying Ministry of Energy offices in
Quito. Yet, the political openings at the national level for indigenous peoples only served to
solidify corporate presence at the local level. Companies intensified their push to open additional
oil wells, by offering more sophisticated CSR projects and dividing indigenous groups, diffusing
the organizational power that motivated the movements of the 1990s.
In other words, the indigenous movements through the 1990s successfully achieved
collective rights to territory for indigenous populations, and transnational advocacy networks
promoted those rights on an international stage through, for example World Bank policies (see
Andolina, et al. 2009). Simultaneously, however, neoliberal policies advocated by development
banks, and enacted by the Ecuadorian state allowed for multinational presence in indigenous
territory, and the implementation of CSR programs. Hale (2011: 195) argues that there is a
“hard-nosed economic logic” at the root of these contradictory processes. So-called
‘development with identity’ can encompass not only a modern state’s recognition of cultural
difference, but also the “regimes of rights” that can help marginalized populations “negotiate the
rigors of modernity.” Thus, “chaos and contention” are replaced with something more intelligible
and predictable, and furthermore something that can be monitored by the market. Hale (2006)
notes that this process of replacement is even more evident in those territories that are closely
linked to the globalized economy. Indigenous peoples, then, were not only entangled with
neoliberal policies, but more specifically with corporate capital.
I suggest that processes of replacement also contain indigenous political participation to
the local level, and prohibit indigenous involvement in larger political economic structures (cf.
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Hale 2011). Hale’s (2011: 196) analysis calls attention to the spatial differentiation in
governance processes, and the way in which the state can devolve responsibility to the local level
through “carefully crafted regimes of autonomy,” but still achieve neoliberal outcomes through
other means. Multinationals remain in the country, CSR programs offer sufficient pieces of oil’s
riches, and the state continues reaping the profits of its sub-surface resources. In turn, I consider
the ways in which the discourses and practices of the indigenous movement through the 1990s
sought to reshape the body of the nation, and the ways in which the ‘governable space of the
nation’ is simultaneously challenged by corporate claims to oil (cf. Watts 2001, 2004a).
Despite maintaining rights to the sub-surface resources, neoliberal reforms challenged the
sovereignty of the state in oil production – the territory of the nation and its oil resources was no
longer under the state’s jurisdiction. More recent reforms in hydrocarbons development seek to
reclaim state control over production processes. In turn, claims on the state by indigenous groups
in the northern Amazon region stand, at least in part in contrast to a national indigenous
movement that emerged in the 1990s. Indeed, I argue that this must be the outcome of neoliberal
processes. The space of the nation is no longer a viable space to voice indigenous concerns.
Instead, communities, oil concessions and local level organizations emerge as new spaces
through which to secure indigenous rights and access to resources. While NAWE exercised its
rights through a private corporation, new leadership in the organization and in other Amazonian
organizations highlight both the containment and undoing of the indigenous movement, but also
challenges to the state through the emergence of indigenous subjects that reflect corporate and
state maneuvers, exposing the duplicitous nature of the state. In the next section, I turn to these
questions through recent shifts in oil governance.
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The ‘political carnival’ or the ‘two-faced state’82
When I arrived in Ecuador to begin my fieldwork in October 2008, the state had already
initiated a process to take more of the windfall profits of oil extraction. President Correa planned
to shift contracts with private companies from the so-called production-sharing contracts toward
the older, service-lending contracts implemented in the 1980s. Production contracts had
eliminated the state's role in overseeing oil operations, while service-lending contracts called for
additional monitoring of oil operations. During the period of my fieldwork between 2008-2010,
the state's discourse was one of taking back control of oil operations from corporations. An
official in the Ministry of Non-Renewable Resources83 informed me “it was time for private
companies to respect Ecuadorian law” (Personal Interview 2009). Subsequent negotiations with
private companies continued to reflect this discourse. In this section I investigate the early stages
of institutional shifts from production contracts to service-lending contracts, and indigenous
claims on the state and interventions in oil governance through CSR programs.
In the 1990s, when the price of oil began to fall, companies claimed higher costs of
extraction, and the state could no longer cover the costs of repaying companies. Petroecuador,
the state company, went into debt in its attempts to repay companies. In turn, private companies
were covered financially by the state, but not much was left over for the state's own benefit. The
state repaid the corporation for its so-called social programs, including CSR projects, which the
company considered part of its operational costs to extract oil. This prompted shifts in the
hydrocarbons law, which would guarantee the state a portion of profits from extraction based on
the price per barrel of oil. This law passed without public consideration, and was in violation of
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Ecuador's constitution, because it took public goods and invested them in private operations.
Despite their illegality, production-sharing contracts were signed with private companies through
the 1990s (El Comercio October 22, 2007; see also Sawyer 2004).
Profits from oil extraction in Ecuador were intimately linked to the global price for oil,
because the private company was the majority investor. In the early period of extraction (1970s80s) in Block 16, currently operated by Repsol-YPF, the price of a barrel of oil was increasing.
The company and state split the windfall profits 20%-80% where the state had 20% and the
company 80%. The price kept rising and this system continued without challenge, until the
arrival of President Alfredo Palacio in 2005.84 Palacio declared the 20%-80% could work only
until the price of a barrel of oil reached $25/barrel. Above $25/barrel, the windfall profits would
be split 50%-50%. This became known as the Law of 50-50. Yet, this new law only served to
give the company even more profits. If the company was already earning 80% on each barrel of
oil until $25/barrel, it would continue to earn more profits overall once the price reached
$26/barrel. The state would never earn as much as the company (Almeida 2009).
When Correa took office in 2007, he immediately introduced the idea of a 99%-1% split
of windfall profits, reforming the so-called Law 42, a section of the hydrocarbons law, and
angering private companies. Repsol-YPF initiated a lawsuit in the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) operated by the World Bank in Washington, DC,
claiming Ecuador had violated the terms of its contract (Almeida 2009, El Comercio November
16, 2007). The state ultimately reached an interim agreement with Repsol-YPF. Some have
suggested that the 99%-1% split was merely a “scare tactic” by Correa (Almeida 2009), and the
president never believed companies would agree to these terms. I suggest this language invokes
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Palacio served as President from April 2005 until January 2007. He had been Ecuador's vice-president, but
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the carnivalesque quality of the political body governing oil extraction in Ecuador (cf. Nelson
2009). However, these tactics, whether real or not, combined with the risk of Repsol-YPF
leaving the country, prompted indigenous groups, self-identifying as CSR recipients, to protest
Repsol-YPF's exit in November 2008. This is when NAWE published its declaration in El
Comercio.
The declaration included seven points, and was addressed to President Correa and the
Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Derlis Palacios.85 NAWE's President during this period,
Enqueri Nihua Ehuenguime, who also signed the declaration, later left the organization leaving
behind a trail of unpaid taxes. NAWE mentioned the agreement signed with Maxus in 1993
when the company began its operations in Block 16 in 1999; the agreement was later transferred
to Repsol-YPF when the company took over operations from Maxus. The agreement, Acuerdo de
Amistad, Respeto y Apoyo Mutuo (Agreement of Friendship, Respect and Mutual Support) lasts
for a period of 20 years – through 2013. The declaration in El Comercio mentions the
cooperation between the Waorani and Repsol-YPF, preventing any obstacles to Repsol-YPF's
operations, and in so doing serving the country by guaranteeing the state ongoing profits from
extraction. The company agrees to certain annual obligations established with NAWE. The
fourth point lists many of the services the company provides the Waorani, including medical,
education, transportation, handicrafts, organizational support, travel and participation in the
United Nations forum on Indigenous Peoples. The declaration claims that this support is required
by the Waorani pueblo on a daily basis for its existence and improvement to daily lives.86 For
this reason, states the declaration, the Waorani are writing to request that the state continue
negotiating with Repsol-YPF to reach an agreement, so that the Waorani pueblo and its
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communities remain respected, can continue to work with, cooperate, participate and benefit
from oil production, something which also belongs to the Waorani people. Furthermore, point six
requests that the Ecuadorian government require all companies that work in Waorani territory to
sign agreements with NAWE, and benefit all the Waorani, not just a few communities. If not,
CSR programs will divide the Waorani people. In turn, companies must seek the permission of
the Waorani to enter their territory, as Maxus did in 1993. Through their declaration the Waorani
intervened in discussions of oil governance and corporate capitalism, claiming rights to their
territory and to oil, threatening the state's control over oil production and the Waorani pueblo.
Yet, as negotiations continued at the national level, indigenous groups were not involved in
debates over new extraction contracts.

Reforming the hydrocarbons law
During this period of tension between the company and the state, the price for oil
remained relatively low globally, and it seemed financially difficult for Repsol-YPF to continue
to operate in the country (Almeida 2009). Ecuador's oil varies in quality, and companies often
spend more money investing in technology to extract oil than they earn on each barrel (see
Valdivia 2008). However, company staff informed me that Repsol-YPF wanted to maintain its
political presence in the region; it has operations in every South American country except French
Guyana.87 During this period, the state and Repsol-YPF agreed to an interim 70% - 30% split on
windfall profits, where the state received the 70% share. However, this new split only applied to
excess oil when the price per barrel went above $42.50/barrel. At $42.50/barrel the base level
split would be the older 80%-20% split. Yet, when this agreement was reached in 2008, the price
87
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Comercio Feb. 26, 2009).
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per barrel never went above $42.50, according to Alexandra Almeida at Acción Ecológica
(Personal Interview 2009). Despite this renegotiation, the company continued to have the upper
hand. The 70%-30% negotiation remained the “new” split with private companies, even though
private companies continued to profit from extraction at the 80%-20% price (El Comercio 17
November, 2007; Almeida 2009).
After negotiations with Correa's administration, Repsol-YPF's contract with Petroecuador
was extended through 2018, and the company was expected to pay $250 million in royalties to
state coffers, and invest in oil infrastructure through that year. In addition, the company agreed to
increase production of crude in the block (El Comercio Nov. 7, 2008). These shifts, though,
prompted Repsol-YPF to claim it had less money for CSR programs, and its tenuous relationship
with the state prevented it from signing any new contracts at the community level in Pompeya.
The agreement with the Waorani remains in place because the funds for NAWE are not directly
tied to profit negotiations with the state, and because the agreement precedes recent negotiations
(Morales 2009). Furthermore, the Fundación Repsol will also continue its programs because the
funding for these is not impacted by negotiations with the state (Valdez 2009).88 Meanwhile,
President Correa continued to push for service-lending contracts, and implemented a series of
reforms to the hydrocarbons law in 2009.
The final changes to the hydrocarbons law arrived at the Constituent Assembly for debate
in June 2010, and became law in July 2010. Some analysts pointed to pressure from President
Correa to ensure the reforms passed (El Comercio 26 June, 2010). The current hydrocarbons law
establishes a new Agency, la Agencia Nacional de Petróleo, to oversee contract negotiations,
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rather than Petroecuador. In addition to this shift in oversight of operations, also included was
the move toward new service-lending contracts for all private companies operating in Ecuador. A
fixed, single tariff to pay the operation costs of companies would be established on a contractual
basis, and tied to barrels of oil extracted. The tariff ensures that 100% of the profits from oil are
invested in the state, de-linking the state's investments from the fluctuating price of oil on global
markets. The reforms also included a 120-day limit, or until November 23, 2010, to negotiate
new contracts to replace the participation contracts.
On July 30, 2010, according to El Comercio (29 July 2010), the state handed over the
terms of the new service-lending contracts to private companies operating in Ecuador. El
Comercio (11 August 2010) reported that Repsol-YPF began its negotiations with the state on
August 23, 2010. In addition, the state planned to ensure it would receive at a minimum 90% of
the total extracted petroleum rent established by the new contracts. This would be an increase
from the existing 65% average established through the older production contracts. The
negotiation of this new tariff would happen on an individual basis dependent on the productivity
of each oil block. As the November 2010 deadline loomed closer, several negotiations fell apart.
Petrobras, the Brazilian state company, along with several smaller companies, left Ecuador
because they failed to reach a contract agreement. Repsol-YPF signed a new contract days before
its contract negotiation deadline.89 This marked the end of four years of negotiations with the
state and private companies.
Meanwhile, indigenous organizations are left to maneuver between these shifting
relationships at the national level making their own claims on the state and private companies at
the point of extraction. Given this political maneuvering to ensure the state received the majority
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share of oil extraction royalties, combined with President Correa’s election platform that ensured
rights for all, including nature, how could indigenous populations not be confused and puzzled,
and sometimes angered, by a state that seems to be sending mixed messages (cf. Auyero and
Swistun 2009)? In the next sections I elaborate on this confusion and anger through
conversations with indigenous leadership in organizations at the local level, as well as through
participant observation in indigenous meetings in Coca.

Indigenous organizations, CSR programs, and the governance of oil
In this section I explore new spaces of governance that emerge at the point of extraction
that challenge the territory of the nation tied oil resources. I begin with shifts in leadership in the
Waorani organization NAWE that engaged in new negotiations with multinationals. As outlined
in earlier chapters, Block 16 (concession established in 1973) lies inside Waorani territory, and
along the border with Yasuní National Park. The Ecuadorian Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma
Agraria y Colonización (IERAC) granted the Waorani rights to their territory (612,560 hectares)
in April 1990. Because the Waorani territory overlapped with the park, the boundaries of the
park were modified to accommodate this land titling, rather than establishing the park in
conjunction with Waorani territory. Moreover, the Waorani land titling was established with the
state's condition that the Waorani not disrupt oil extraction that occurs in their territory (Gavaldá
2003). At the same time, the park boundaries were carefully redrawn to exclude the majority of
Block 16. Yasuní became a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 1989, and this recognition prohibits
oil extraction inside the park's borders (Gavaldá 2003; Almeida 2009; Sawyer 2004). Yet, due to
a series of constitutional reforms, oil drilling does happen inside the park (Pearson 2010).
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My exploration of CSR programs in Block 16 led me to the Waorani organization, which
in recent years has received $800,000 to $1 million annually from Repsol-YPF. Indeed, Maxus,
the company operating in Block 16 before the arrival of Repsol-YPF in 1999 instigated the
founding of the organization. The establishment of NAWE by Maxus reflects more recent
characterizations of indigenous organizations in Ecuador that emerged through support of
corporations. Sawyer (2004) recounts ARCO's strategies to divide indigenous groups through the
1980s and 1990s, siphoning off indigenous people who favored corporate influence, and forming
other organizations that favored company support.90 Leadership in NAWE is the primary
negotiator with the company, making it much easier for the company to work with the entire
Waorani pueblo, or in other words to monitor the Waorani population. However, it became clear
that the Waorani do not organize themselves under an umbrella organization like NAWE
(Almeida 2009). Each community is autonomous, and this continues to plague company
relationships with NAWE and Waorani communities. Today NAWE's leadership continues to be
tempted by corporate monies, and several presidents have been accused of taking money for
personal gain, calling into question the effectiveness of the organization (see High 2006).
In the early months of my fieldwork, in late 2008 and early 2009, NAWE continued to be
in disarray. I heard stories when I arrived in Puyo, the capital of Pastaza Province and location of
NAWE's offices, about NAWE's president leaving the organization, taking the computer that was
provided by Repsol-YPF. Indeed, the organization no longer had a staffed office in Puyo when I
arrived in March 2009. However, the new President, Pedro, elected around this same time, was
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goal was to contact the Waorani to lessen the impact of the fast approaching oil industry, and reduce any associated
violence. Yet, Labaca was later found speared to death by the Waorani, prompting national responses, including
indigenous organizations who claimed title to their lands, pushing the Waorani into the national political sphere
(Macdonald 1999).
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viewed as someone who could revamp the organization (Lopez 2009). Furthermore, in 2005, a
Waorani women's organization was established, the Associación de Mujeres Waorani de la
Amazonía Ecuatoriana (AMWAE).91 AMWAE, though technically a subsidiary of NAWE,
receiving 5% of NAWE's overall operating budget, had stronger leadership, a clear vision for the
organization, and successful programs in place (Noss 2009). Both NAWE and AMWAE operate
with so-called 'technical advisors,' non-indigenous men to help manage the organizations'
programs. These advisors are employees of Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), an
international conservation organization that funds several programs in both NAWE and
AMWAE.92
The rumors and stories about NAWE that were recounted to me in Puyo were the result
of cultural impacts from oil company presence at the local level. Indeed, High's (2006: 36)
analysis points to the Waorani traditions of “non-reciprocal giving and receiving,” which has
ultimately influenced their negotiations with oil companies (see also Chapter 3). Instead of longterm sustained support, the Waorani ask for immediate, material goods, such as food (High
2006). The oil companies are associated with a source of constant gifts as new neighbors, which
reflects the traditional hunting and gathering economy of the Waorani (Rival 2002). Geographic
patterns within Waorani territory, I was informed by Repsol-YPF program officers and others,
reflect this relationship with companies and many Waorani inside Block 16 have moved closer to
oil operations to access corporate handouts. New 'communities' emerge through which the
company controls the Waorani population.
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recognized in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution. The council has since dissolved (personal communication with
Dana Hill).
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WCS had also approached FCUNAE, the Kichwa organization in the northern Amazon region, as a possible
project recipient at the end of my fieldwork period in May 2010.
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The growth of NAWE as a political organization mirrors these negotiations with the
company, although in recent years dependence on oil companies is more pronounced. As High
(2006) suggests, NAWE is dedicated to negotiations with oil companies and administering
company funded projects. He argues that the organization would probably not exist were it not
for the relationship with Repsol-YPF. NAWE does have other sources of funding, including
USAID and WCS, but the close relationship with Repsol-YPF recounted to me by interview
respondents affiliated with NAWE and AMWAE, spoke to the company’s significant
contributions (Lopez 2009). In 2009, the newly elected Waorani leaders suggested they would
like to move the organization away from ENTRIX-based (the consulting company employed by
Repsol-YPF) control of corporate monies.93
ENTRIX establishes certain programs based on perceived deficiencies in Waorani
communities, such as education and health care, and Repsol-YPF money is funneled into these
programs. NAWE has little say over how the money can be used and distributed. On July 17,
2009, NAWE organized a meeting to work toward changing the organization's practices. I
traveled to Coca to observe this meeting. Local Waorani community leaders, FCUNAE
leadership, a Pachakutik representative94, and AMWAE leaders were also present. The meeting
was organized around themes of defending territory, stating that NAWE's strength lay with the
Waorani communities. Much of WCS's work with NAWE and the Waorani has to do with
delineating territory. The Waorani are proud of their heritage, and often reference the fact that as
an indigenous group, they only exist in this part of Ecuador, and nowhere else in the world (Field
Notes 2009).
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This meeting in Coca was a call to organize the Waorani and to work together on a
community level. The meeting opened with a few words from a Pachakutik leader. Next, the new
president of NAWE spoke about CSR projects, reminding those present that the company offered
only a few material items here and there - not enough for communities to rely on. He relayed a
conversation at Repsol-YPF's offices in Quito with the community relations director, Samuel,
apparently to discuss CSR programs and extraction. Samuel stated, “Extraction is never going to
stop,” and Pedro replied, “Well, I never thought I'd become president [of NAWE],” suggesting
“anything is possible.” Pedro recounted how he secured funding for several computers, and was
looking for office space in Puyo. In turn, he would search for ways to involve the youth (Field
Notes 2009). Essentially, the meeting was a call to action, a way to reestablish faith in NAWE.
Pedro would not be corrupted by Repsol-YPF, although for financial reasons, he would not
immediately end funding from company. Instead, the goals for the new administration in NAWE
included ending ENTRIX's role in distributing money to NAWE (Noss 2009). The Waorani
preferred to work directly with Repsol-YPF, and to have more say in how monies from the
company are distributed.
I often remained unsure of corporate and indigenous relationships. Later, when I asked
Repsol-YPF about this gathering in Coca, the community relations officer, Samuel, confirmed
that NAWE was not planning to end Repsol-YPF's support completely. Indeed, the company was
also dependent on indigenous people's continued reliance on corporate operations, and any point
of weakness in this relationship was quickly hidden. This quick subversion of a possible crack in
the façade of CSR programs points to the discursive construction of CSR programs that often
does not match the everyday realties in indigenous communities and organizations. In a
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conversation with Pedro, he told me that NAWE is essentially maintaining Repsol-YPF, not the
other way around.95
Meanwhile, the Kichwa organization for the northern Amazon region, FCUNAE, was
also struggling to reorganize itself during this period. FCUNAE, while a prior recipient of money
from companies, which ultimately led to its downfall, is now trying to find renewed financial
support. In January 2009 Claudia was elected president of the organization, and she was the first
female president of FCUNAE. She hoped that Repsol-YPF might be able provide some support,
despite the fraught histories of FCUNAE linked to oil influence. The organization was left with
few options because the patchwork state presences at the local level made it impossible for the
organization to dialogue with state representatives. FCUNAE was established with the support of
Catholic missionaries in the 1970s (Velasco 2009). Claudia told me what happened to FCUNAE
in the recent past:
We have had seriously real themes of conflicts… perhaps, because of the situation of our
colleagues in leadership positions, because of our previous leadership who left things, in
reality, in a process of almost the collapse of our organization. But, this doesn't mean that
our bases are falling apart, in actuality we're revealing this [problem of lack of] selfesteem in the communities, and we're working on the issue of the environment, so that
when you refer to themes of oil - one that has been...one that is really difficult - so that
we would say, previously our colleagues didn't think about what would happen with oil
issues. But, the companies have entered [into communities, and people’s lives] and
unfortunately what has continued to be left to our organizations is contamination, and
more contamination and unknown diseases that our Kichwa brothers and sisters are
currently suffering from here in the Ecuadorian Amazon region.96
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...pero el Waorani mantenga la empresa Repsol.
Hemos tenido seriamente realmente temas de conflictos he, de pronto, por la situación de los compañeros
dirigentes, por los compañeros dirigentes anteriores que dejaron haciendo en realidad casi caída nuestra
organización, pero eso no significa de que nuestras bases están desmayadas, más bien estamos revelando esta
autoestima de, de todas las comunidades y que, y que estamos trabajando en la cuestión del medio ambiente por que
en cuanto se refiere a las, a las temas petroleras ha sido un tema tan difícil, tan que diríamos de pronto anteriormente
no pensaban nuestros compañeros que pasaría con estos temas petroleros, pero han entrado y lamentablemente lo
que si han dejado a nuestras organizaciones es contaminación, más contaminación y enfermedades desconocidas que
actualmente están sufriendo nuestros hermanos quichuas de aquí de la amazonía ecuatoriana, por esta
96
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Claudia’s comment focuses on the way in which oil permeates indigenous peoples’ lives through
the company. Furthermore, indigenous organizations are entangled in these relationships of
corporate capital and neoliberal reforms. This has not only politically marginalized indigenous
organizations, but also physically impacted indigenous livelihoods and bodies. The body politic
of a state rooted in oil has literally made indigenous populations sick. And she continued, stating
that there is no help from companies (or the state) today, something that is hard for the
organization as it seeks out financial support:
And the oil companies, a little...no, let's say 80, 50 or, very few, also have contributed to
our organization, and in…Well, in that, in the time of the other colleagues, and currently
in this new leadership, we haven't been touched absolutely at all [by the companies],
because the companies now, we might say, have denied everything, all the help to this
sector, to FCUNAE.97
Claudia also seeks to regain the trust of Kichwa communities in the region. In Pompeya I was
often informed that FCUNAE representatives would ask community members for funds, but
most in Pompeya were wary of contributing to an organization that had such a long history of
failed leadership and corporate influence. Moreover, they were unsure what FCUNAE could do
for them (Davila 2009).
Claudia agreed,
But the issue of our institution has been really difficult and it hasn't fallen to pieces like
other organizations. It's a big organization that includes the cantón of Aguarico until
here, until the province of Francisco de Orellana, where we have been a single, [unified]
group of people. It hasn't been broken up into centros like other federations. No, it has
been a federation strengthened by its bases [in the communities], and that has given us
solidarity, even though our communities are resentful and are angry at what happened in
our federation.98
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Y las compañías petroleras un poco, no digamos el 80, el, el 50 sino muy poco también han contribuido a nuestra
organización y en, bueno en ese, en el tiempo de los otros compañeros y ahora actualmente en esta nueva dirigencia
no hemos tocado absolutamente por que las empresas petroleras ahorita más bien he, han negado toda la, todo el
apoyo a este sector de la FCUNAE.
98
Pero la, la cuestión de nuestra institución ha sido muy fuerte y no se ha roto en pedazos como otras organizaciones
es una organización grande conformada desde el cantón Aguarico hasta acá, hasta la provincia que es el, Francisco
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Yet, Claudia also outlined a call for reinvestment in FCUNAE. She called for a return to
subsistence living, using indigenous knowledge of the natural environment to implement
conservation programs, even if pollution from oil extraction and the existing role of companies
makes this almost impossible. Furthermore, she acknowledges the limited ‘solutions’ presented
by the company – or the technical solutions that attempt to solve political economic problems.
She says,
We [as indigenous peoples] are, at the very least, socialized to conserve the environment.
They know very well how to do it, my communities, and that has been the theme of our
colleagues in each institution. Because, here we now have municipalities, provincial
advisors, national parks, the cooperatives of Yasuní National Park, and other institutions,
FCUNAE, and others, such as leadership for the conservation of the environment, and for
that we have to go community by community socializing our people. But, this
socialization is not something they're aware of – they only know words, and technical
solutions, nothing more. From now on, the conservationist ideal must make them the
knowledgeable ones. They know how to take care of nature, how to take care of animals,
and in this contamination – there was just an oil spill, and everything was damaged, fish
died, while the government didn’t say anything, and nothing happened. We are left at this
point, and for the government la Patria is for everyone, and nothing more. Here no. Here
how would the pueblos indígenas live? That doesn't interest them [the state]. What
interests them is how to take out the oil, and have more profits and to be well.99
Again, Claudia recounts the way in which la Patria cannot account for those populations
living at the point of extraction, and the so-called benefits of modernization are replaced with
pollution. Claudia’s reaction forces us to consider where and how the state emerges. When we
de Orellana, donde hemos sido una sola masa no se han conformado en centros como en otras federaciones, sino ha
sido una federación de fortalecimiento de las bases, y eso nos ha dado ahora esta, esta solidaridad a pesar que
nuestras comunidades si están muy resentidas y están enojadas de lo que iba a pasar en nuestra federación.
99
Nosotros de a lo menos de socializar para decir conservar el medio ambiente lo saben muy bien mis comunidades,
y eso ha sido el tema de, de nuestros compañeros en cada instituciones, por que aquí estamos ahorita municipios,
consejos provinciales, el parque nacional, los cooperantes del parque nacional Yasuní, y otras instituciones,
FCUNAE y otras aurita como vocales principales para esta conservación del medio ambiente y para ello nos toca ir
de comunidad en comunidad socializando a nuestra gente, pero esta socialización ya lo conocen ellos, solo que no
conocen ellos son las palabras he, las palabras he, técnicas nada más, de ahí de conservacionismo ellos son los
conocedores, ellos saben como cuidar la naturaleza como cuidar los animales, y en esta contaminación que ahora
hubo del derrame petrolero anteriormente todito se derramó, murieron pescados mientras que el gobierno no
pronunció nada no pasó nada, se quedó ahí y para él es la Patria es para todos y nada más acá no, acá como vivirán
los pueblos indígenas eso no les interesa, lo que a él si los interesa es sacar el petróleo y ganar más y estar bien.
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try and look for it, it disappears, and only its effects remain. Returning to the two bodies of the
state, those individuals who can carry out its deeds, and the other body, the larger social forms of
incorporation, these two bodies are reflected in Claudia’s discourse, and indeed within Claudia
herself (cf. Nelson 2009). Claudia’s analysis mirrors Hale’s (2011) framing of the neoliberal
state tied to resources as a pretense. The state is unable to monitor new spaces of governance that
emerge through certain technologies of rule, such as CSR programs.
Claudia went on to explain that the Kichwa cannot protest the current government and its
continued push for oil extraction in indigenous territory. If the Kichwa attempt to strike, the
government will merely implement pressure to disrupt the strike, making future dialogue all but
impossible. She says,
There's not even a way to protest, because if we say something real, the government puts
them [indigenous peoples] in prison. They can't even hold a strike...they can't state their
thoughts, because he who is saying something bad, is thrown in prison. So, we are in a
country that is really, is very critical and harsh.100
My conversation with Claudia demonstrated the strategic interests of the state in the
Amazon region. I argue that this conversation also reflects a process of competing sovereignties
and contradictions, or the duplicitousness of the state. FCUNAE confronts and internalizes these
processes, made more complex by questions of ongoing oil extraction. While the state continues
to push for ongoing oil extraction at the national level, and removes CSR programs at the local
level in an attempt to garner more of the profits from resource extraction, those populations at
the point of extraction see these changes as challenging their rights to participate in the bodypolitic of the nation. Indeed, the state’s disciplinary practices that prevent indigenous protests

100

ni como protestar por que si decimos algo realidad el gobierno ya les mete preso no pueden hacer paro, no
pueden, no pueden pronunciar sus pensamientos por que ya el que está pronunciando mal ya está preso, entonces
estamos en un país realmente es muy crítica y dura
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highlight strategic state interests in oil rents, rather than indigenous membership in the nationstate.
My analysis also suggests that while the company might have duped indigenous peoples,
they are certainly not duped by the state. While oil company operations and programs infiltrated
communities and organizations at the local and regional levels, the state maintained its interest in
controlling ongoing oil operations at the national level. This distancing of the state also suggests
an expansion of state power through absence. Mountz (2004: 329) argues that the “less
accessible the decision-makers are to those whose lives they influence, the larger looms the
power of the state to act without demands for accountability.” Claudia's confusion and
uncertainty mirrors these contradictions, but also highlights the way in which she negotiates
these processes of marginalization (cf. Bondi 2004; Hale 2011).
Meanwhile, in Coca, where FCUNAE offices are located, infrastructure and facilities are
non-existent. There are no decent hospitals or educational facilities, for example. “How,” asked
Claudia, “could there be any room for indigenous advancement without these basic resources?”
She goes on,
Really the government should put a hand on the chest and help in health issues, because
due to the pollution they [local people] are dying – because of the water, bad basic
services here, and everything here really hurts us as an organization.101
Claudia said she just wanted to be able to dialogue with President Correa, but it seemed
impossible. Correa has taken a turn toward dictatorial decision-making, she claimed, leaving
little space for indigenous peoples to present their own ideas.102 She says,

101

Realmente el gobierno debería ponerse la mano en el pecho y ayudar en el campo de salud, por que, por la
contaminación se están muriendo, por el agua, malos servicios básicos acá, y todo esto realmente si nos duele como
organización.
102
My conversation with Claudia essentially mirrored much of what Bebbington (2009) observed in the region, and
the authoritarian style of ruling that prevents debate over how extraction occurs.

156

A dialogue must happen, not just with my federation, but with various federations, with
various pueblos that are throughout the Amazon region, the coast, the mountains, where
they also have their culture, and that if there is a march, that possibly it would happen
with CONFENIAE and CONAIE.103 They are already saying there is going to be a
peaceful march, not revolutionary, but peaceful, and that he [President Correa] must
listen and to say, well, the pueblos indígenas are protesting, they are doing this, what do
they want. We would dialogue, from each side, them as much as us. That is...that is what
we want in a dialogue. And that is what does not exist; it's not there. Only [President
Correa] is there, blah, blah, blah, every Saturday [referring to his weekly radio address to
the nation]. [He says] 'this is what I do, this is what I say, this is it.'104
Thus, the only viable option for indigenous peoples is to turn to the company, which is
better at protecting the environment and providing some basic health care and educational
opportunities, according to Claudia. As our conversation concluded, she recounted a recent
transportation request she made of Repsol-YPF – a canoe to allow access to Coca and then
Quito. Repsol-YPF responded that it was unable to provide such services now, because the state
prohibited it:
So, now, as well, the state got rid of a budget that said the companies had to help the
communities – they ended that budget – it doesn't exist anymore. For us, it was
mentioned one time, when we went...we wanted to go with some urgency to Quito, and
that it was urgent that they help us with a canoe to be able to travel. The response the
company gave us was that now they don't have support [for communities]. Why!?
Because the government has ended these forms of support, because the money is going
toward other issues.105
103

CONFENIAE was also non-existent through much of my fieldwork. It had divided into two factions, and neither
side was willing to negotiate to reorganize the institution (Grefa 2009; Alvarez 2009). These sorts of divisions
characterize the history of the indigenous movement in Ecuador (see Lucero 2008). Much of this hinges on conflicts
amongst indigenous groups, especially between the dominant lowland Kichwas and the Shuar.
104
Un diálogo que debe haber no solo con mi federación sino con varias federaciones, con varios pueblos que
aglutina la amazonía, la costa, la sierra, donde también tienen su cultura y que si es que hay una marcha que
posiblemente está con CONFENIAE y CONAIE ya diciendo que va haber una marcha pacífica no, no de
revolucionarios, sino pacífica sino que él debería escucharnos y decir bueno pueblos indígenas protestan, están en
esto, que quieren haber, que quieren, dialoguemos hagamos un diálogo de parte a parte, tanto ellos como nosotros,
eso es lo que, lo que realmente queremos un diálogo, un diálogo y eso es lo que no existe, eso es lo que no hay,
solamente él está, bla, bla, bla todos los sábados esto es lo que yo hago, esto es lo que digo, esto es.
105
Entonces ahora también le quitó un presupuesto que las compañías tenían para apoyar a las comunidades, quitó
ese presupuesto ya no hay, no, a nosotros nos mencionó una vez que fuimos queríamos irnos de urgencia a Quito y
de urgencia que nos apoyen con una canoa para poder viajar, la respuesta que dio la empresa petrolera es que ahora
no tienen apoyo. ¿Por qué?; Porque el gobierno ya les quitó esos apoyos, por que les está mandando para otro lado,
para otra cosa.
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Claudia's complaint also acknowledges the construction of beneficiaries through CSR programs,
and the company's process of defining the particular territory that falls under the company's rule.
In other words, the company defines those who will receive gifts, and any claims made on the
company are rejected as one of entitlement (Rajak 2011).
My conversation with Claudia also acknowledges state strategies through the 1990s.
Indigenous demands were dismissed as subversive, and indigenous peoples were accused of
threatening la Patria and state sovereignty (Sawyer 2004). The conversation I had with Claudia
exposes the way values that regulate social life exist nowhere, and yet they produce ‘real
effects.’ Furthermore, the state is only ‘actual’ in the activity of citizens, and the notion of
‘Fatherland’ in the actions of those that heed its call. Yet, the state cannot also be reduced to
these effects. It exists nowhere, and yet we cannot explain the material reality of suffering
without referring to it (cf. Žižek 1992 in Nelson 2009: 24).
The ‘carnival’ of the state, then, allows us to witness and experience the domesticated
versions of submitting to the state, but also a glimpse into the other side – the “inevitability of
collaboration; the obscene arbitrariness of the market” (Nelson 2009: 24). This chapter points to
the way in which CSR programs, framed through discourses of participation and inclusion and
economic justice, also fail to address questions of resource distribution and rights, or questions of
social justice. The state's self-imagining as a petro-state, and visions of la Patria continue to
challenge indigenous membership in the nation state. In turn, it is these moments of uncertainty
and resistance within indigenous leadership, which we must continue to uncover to produce
alternative discourses and practices (Mountz 2010).
Following Hale (2011) I want to consider the ways in which Claudia’s frustrations may
also reflect broader debates within indigenous and other marginalized populations. We might
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first ask, as Hale (2011: 188) does, “to what extent can black and indigenous territorial rights
advance within the broader logic of neoliberal development…?” Hale (2011) argues that in
responding to this question we have to consider the ways in which the state is reconfigured in
new ways, focusing on those spaces where resources are most productive, which leaves other
areas and inhabitants to fend for themselves.
In the case of Ecuador, I contend that this pattern of state restructuring emerges most
clearly in the recent shifts in governance of natural resources, as the Ecuadorian state identifies
‘strategic resources’ deemed necessary for the country’s ongoing development. Despite living at
the point of extraction, indigenous populations are left to fend for themselves in the face of
ongoing resource extraction, or as CSR programs illustrate, through the material resources
provided by corporations. Furthermore, building on Hale (2011), indigenous entanglement with
the structures of dominance that communities intend to challenge leads to movement confusion,
and limits indigenous resistance.
As Nelson (2009) notes, there is also participation in these programs without
consideration of outcomes. In the same way that she is concerned about marginal populations
that are “acted on by NGOs,” corporations also act on indigenous populations in Ecuador. In
turn, the company provides an image of what indigenous peoples should be, and indigenous
peoples become the victim – they are passive. CSR programs are about how to spend the money,
and as the previous chapter illustrated, people start to fight with one another. CSR programs,
then, can tell us about how the state is being run, and as Nelson (2009) suggests, rather than the
presence of political movements, we see a state and people engaged in managing money. I
explore the strategic practices of the Ecuadorian state in managing resources and a population in
the space of the nation in the next section.
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State Institutions and Oil Governance
Rafael Correa was elected in 2007 under the slogan “citizen participation” or
participación ciudadana. In 2008, Correa called for a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the
Ecuadorian Constitution. The new Constitution includes rights for nature, and incorporates the
language of “collective wellbeing” or buen vivir and sumaq kawsay in Spanish and Kichwa,
respectively. CONAIE participated in drafting the new Constitution. Yet, as many authors,
including Bebbington and Bebbington (2010) and Escobar (2010) acknowledge, these moves
toward other models of development do little to slow extraction. Instead, oil is a resource
deemed necessary for the country's ongoing development (Escobar 2010). Correa’s plan only
calls more attention to the state’s interest in its natural resources, its national patrimony. In fact,
part of Correa's development plan for the nation was to divide the country into zones based on
availability of natural resources. In this section, I explore development in Ecuador tied to
ongoing extraction of these “strategic industries,” and the contradictory language of the nation's
development and rights outlined in the new Ecuadorian Constitution.
Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarollo (SENPLADES)106, the state institution
tasked with development of the country, has a regional office in Tena, the capital of Napo
Province. I was referred to the director of this office, Eduardo, a Kichwa who graduated from the
private Universidad de San Francisco, in Cumbayá, a wealthy suburb of Quito.107 Professors I
spoke with at the university knew Eduardo, as he successfully used the scholarships offered by
private companies (part of CSR programs), including Repsol-YPF, to attend university in Quito.
Following university in Ecuador, he attended with full scholarship the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champagne, where he studied Latin American Studies. While earning his master's
106

The National Secretariat of Planning and Development
Eduardo is the same person I interviewed referenced in Chapter 2, when I had a particularly frustrating interview
experience.
107
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degree he met Rafael Correa, a graduate student of economics at the same university. In my
interview with Eduardo, he recounted a meeting where Correa urged Eduardo to return to
Ecuador following his degree, to use his knowledge in his own country. Eduardo did so, and
initially began working for EnCana a Canadian oil company, as a community relations staff
person that operated Block 15 in the region.108 Later Eduardo was appointed director of the Tena
office of SENPLADES. Eduardo, while capitalizing on opportunities made available because of
company interventions and programs, now takes a political stance that aims to undermine these
same opportunities that at least in part led to his own successful career (Roca 2009).109 The
duplicitousness of the state embodied in an indigenous bureaucrat.
SENPLADES was formed in 2004, and is tasked with development projects around the
country.110 The institution was re-structured to some degree with Correa's election in 2007, and it
now operates with various zonal/regional headquarters. Rather than operating on a provincial
basis, the country is divided into “zones” tying several provinces together. These zones, Eduardo
informed me, were designed to become the new administrative and political capitals of the
country, instead of the provincial capitals.111 Zone 2, where Eduardo works, encompasses the
provinces of Orellana, Napo and Pichincha, conspicuously linking Quito, the capital city, to the
108

This is the same block where Pompeya is located, currently operated by Petroecuador. EnCana sold its rights to
Occidental Petroleum, the company later ousted by the Ecuadorian government due to contract disputes
(Kimmerling 2006).
109
Thanks to Nancy Hiemstra for noting this contradiction.
110
See Escobar (2010) for a discussion of development defined by SENPLADES. In particular, Escobar (p. 21-22)
notes the mixing of “mainstream” development concepts, including economic growth and its ties to “strategic areas”
that include energy, hydrocarbons, mining, and water, among others.
111
Distribution of rents from oil extraction is currently determined on a provincial basis. In 2007 a reform to the
hydrocarbon law known as Law 010, which manages the distribution of oil rents in Amazonian provinces, was
presented in the Ecuadorian congress. The proposed reform included an increase in rents captured from each barrel
of oil extracted, from 50 cents/barrel to $1/barrel. According to an El Comercio article from July 2, 2007, since
2005, Amazonian provinces have received between $200-$286 million from private companies and Petroecuador.
The Law 010 relies on the state institution ECORAE to distribute rents in each province. Increasing the rent on each
barrel would add an additional $90 million/year to the total amount. Moreover, the provinces of Sucumbíos and
Orellana receive an additional 5 cents/barrel because these provinces produce the most oil in Ecuador. The proposed
reform called on the local governments to manage more closely the distribution of monies, and President Correa
stated that each dollar must be accounted for in infrastructural improvements (El Comercio 2 July 2007).
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richest oil producing area of the country. Development in Zone 2 relies on ongoing oil
production, as well as tourism in the cloud forest area that connects Quito to the lowlands of the
Amazon region. SENPLADES is also tasked with overcoming pollution problems linked to
ongoing oil extraction. Tests of the water in this area show that most of it is polluted and unsafe
for drinking, but it is unclear what infrastructural improvements will be made to solve these
issues (Roca 2009).
I tried to steer the conversation toward impacts on indigenous communities, although this
seemed to be an area that was even less studied than others. Eduardo could tell me about
practices inside Block 16, and impacts on Waorani culture, and the shifting geographies of
communities due to CSR programs. He repeated the stories of the Waorani moving to be closer
to oil operations, waiting for corporate handouts. Many of the themes we discussed had to do
with the government's desire to take back control over processes in the country, not only oil
extraction, but also research by foreign scientists, and NGOs. In other words, the state would
oversee the country's development and monitor outsiders' presence in the country. This, Eduardo
informed me, was the hallmark of Correa's platform. Within the oil extraction industry
companies would merely provide a service for the state, extracting oil, eliminating any local
development projects in indigenous communities. Eduardo claimed that current CSR projects are
reimbursed by the state. If a private company spent $2 million providing local projects in
indigenous communities, this would be reimbursed, he told me. Shifts in implementation of CSR
programs were explained to indigenous leaders, Eduardo informed me, but many leaders were
indignant that the state had the right to determine relationships in indigenous territory, as the case
with NAWE and FCUNAE suggests. Eduardo worried that this “attitude” might pose problems
for the state's plans (Roca 2009).
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These plans include what the state thinks is best for a community. If a community claims
to need a school, the state will decide that this is indeed necessary. If a community has been
harvesting cacao, SENPLADES' statistics will determine whether cacao is the agricultural
product that will reap the most benefits for the region. Similarly, tourism will be presented in
certain communities as a viable option, but not others. Yet those communities, like Pompeya,
impacted by ongoing extraction will still be implicated in an extraction model. If new seismic
testing is required, indigenous people will be employed; if an oil spill occurs, indigenous people
will engage in cleanup procedures (Roca 2009). This happens today, except a private company is
in charge. Merely replacing a multinational company with the state continues to raise questions
about indigenous participation in resource governance decisions. Even though the new
Constitution opens the space for different viewpoints, including interculturality and rights to
nature, interpretations of these goals remain contradictory (see Escobar 2010; Gudynas 2009).
Questions of territory, rights to resources, and participation in governance decisions highlight
concerns about oil as a resource linked to indigenous subjectivities and constructions of the
nation in Ecuador.

Conclusion
How do we avoid reproducing the very structures we’re trying to undo? What is the
relationship between economic justice and social justice? This chapter aims to bring to the
forefront real and practical questions about indigenous participation in governance processes,
ones that are still up for debate. How do indigenous organizations in Ecuador engage with the
global economy? Or, how can they interact with mestizo populations? Finally, what relationship
can these organizations have with the state? (cf. Hale 2011). This chapter draws on Hale’s (2011)
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consideration of linking processes of everyday resistance with political outcomes. How can we
begin to make change? By focusing on processes of neoliberal reforms in the nation-state,
including privatization of resource extraction and implementation of CSR programs, I highlight
the unanticipated impacts of these practices and programs.
Neoliberal reforms in Ecuador demonstrate the state's desire to use petroleum for the
country's national development, contrasted with the relatively weak institutions to facilitate that
process (Perreault and Valdivia 2010). In order to secure its oil wealth, certain populations were
excluded from governance processes, namely those living at the point of extraction. Thus,
indigenous protests through the 1990s called attention to the failure of the state to recognize
indigenous citizenship and rights, or their membership in the nation-state. The implementation of
CSR programs was designed to aid the state in resource extraction, and also incorporated
indigenous subjects into various local level 'development' projects, diffusing the politics of
indigenous membership in the nation-state.
While CSR programs can incorporate indigenous populations into processes of economic
growth and development, they do little to address questions of social justice and resource
distribution. Thus, shifts in oversight of multinationals in Ecuador, including a formal end to
CSR programs calls attention to the disjuncture between state provision and marginalized
indigenous populations. CSR programs do not render the state obsolete. Instead, they operate as
a particular mechanism that allows multinationals to “confront tensions between a global
political economy and state authority” (Rajak 2011: 232). In turn, CSR programs take on
national projects of development, positioning the corporation at the forefront of resource
extraction processes in Ecuador. However, as illustrated by Correa's campaign, the state has
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started a process to take back control over its economic growth tied to ongoing resource
extraction.
I build on studies that link petroleum development to questions of nation-building,
subject formation, citizenship, and regulation of social life (cf. Valdivia 2008; Watts 2004,
2003). The development of petroleum as an energy resource through the 20th century shaped
Ecuador as a petro-state. In turn, petroleum was transformed into economic wealth to be used for
the good of the nation and its citizens. Furthermore, petroleum developed particular imaginaries
and belongings within the nation-state that could shape understandings of territory and
nationhood (see Valdivia 2008; Perreault and Valdivia 2010). Yet, this process allowed for
certain populations to be exploited in the name of securing economic wealth.
This chapter highlights the tenuous construction of the Ecuadorian nation rooted in oil
extraction. The state's push to link processes of modernization with resource extraction continues
to raise questions about how to understand indigenous roles in the nation state, and who is
worthy of membership. Failure to acknowledge and respond to indigenous peoples' subjectivity
that emerged through links to multinationals and CSR programs will only continue to undermine
nation-building in Ecuador (see Watts 2004a,b). Dismissing indigenous claims to resources
through CSR programs allows the nation-state to reclaim its control over resource extraction, and
secure its source of wealth, but it also discounts expressions of rights to resources, and belonging
in the nation-state. While CSR programs produce spaces of inclusion, they also lead to spaces of
exclusion (Rajak 2011). The following chapter addresses the corporation's 'zone of influence' to
understand how CSR programs operate as a technology of rule that further reconfigures
relationships in the governance of oil and challenges state sovereignty.
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Chapter 5
The Zone of Influence
Until what point does the presence of the private companies, the presence of an NGO, the
presence of the church, through which, currently...well, has produced...there has been a
lot of money, and it has generated a passive position, no? That is probably certain. If you
compare it to other communities that haven't received as much, and their activity, their
efforts, they are involved more, that is certain. But, it's complicated. To analyze this
theme requires a study that has to analyze cultural aspects, because the communities, the
majority Kichwa, in themes of abandonment on the part of the state over a lot of time, the
presence of private oil companies that haven’t always known how to handle the support
that they gave to communities – if they intervene...there are a lot of intervening factors. I
believe it is complicated to evaluate, and, and above all, you have said it perfectly, you
have identified a problem that...that exists. We have the philosophy that with intervention
we try to end a little of that, or we end the gift giving. To not look at what it has done, but
to try and create engaging...or, to say, folks, what you have, I'm not going to be here year
after year repairing the potable water system. I put it there, and you wanted to have the
system. Perfect. Now manage it.112
Personal Interview, Margo, Director of the Fundación Repsol, Quito, Ecuador, October 2008

Introduction
In November of 2008, I was beginning my fieldwork in the community of Pompeya. I
had decided to conduct a series of house to house interviews to try and understand a bit more
about daily lives in relation to CSR programs. David, a research assistant from Pompeya, and I
planned to meet one morning to begin these visits. Because of its large size, Pompeya is divided
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Hasta que punto la presencia de empresas privadas, la presencia de ONG, la presencia de la iglesia a través real,
pues ha generado ahí un, una, habido mucho dinero y ha generado una posición pasiva no, eso si probablemente sea
cierto, en cambio lo comparas con otras comunidades que no han recibido tantas comunidades, mucho más su
actividad he, más esfuerzos, he, se involucra más, eso si pero es complicado no analizar ese tema ya requiere de un
estudio que, que tiene que analizar ya aspectos culturales por que las comunidades en su mayoría quichuas en temas
de abandono por parte del estado durante muchísimo tiempo, presencia de la empresa privada petrolera que no
siempre ha sabido manejar muy bien los apoyos que daba a la comunidad entonces ahí si intervienen, intervienen
muchos factores, yo creo que es complicado evaluar y, y sobre todo bien habías dicho esto perfecto has identificado
un problema que, que, que existe nosotros con la filosofía de intervención que tenemos intentamos romper un poco
eso, no o sea se acabó el regalar dar, no mirar lo que se ha hecho sino intentar crear involucración o sea decirles
señores, eso se ha hecho ustedes tienen que, yo no voy a estar aquí año tras año reparando la planta de agua potable,
yo la puse, ustedes querían una planta, perfecto, ahora gestiónenla.
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into different branches that correspond with oil well access roads. The Via Maxus and a road that
connects Petromazonas' oil well with the center of the community essentially form axes along
which the community is organized. I used these axes as points to begin conducting my
interviews. On this day, we headed into the eastern most branch toward the Petroamazonas oil
well, riding on the Repsol-YPF bus with Pompeyans traveling to work on their farms. As we got
closer to the well, I could hear the sounds of the drilling, the non-stop motor droning away. The
bus dropped us at the chain link fence that marked the boundaries of the well. At this point the
noise was almost deafening, and it was impossible to hold a conversation. As we walked around
the corner of the fence to find a house to begin the interviews, I decided to take a photo of the
well. Poking my camera between the holes in the fence, I snapped a couple shots of the facility,
and David and I continued on our house-to-house visits.
We wrapped up the interviews in houses located close to the well and began the several
kilometers walk back to the center of the community, stopping off at other houses along the way.
Soon, though, a company pick-up truck approached us. The driver slowed and stopped. He
immediately asked whether I had taken a photo of the oil well. Company personnel at the well
must have contacted staff at the guardhouse, I reasoned. I replied that yes, I had taken a few
photographs of company operations. The Petroamazonas personnel asked me to delete my
photos. Trying to engage the company staff person in conversation, I asked why I had to do so,
and he responded that it was an Ecuadorian law that no photos are allowed of oil operations. For
a moment, I contemplated only pretending to delete my photos, but decided as this was early on
in my fieldwork period I should not risk angering company personnel further. Indeed, after
deleting the photos, the company representative asked to see my camera to ensure that I had done
so. Wordlessly, I handed it over, as he flipped through my photos. Satisfied that I had removed
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the offending photographs, the corporate officers went on their way. I was shocked and angered
by the power the state, and by extension the state company, had over my decisions and freedom
to behave as I wanted in Pompeya. Indeed, Petroamazonas, a privately operated and organized
subsidiary of the state company took on this policing role in the absence of other state officials.
Meanwhile, David, unfazed, continued our hot, tiring walk. I tried to ask David why the
state had this policy, but he did not know, nor was he interested in commenting on what it was
like to live under these rules. Instead, he preferred to tell me his plans to become an eco-tourism
guide, and asked whether I could help him get a guide book. David's lack of concern for state
policy was not necessarily surprising to me. Corporate presence in the region, and company and
state rules and regulations that governed resource extraction were the norms through which
Pompeyans lived their lives. David and I continued our walk, without tree cover, as the sun
continued to beat down on us. Soon, the same pick-up truck approached from behind us; it had
turned around at the well and was headed back to the guardhouse near the center of Pompeya.
David flagged it down to see if we might get a ride back. I was still angry, and did not want
anything to do with the Petroamazonas officials. But, it was too late. David climbed in the back
of the truck, and company officials urged me to get in the back seat inside. As we drove, the
officials began asking me a series of questions about my work and who had granted me
permission to be there, and I became nervous I might not be allowed back into the block. A
private security service, paid for by Repsol-YPF, monitored access to Block 16, and I usually
passed through this entrance on my way to the community. We were dropped off at the center of
the community, and nothing more was said to me about my access, or the work I was conducting.
Occasionally I would see this Petroamazonas representative on my river crossings in RepsolYPF boats. He would say hello, remembering me by name.
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The everyday space of Pompeya and indigenous territory is a complex arrangement of
corporate, state and indigenous interactions all designed to facilitate oil extraction (see Watts
2001, 2003). In this chapter I explore these governable spaces established through corporate
claims to trusteeship. Trusteeship is “defined by the claim to know how others should live, to
know what is best for them, to know what they need” (Li 2007: 4; Cowen and Shenton 1996). In
turn, by conceptualizing CSR programs as programs of improvement, I also explore the way in
which trustees intervene in state and indigenous relationships designed as programs that will lead
to more beneficial outcomes (Li 2007). Indeed, corporations reconfigure relationships at the
point of extraction to ensure their ongoing presence that facilitates resource extraction.
Trusteeship is not a process of domination. Instead it aims to “enhance a capacity for
action” (Li 2007: 5; Cowen and Shenton 1996). The role of the trustee is to intervene in
relationships between a population and its resources, territory, and customs, for example and
adjust them as necessary. To ensure that development processes are beneficial, sometimes a
population must be divided by gender, age, income, or race, to find points of entry and correct
deficiencies (Foucault 1991; Li 2007). Trustees provide enticements. Their schemes often appear
as the result of everyday interactions, rather than external imposition. They become common
sense. Calculation is essential for improvement schemes, because it helps to prioritize a series of
goals, and to focus on the tactics necessary to achieve results (Goldman 2004).
Li argues that there are two key practices to understanding how the will to improve is
translated into programs. The first is “problematization” or identifying the deficiencies that must
be corrected. The second is “rendering technical” or a set of practices that can set boundaries
between trustees and recipients, determine who has the ability to diagnose deficiencies, and who
receives “expert direction” (Li 2007: 7; Mitchell 2002). Problems must have solutions, and these
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solutions emerge as part of a whole, with techniques and prescriptions that are clear for the
person with appropriate training (Li 2007; Mitchell 2002). For Li (2007), the process of
rendering technical also means questions are rendered non-political (see also Birkenholtz 2009;
Ferguson 1990; Rose 1999). This means political-economic questions are excluded from
prescriptions and diagnoses. In other words, the capacities of the poor become the focus, rather
than processes that have impoverished the poor (Ferguson 1990; Mitchell 2002). Depoliticization
becomes routine because experts are trained to examine problems in technical terms (cf. Escobar
1992, 1995; Sachs 1992; Yapa 1996). Thus, the diagnosis of the problem through various
institutions, including the government, corresponds to the experts who are available. At the same
time, these processes make clear the boundary between trustees, those able to diagnose problems,
and the recipients, those who remain subject to expert advice (Li 2007; Pigg 1992).
Yet, depoliticization is not a secure accomplishment (Li 2007: 11; Moore 2000; Perreault
2003b). Instead, experts tend to rule by disguising their failures, and designing new programs
that go unchallenged, effectively eliminating any controversy within the political system. Experts
continually search for closure to ensure their diagnoses are complete (Rose 1999). This process
avoids questions the expert cannot answer, including any political-economic questions, such as
the control over the means of production and the structures that lead to inequalities (Ferguson
1994; Li 2007; Mitchell 2002). In turn, as explored through Chapter 3, more recent studies of
development have called attention to its contentious processes that reflects cultural, political and
economic struggles (Goldman 2004; Moore 2000; Perreault 2003b).
This chapter is about how CSR programs function as a technology of rule. To govern,
following Foucault (1991) is about structuring “the possible field of action of others.” In turn,
there are particular moments, or places where we can study the effects of power. Indeed,
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following Moore (2005: 5), if we “pry apart government and the state,” we can understand the
way in which power relations engage in articulating subjects and space through particular
practices. As explored through the prior two chapters, we saw the way in which power is
grounded through historic, and spatial practices, and how certain struggles are rooted, “gain
traction” and shape fields of action (Moore 2005: 6). CSR programs operate to facilitate highly
asymmetric modes of power. Indeed, no longer is a simple binary of resistance/dominance easily
mapped onto the space of an indigenous community. Instead, as I demonstrated in prior chapters,
ambivalence and uncertainty, and divisions at the local level, which ultimately undermine
indigenous organizing, are the result of historic processes of power that compete for control over
indigenous populations (Agrawal 2005; Moore 2000).
The Amazon region is marked by long histories of outsider presence that sought to
control indigenous populations through various projects of rule, and these “political technologies
encountered subjects and territories already embedded in ruling relations” (Moore 2005: 9,
2000). In turn, the interventions of corporations and CSR programs, the subject of this chapter,
relieves the state of the risks of collective challenges from indigenous organizations, but also
confronts indigenous populations who do not fully embrace the interventions of CSR programs.
Indeed, by engaging with the company, encouraged by the state historically, indigenous
populations received the material rewards of resource extraction, and corporate knowledge is
transferred to indigenous populations, leading to new forms of capital accumulation (Goldman
2004). By encouraging participation in CSR programs, the state essentially continued the patronclient relationships of earlier centuries. This stands in contrast to neoliberal rhetoric of self-help,
and instead decentralization and privatization continue to promote paternalism (Zalik 2004: 403).
In other words, the inclusionary and participatory nature of CSR programs (Bridge and Perreault
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2009) also lead to certain entanglements, including questions of social justice, rights, and
distribution of wealth, which I attempt to pry apart through the chapter (Moore 2005; Bridge and
Perreault 2009; Hale 2011).
While oil blocks are rented to private corporations these often do not correspond with a
company's 'zone of influence'. For example, Pompeya serves as the entrance to Block 16, and
Repsol-YPF has to secure its 'right of way' through the community. The company implements
CSR projects in Pompeya, in addition to Waorani communities that lie inside Repsol's oil block
through NAWE, the Waorani indigenous organization, as explored in Chapter 4. Moreover, the
company's Foundation, the Fundación Repsol, designs projects in Kichwa communities along the
Napo River, well outside the company's immediate space of operations. Thus, these new spaces
of corporate influence raise important questions about control over (subterranean) territory, and
the people within that territory, or the governance of 'men and things'.
This chapter addresses the politics of CSR programs. The corporation is most concerned
with maintaining its own power and presence in Ecuador, linked to the ongoing accumulation of
capital, and points to the necessity of limited state control in maintaining its legitimacy, marked
by indigenous participation in CSR programs. Indeed, the uncertainty and ambivalence that
characterized conversations I had with indigenous peoples in part reflects the state's own
confusion and uncertainty in monitoring corporate activity. If we consider the space of extraction
as one that is shared between the dominant and the dominated, we might explore the processes
through which indigenous peoples find the company as a good provider of basic services, rather
than the state. In turn, we can use this analysis to think about how these views also contribute to
indigenous populations' own inaction, and in turn their ongoing domination (Auyero and Swistun
2009). In the next two sections, I draw on conversations with corporate representatives that
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occurred in Quito, and participant observation in Pompeya to focus on the ways in which the
company generates knowledge of indigenous populations – it judges needs and deficiencies in
the space of Pompeya, and this is critical for the corporation's implementation of CSR programs.
In turn, the ongoing 'failure' of CSR programs generates new sites of encounter and new forms of
power and knowledge in the space of indigenous communities. In the last section of the chapter,
I examine the company's maneuvering between state regulation and ties to indigenous
populations. While the company often takes on projects that should be the state's responsibility,
and indeed its presence in the region allows it to monitor and control indigenous populations, it
also acknowledges that the state's absence contributes to disarray at the local level. Thus, this
contradictory position of benefiting from, but also challenging state presence points to openings
in the governance of resource extraction. It is in these contradictory spaces that room for
additional indigenous participation in control over rights and access to resources might be
created.

The 'zone of influence' and Pompeya
Pompeya serves as the entrance to Block 16, although it is actually located inside Block
15, currently leased by Petroamazonas.113 As a result, Pompeya is a recipient of CSR programs
from both Repsol-YPF and Petroamazonas. The community receives a monthly sum for the use
of its territory for the guardhouse operated by a private security company paid by Repsol-YPF.114
These guards check all who enter and exit the region, and company officials informed me that
the company has prevented colonization of the region, or entry of outsiders. In addition to the
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Block 15 used to be operated by Occidental (Oxy), a United States' based company. In 1999, Oxy violated terms
of its contract and was forced out of Ecuador (Kimmerling 2006). This left Block 15 to the state company, and its
subsidiary Petroamazonas.
114
In the community agreement signed between 2006-2008, this “rental fee” paid to Pompeya was $500/month.
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monitoring of the access to the block, the company has also implemented several CSR projects.
Repsol-YPF has both a community relations staff responsible for impacts from oil extraction at
the point of extraction, and the Fundación Repsol, designed to implement development projects
outside of Repsol-YPF's oil block. The foundation implements projects through NGOs and the
local junta parroquial government, but has also worked at the community level in the case of an
agricultural project with the local high school. The various CSR programs implemented by the
corporation correspond to different perceived deficiencies in the community. For example, the
foundation is responsible for a cacao production project that is designed to provide economic
development for local Kichwa communities along the Napo River and the micro-credit project to
stimulate economic development for women. These projects are implemented through local
NGOs, and the foundation provides the funding. Other infrastructural projects, such as a potable
water system, were developed in conjunction with the local government. Simultaneously,
community relations staff invests in projects such as a women's sewing group, transportation,
health facilities, education, conservation and subsistence programs within Pompeya and other
communities impacted directly by corporate operations.
I describe these projects and programs below in the context of two encounters. The first is
a meeting I had with Samuel, the community relations staff person in Quito. He discussed the
way projects are implemented in Pompeya, stating that if a community is left to make decisions
about CSR projects on its own, this will lead to the community's own downfall. Yet, at the same
time Repsol-YPF hopes Pompeya will eventually be an “autonomous” community able to make
its own decisions. The second encounter describes an opening celebration organized by an
Ecuadorian NGO, Conservación y Desarollo (CyD) of an agricultural drying facility for the
cacao project. CyD is a recipient of funds from the Fundación Repsol. In turn, through the
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chapter, I argue that the everyday spaces of indigenous communities are converted into spaces of
oil extraction.

Encounter One: Community Relations
In October 2008, I set up a meeting with Samuel, the first of several I had during my
fieldwork period. We had met the year before as I outlined my proposal to study CSR programs
of an oil company in the Amazon region. Samuel was open to my ideas, and offered to let me
study Repsol-YPF's programs, because he was proud of what the company was doing. This was
the only company operating in Ecuador at the time that even agreed to meet with me. I arrived at
Repsol-YPF's offices in the northern part of Quito, an area marked by international corporations
in glassed-in office buildings and business hotels. Repsol-YPF's security required that I wait in
the lobby as the receptionist called up to Samuel's office to confirm my appointment. My name
was approved and I was given a badge that stated the floor I was to visit, in exchange for my
identification. I proceeded into the building flashing my badge to enter the turnstile into the
elevators. I arrived on floor six where I had to reconfirm my name to the guard positioned on that
floor. Soon Samuel came out to meet me. We walked back to his corner office with views down
to the street. The afternoon equatorial sun filtered into the building. Samuel was with Rodrigo, a
project manager at ENTRIX, a Texas-based environmental consulting firm Repsol-YPF worked
with to implement its CSR programs. ENTRIX was in charge of establishing community
deficiencies, which CSR programs were designed to address. The company employed
anthropologists and biologists to carry out house-to-house surveys gathering data on livelihoods
to figure where the corporation should intervene. In this conversation, I wanted to learn about the
different projects the community relations staff had in place in Pompeya.

175

Samuel informed me that community relations programs encompassed only the direct
area of influence of corporation operations. This included two Kichwa communities, Pompeya
and Indillama impacted by the Via Maxus, and the Waorani communities located within Block
16. Yet, despite this delineation of responsibility, Samuel assured me that the company did more
than was required by law: “we're not adjusting ourselves exclusively to comply with the law”, he
said.115 Community relations projects are typically focused projects that address certain
community needs defined by the company. These projects are not necessarily designed to be
sustainable, but instead should last the period of the CSR agreement signed with local
communities. Samuel elaborates,
We arrived at an agreement, and that is the agreement that continues to be effective. But,
much of those agreements are short-term. Because they are not agreements that are going
to be valid for a long time, but instead obey certain situations. We don't have projects, we
might say sustainable projects, but mostly projects that assist in focusing, and in some
cases over the long term.116
Samuel enjoys talking; one sentence flowed into the next. He spoke quickly and it was hard for
me to get a word in to direct the conversation. This seemed typical of community relations staff,
as I soon learned in other conversations in the offices of Petroamazonas and with Repsol-YPF
field staff. Community relations like to get their story down first, as a sort of public relations
campaign, before any questions are asked. I had to temper my skepticism as the words flowed
over me. My familiarity with Pompeya made me question whether or not we were viewing the
same projects, as the rosy picture Samuel painted seem to contrast with the almost non-existent
programs, and run down facilities I had seen in the community. Indeed, in hiding the reality of
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no estamos nosotros ajustándonos exclusivamente a lo que manda la ley.
...llegamos a un acuerdo y ese es el acuerdo que sigue vigente, pero muchos de esos acuerdos son puntuales,
entonces como no son acuerdos que van a tener vigencia sino que obedecen a ciertas coyunturas no necesariamente,
no necesariamente tenemos proyectos digamos sustentables, más son proyectos de asistencia focalizada, en algunos
casos si es con, a, a largo plazo...
116
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Pompeya in company discourse and glossy annual reports, the corporation also reveals the
process through which it crafts its legitimacy, all in the face of ongoing impacts from oil
extraction (see Auyero and Swistun 2009).
Samuel began his monologue describing the way in which Pompeya exists today is all
due to the company: the center of the community with the soccer field, the multiple communal
buildings, transportation and medical facilities. He went on to discuss a new project, a sewing
group for women in Pompeya to produce clothing for communities in the area, including the
Waorani. The company would pay the women's cooperative to make the clothing. In my visits to
Pompeya, I rarely saw women working on this project, and the house the company had built to
store the women's fabrics was overgrown with grass. The sewing machines were located in one
of the several abandoned communal buildings. Samuel said that implementing this project was
difficult. The company had to overcome gender barriers, and work with households to allow
women to participate in this program. He elaborates,
Look, since 2004, it has been tremendously difficult because women have had to
overcome a ton of barriers, cultural barriers. Well, women, whose role is in the home, to
take care of the children, the chacra, it has been difficult to convince men to allow
women to attend a course or create a company. Women try to earn their own resources,
which for a Kichwa is really clear. Kichwa men are machistas, well, so, for example this
has been really, really complicated. But, despite it all, we have managed to constitute,
without a doubt, we have good management, helped with it, as have the women with the
junta parroquial.117

117

Mira que desde el 2004 ha sido tremendamente difícil por que las mujeres han tenido que superar un montón de
barreras, un montón de barreras culturales pues no, las mujeres su rol cual es, es el hogar, cuidar de los niños, la
chacra pues, entonces hacer que los hombres les permitan asistir a un curso o que les permitan he, crear una empresa
y que ellas traten de ganar sus propios recursos para un quichua es muy claro, he, los hombres son, he, un quichua es
machista pues si, entonces eso por ejemplo ha sido muy, muy complicado, pero con todo hemos logrado que se
constituya la he,…y que sin duda han hecho una buena gestión, ayudado con todo lo….y ellas con la junta
parroquial.
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During my seventeen months of fieldwork, this project ended because of the company's decision
to stop paying a woman from Quito to live and work with the women in Pompeya. This was
partially tied to the state's mandate to end CSR programs at the local level (see Chapter 4).
In one of my first meetings with Samuel, I was given a copy of ENTRIX's diagnostic
report of the so-called 'zone of influence' in Repsol-YPF's operations. This report established the
education, healthcare, and cultural deficiencies in the region and is used as a tool to determine
ongoing CSR projects. Samuel focused on the role of the company in education, and the
formation of a 'virtual' high school. The company provided the several old computers and
internet service for students. When I was in Pompeya, however, I only saw between four and six
students using the computers. As the months of my fieldwork period went on, many of the
computers broke down and the internet service disappeared. Because the state cannot fully
provide resources for schools and medical facilities, the company provides much of this in
Pompeya – or “top-up salaries” – support that enables state employees in extraction zones to be
paid the equivalent of employees elsewhere in Ecuador (Zalik 2004: 415). In my conversation
with Samuel and Rodrigo, we talked about how funding for these state services works,
Samuel - Similarly, for the high school, they have a deficit of teachers, so practically,
from last year until the beginning of this year, we've helped with teachers. But, the
budget was that the directives had to commit themselves to management through the
Ministry to reach the partidas. And just this year they reached the partidas. The other
theme is health. The doctors who are at the sub-centro de Salud are, what are they called?
Rodrigo - Residents.
S - The medical residents, who in practice are students who are practicing in all the subcentros.
Emily - Do you pay them?
S - No, we don't pay them, but we help them. For example, with logistics, with food.
They don't receive, or they receive a minimum of income from the state, so we help them
so that they feel better. We give them food. With Petroamazonas we constructed a new
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house. Before they had the same one there [in Pompeya]. We are integrating the subcentro and the house, which was constructed by us.
R - We have contributed equipment, basic equipment for the sub-centro, things it might
normally have. 118
Electricity is provided free of charge in the center of the community because the
company needs it for its own operations. However, by the end of my fieldwork period this
shifted, and community members were expected to pay a nominal monthly fee to the state for
electricity.119
In Pompeya, people get from the center of the community to their fincas on the outskirts
via a bus service provided by the company. Company trucks now frequently travel the roads that
criss-cross Pompeya, constructed by companies. Most residents of Pompeya do not walk
anymore, and hitch rides whenever possible, as illustrated in the introduction to this chapter. The
company run bus is an example of a project requested by the community, and is frequently the
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S: Igualmente entonces para el colegio he, tenían déficit de profesores, entonces he, por, prácticamente, este el
año anterior hasta principios de este año apoyábamos con profesores nosotros, pero la, la propuesta era que he, la,
las directivas tenían que comprometerse hacer las gestiones ante el Ministerio para lograr que, conseguir las
partidas, y justamente en este año ya las consiguieron las partidas, por, el otro tema es la salud, los médicos que, los
médicos que atienden el subcentro de salud he, son médicos que se les llama, como se llaman los...
R: Residentes.
S: Los médicos residentes que en la práctica son estudiantes que están haciendo he, prácticas no, en todos los
subcentro.
E: ¿Y es, ha, pagado para ellos?
S: No, no les pagamos pero les ayudamos por ejemplo con la logística, con todo lo que es la alimentación, ellos no
reciben, o reciben un mínimo de ingreso no cierto, de parte del estado, entonces nosotros para ayudarles para que
ellos se sientan mejor, les damos por ejemplo todo lo que es la alimentación, si, he, de parte de Petroamazonas les
construyó una nueva casa antes tenían ahí mismo estaban integrado el centro de salud y la casa que fue construido
precisamente por nosotros.
R: La casa del médico si, entonces digamos está, hemos contribuido a equiparle con equipos básicos o sea de lo
que normalmente tiene un centro de salud
119
Zalik (2004) writes about electrification between Shell and communities in the Niger Delta. Maintenance and
upkeep for the services is usually dependent on communities themselves, but in other more 'developed' regions of
the company's operations this responsibility is not shifted to communities. In part, this reflects corporate concerns
that financing infrastructural improvements like electricity would mean the company would have to provide similar
services in all the communities in which it operates. However, this discourse also reflects the corporation's
preoccupation with undoing the image of the company as 'the only government we know.' As Zalik notes, though,
this discourse changes if the company's image is challenged, or if competition with other companies in the region
force it to also implement these changes.
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topic of much debate as community members want a larger vehicle. Yet, the majority of CSR
projects are implemented with company recommendations. As Samuel says, “the things that are
best for a community, such as education or health care are paradoxically the things that other
people think are best for a community. If a community is left to its own devices it will choose
things that will lead to its own demise.”120 Communal buildings and chickens are the result of
community desires. He continues: “The issue of chickens 'we want 20 chickens' so they leave
with 20 chickens. In three months do they have food? No.”121 Of course, the company's own
recommendations also result in failure, raising questions about how CSR programs are received
at the local level. “So, we suggest why don't we do a poultry raising project, consistently, you
understand, that might be managed, that they can manage like a small micro-credit project, but
this never results in anything.”122
Continuing, Samuel concluded that this community failure was due to a loss of traditional
Kichwa practices, including conducting mingas. Instead, indigenous people in Pompeya would
rather work independently, earning an income. Yet, when this source of income ends, no one has
anything. In some ways, says Samuel, this is almost a good thing, because then the community is
forced to return to things it knows, including working within the social fabric of the community.
Samuel would like to continue supporting indigenous livelihoods until the community is able to
stand on its own, “ until they consolidate, and take control and autonomy.”123 Perhaps this
would occur through a series of micro-credit projects. However, the community cannot take on

120

Las cosas buenas para ellos son las cosas paradójicamente inducidas por quienes creen que es bueno para ellos,
por ejemplo; educación, salud, pero si tu dejas a que la comunidad fije sus prioridades probablemente son
prioridades que, que, que conspiran contra su propio futuro.
121
la cuestión de los pollos, 'queremos 20 pollos' entonces, claro salen con 20 pollos en tres meses y tienen, tienen
comida? No.
122
Entonces les planteamos a que hagamos un proyecto avícola, consistente no cierto, que sea gestionario, que se lo
pueda gestionar como una pequeña micro empresa, pero no, nunca dio resultado.
123
hasta que se consolide y tome fuerza y tome autonomía.
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these challenges because it is not aware of its own potential, and there's a lack of capacitación,
argued Samuel. Yet, CSR projects are predicated on ensuring that community residents continue
to call on the company for ongoing support, and thus, development is never complete in the
region. This sort of language was mirrored in the conversation I had with Doña Barbara, the
junta parroquial president (see Chapter 3). She was a close confidante of Samuel's and could
usually ensure that CSR projects would be implemented. Samuel discussed this relationship with
me. He says,
Sure, but Doña Barbara is one of the...she has made possible the presence of the junta
parroquial, with its main office in Pompeya. She has made possible the position of
teniente política. In any moment she asked for help so that there's presence of an
authority, to control excesses and everything. I mean, she is the one who leads the junta
parroquial, but she doesn’t have enough support from her own community, they don't
have anyone to lead them, because they have started to see each other with jealousy. The
communities could do much more if they conducted themselves with mutual and
reciprocal support. And the institutions like the minga are disappearing, losing
importance. Each person wants to have his/her own work and to have his/her own
income. Each person wants to be involved in some business, and so on. But, the paradox
is that many times what one terms, explains, suggests is the best for them, is not what one
thinks is the best. For me it's much easier to build [a school or health care facility], than
to give them a micro-credit project through which we have to continue helping and
supporting until they consolidate, and take control, and become autonomous. They are
also less likely to take on these challenges, because they don't believe in their own
potential, and obviously there's a lack of capacitación, a lack of this type of help.124
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Claro, pero Doña Barbara es una de las, de las, ella ha hecho posible que esté la junta parroquial, la sede en
Pompeya, ella ha hecho posible que esté la tenencia política, ella he, algún momento pidió ayuda para que se, para
que haya presencia de la autoridad, para controlar desmanes y todo, o sea ella es la que lidera la junta parroquial,
pero en su propia comunidad no tiene el ascendiente ni el apoyo necesario por que le comienzan a ver con cierto
celo, no, las comunidades podrían hacer mucho más si tuvieran una conducta de mayor apoyo mutuo recíproco y a
instituciones como la minga, ha ido perdiendo, perdiendo peso, cada quien quiere tener su trabajo y tener sus
ingresos, cada quien quiere meterse en algún negocio y así por el estilo, pero la, la paradoja está en que muchas
veces lo que uno termina he, he, explicando he, sugiriendo es lo más positivo para ellos mismo aunque no sea lo más
positivo para uno, para mi puede ser más fácil hacerles una construcción y darles que tener un proyecto de micro
empresa en la que tenemos que seguir ayudando y subsidiando hasta que se consolide y tome fuerza y tome
autonomía, entonces y ellos también son muy poco proclives a asumir esos retos por que no creen en su propio
potencial, y obviamente falta capacitación, falta ese tipo de, de asistencia
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Samuel's remarks failed to acknowledge the way in which the corporation itself, and
ongoing implementation of CSR programs might contribute to, and undermine the community's
lack of control over its own development. As Zalik (2004) suggests, transferring large amounts
of cash directly to local residents like Doña Barbara and community presidents, often results in
distrust and poor management (see Chapter 3). In some cases, community members have resisted
participation in corporate projects because of the risks of conflict (Zalik 2004). For Samuel, it is
much easier to continue to implement CSR programs, as a kind of technical solution to the
community's ongoing failure to take control of its own development. Samuel's acknowledgment
of these paradoxes at the community level raises important questions as to why the company
chooses to engage at the community level. It seems obvious from these remarks that CSR
programs are not designed to secure wealth for indigenous populations, and cooperation among
community members is undermined by corporate presence. Why then, does the corporation's
presence persist? I argue that this question can be answered more fully be addressing the state's
mandate that required corporations implement CSR programs as a more efficient way to extract
resources. In turn, CSR programs as programs of improvement are analyzed in terms of their
technical capacity, or focus on solutions, rather than problems, and their repeated failure only
reconfirms the need to continue to implement CSR programs, and the corporation's role as
trustee. Furthermore, the zone of influence that encompasses the point of oil extraction is
outlined by the corporations, and it is the corporation, not the state, that is the actor necessary for
the proper management of relations between 'men and things,' or the ongoing extraction of oil,
and one that will benefit the wider population (Li 2007).
Our conversation, and subsequent ones, was marked by Samuel's desire to show me
different photos of indigenous peoples on his laptop. “Look,” he would say, “this is Don Pedro.
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He used to be president of the comuna. I helped his wife when she was sick. We flew her to
Quito. Whenever they see me in the community they always say how grateful they are.”125 These
sorts of asides seemed to assure Samuel as much as me that he was still important to people in
Pompeya. On other occasions, Samuel answered phone calls from an indigenous community
member looking for help with a flight to Quito, or support for a sick family member. Samuel had
to determine whether the case warranted support, or not. During a later visit, Samuel had just
returned from a celebration of the re-election of the Waorani president to their women's
organization, AMWAE. He showed me a photo of an indigenous woman wearing traditional
clothing and a feathered headdress. Samuel wanted me to notice something in the photo. “What
is different about her?” he kept asking. When I didn't know how to respond, he said, “She's part
Kichwa, part Waorani. This is what makes her so beautiful.”126 The objectification of this
indigenous woman, while sitting in Samuel's office in Quito was stunning. The paternalism that
underlay his characterization of indigeneity was difficult for me to process, especially when
considering Samuel's discourse of undoing indigenous machismo. Indeed, this racialized
discourse marked a longer history of marginalization of indigenous peoples, and Samuel, as an
upper-class Ecuadorian mestizo embodied this history and ensuing discourse that reaffirmed his
patriarchal role. Through the corporation, indigenous populations are helpless, non-modern
societies that require the intervention of outsiders to become modern, rational and sustainable
populations. Hence, despite neoliberal rhetoric that promises otherwise, privatization promotes
paternalism (Zalik 2004).
In other interviews and conversations with Samuel and NGO representatives and
missionaries, I was always cautioned to be wary of indigenous responses. “They will tell you
125

Mira, esto es don Pedro. Él era presidente de la comuna. Me ayudó a su esposa cuando ella estaba enferma. Nos
llevó en avión a Quito. Cada vez que me ven en la comunidad que siempre dicen lo agradecidos que son.
126
¿Qué es diferente acerca de ella? Ella es parte Kichwa, parte Waorani . Esto es lo que la hace tan hermosa.
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what you want to hear,”127 I was repeatedly informed. Thus, this notion that indigenous people
were constantly searching for 'help' from those deemed to have more power, was implicitly
transferred to me as an outsider. Often my role as a white, North American woman conducting
house to house visits about the role of oil companies was equated with that of an oil worker, as
explored in Chapter 2. In a conversation with a priest who had worked for years in the region, I
was told that Kichwa people are gatherers; they will always take things that are offered to them
(see Chapter 3 for a further discussion of cultural norms). In other words, it is indigenous culture
that also leads to indigenous populations’ own downfall. As the next section illustrates, these
indigenous cultural norms of gift-giving expected from a powerful neighbor seem to characterize
the 'failure' of CSR projects, while also highlighting the corporation's stubborn adherence to
technical programs that fill community deficiencies, or its inclusive, authoritative, and
disciplinary practices to ensure the conversion of indigenous populations into modern, rational
subjects (see Goldman 2004).

Encounter Two: Fundación Repsol
The following excerpt is a moment I spent in Pompeya in March 2009. I was invited to
attend the opening of an agricultural drying facility, the Centro de Acopio, in Pompeya. This
project was the result of funds from the Fundación Repsol. The foundation was established in
2001, and receives funding from the corporation to implement projects within and beyond the
immediate area of extraction. In this case, the Fundación has programs in several indigenous
Kichwa communities along the Napo River. It invites Ecuadorian NGOs to submit applications
for funding opportunities. The cacao project was successfully funded through the Ecuadorian
127

Ellos le dirán lo que quieren oír. This comment also speaks to arguments made in feminist scholarship: “there is
no underlying truth to be discovered in interviews, only a series of narratives that people tell, performances offered
at distinct moments for distinct reasons” (Mountz 2007: 46; Rose 1997)
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NGO CyD in 2007, with support of Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP), an NGO
with a long history of working in the region.128
In its Annual Report from 2008, Repsol-YPF summarizes the project this way:
The company, jointly with six Kichwa communities, launched a program for planting and
marketing cocoa. This agrosustainable project is being carried out in Block 16 in the
Yasuní National Park. The agroforestry approach, which combines trees and shrubs, was
chosen for this project, an environmentally-friendly and economically viable farming
activity. In the Kichwa communities, farmers attend two training courses per month in
field schools, with workshops and practical classes covering all technical cocoa
production aspects, including planting, the use of natural insecticides, grafting, and
pruning. The farms have received the Rainforest Alliance Certified Seal of Approval,
which ensures that farming and management methods comply with environmental and
social standards, including acceptable salaries, proper equipment, and access to education
and medical assistance. The project’s first crop, with the brand name Ekocao, was
acquired in March by Ecuatoriana de Chocolate, the leading company in the sector.129
After a period of several months working in Pompeya, CyD decided to hold a grand
opening of the cacao drying facility. Drying is the final step in production of cacao for markets. I
attended the opening event with staff from FEPP’s Coca office. Coca is an easy 30-minute flight
from Quito. Many office workers based in Quito come to Coca for the day, including the
Fundación Repsol staff. On this day, they were scheduled to arrive on an early morning flight
from Quito, but heavy rain in Coca delayed their plane. By late morning, the foundation staff
arrived, along with Repsol staff from Spain, and CyD Quito employees. At Repsol’s port in
Coca, we were all asked to watch a safety video before boarding the speedboats that would
whisk us the several kilometers upstream to Pompeya. We put on life vests, and were handed
128

In subsequent visits to the region, the foundation decided to end funding for other projects FEPP was involved in.
The FEPP regional office was a shell of its former activity. Staff members left to find other work, and it was not
clear what projects would be available in the future. The Fundación money was crucial to the office's survival.
129
Despite Zalik's (2004) observations of CSR programs in Nigeria that avoided local production, “value-added
agricultural processing” and eco-tourism, for example, because of multinational concerns with risks of increased
costs from land access and environmental compensation that might increase if non-oil activities became more
prosperous, Repsol-YPF seemed to promote this process through this particular cacao production project. Thus,
where Zalik observed neoliberal development processes of post-secondary education, or entrepreneurship and a
clear avoidance of projects that might strengthen the local economy, my work in Ecuador seemed to mark a move
toward some sort of post-neoliberal development agenda, although one that is still driving by corporations.
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earplugs to cover the sound of the motor. With the sides of the boat unfurled to keep water out,
the journey had a rather disembodied feel, especially when contrasted with the bumpy bus ride I
normally took to arrive in Pompeya, where the sights, sounds and smells could not be avoided.
In an hour's time when the bus normally took three, we arrived at Repsol’s pier in
Pompeya. We climbed the steps from the river, and proceeded down a covered walkway,
enclosed by fencing. All workers have to pass through a metal detector and put their bags
through an x-ray machine. However, community members are allowed to exit the walkway
before this point. We waited as our names were called to pass through the metal detector and
enter the guardhouse at the entrance to Block 16. At the guardhouse we climbed into vans for the
short trip into the community, but the vans drove us to the far side of Pompeya, away from the
Centro. Following the direction of the Fundación Repsol’s Quito-based director, the van driver
had arrived in the wrong part of the community. Laughing, acknowledging her mistake, the
director jumped out in her city shoes, as we trekked through the mud and water to the project
site.
The director had not visited the community in several months, and was clearly not
familiar with the location of the project. We arrived mud splattered and wet to join waiting
project participants from Pompeya. Having waited most of the day for the rain to subside, we
watched a condensed version of events. Quito dignitaries sitting at long tables faced the
indigenous audience to say how excited they were about this project. This project, in particular,
is an example of the way in which CSR programs shift people's relationships to their
environment. The foundation's project hinged on making indigenous populations “intelligible to
global experts, managers and investors,” and this could be done through “market-oriented,
scientifically based and ecologically sustainable” projects designed and operated by
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multinationals in conjunction with NGOs. In turn, the project of governing oil extraction expands
through new sites of encounter, leading to new forms of power/knowledge (Goldman 2004: 17071). Furthermore, as Zalik argues, depoliticization is an objective of corporate operations as
NGOs move away from community activism toward community development. Indeed, the
company seeks out support from other institutions, including non-profits, governments and
international agencies in order to foster the corporation's efforts. For Zalik (2004: 418), this
process also calls attention to the simultaneous exposure and subversion of neoliberal policies in
practice, as the support of other institutions might, in effect, serve as a form of government
subsidy.
Because Repsol-YPF's oil block lies partially inside Yasuní National Park, the company
and its CSR programs are in part concerned with ensuring limited impact on the park, especially
in the context of traditional indigenous subsistence farming and hunting practices.
Samuel reminded me:
But, there's also another, another thing that still...that is important to know – that they are
located in a buffer zone, in a protected area, and in the protected area is the Yasuní
National Park. This also puts the breaks on whatever conventional project, whatever
project one does there. It has to be a project that doesn't harm the flora and fauna of the
zone...well, that will not be able to. So, there are a series of legal figures, current
conditions that typify the areas that constitute putting the breaks on - to conceive of
whatever project should receive the permission and approval of the Ministry of
Environment, which is the last place of responsibility of environmental politics in the
protected areas and in others.130

130

Pero también hay otro, otro asunto que todavía no, no, que es importante conocer, el hecho de que ellos estén
ubicados en un área de amortiguamiento, en un área protegida y en la propia área protegida que es el parque
nacional Yasuní también le pone frenos a cualquier proyecto convencional, cualquier proyecto que se haga ahí tiene
que ser un proyecto que no atente a la flora y la fauna de la zona y eso es un, y eso es un freno, si tu tienes que poner
piscinas de, de una especie que no es de la zona pues no van a poder hacerlo, entonces hay una serie de figuras
jurídicas, de condiciones reales de tipificación de las áreas que también constituye un freno a cual, para impulsar
cualquier proyecto y cualquier proyecto debería pasar por el permiso y la aprobación de el Ministerio del Ambiente
que es última instancia el responsable de las políticas ambientales en las áreas protegidas y en otras.
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Indeed, related to these concerns is the Yasuní-ITT project, which refers to an oil block in
the vicinity of my work in Block 15 and the park. President Correa has pledged to leave the oil in
the ground in this block with the financial support of the international community, compensating
Ecuador for the loss of revenue from not exploiting these oil fields. The project is quite
controversial and several funders have backed out, while Correa himself has threatened to
dismantle the project. Currently, it still stands as Ecuador continues to look for financial support
(Time 2012).
A Repsol appointed community member spoke on behalf of the community. He
mentioned the benevolence of the company, and the long association the community has had
with Repsol. The paternalistic relationship between the company and community was obvious,
despite industry claims to the contrary. In this project, according to NGO staff, indigenous
peoples would take responsibility for production and replication of project goals. If an
indigenous person can earn $300-400/year, CyD told me, this would constitute a successful
project. Environmental conservation at the community level had failed in the past, said CyD,
because it was not accompanied by a market based approach. If indigenous peoples can learn to
work together, to be good neighbors to one another, emulating Repsol’s own model, then there
would be less individualistic behavior, including hunting within the bounds of Yasuní National
Park. Instead the money earned through the project would provide the option of buying a
chicken, rather than killing a monkey illegally when desperate (Personal Interview, CyD 2010).
Yet, the roots of this so-called “individualistic” behavior were not discussed.
CyD's goals for the cacao project, I was informed, were to open markets for indigenous
peoples in the region. A CyD representative told me:
Although cacao is the community's main source of income, there's still a major weakness
in the management of this product. So our first step is to better this management, and the
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second is to accompany this management with better agricultural practices, and that these
practices will allow community members to reach certain socio-environmental processes,
or in other words, reach norms and processes of environmental certification. What we're
trying to do is not pressure people to adapt a forced model, instead we're trying to guide
the people, so that they pay attention to these social and environmental processes related
to their agricultural practices and productivity.131
In other words, indigenous populations are being made accountable for their
“ecologically destructive conduct” and this process of targeting indigenous people, and
accounting for them, is central to the implementation of CSR programs. Indeed, CSR programs
“compel” indigenous populations to participate in this new process of governing resource
extraction (Goldman 2004: 171), further highlighting the opportunistic, and individualistic result
of earlier iterations of CSR programs.
After the formal part of the ceremony, we watched school children perform traditional
dances, and then were shown around the drying facilities of the Centro. Throughout the whole
day’s celebration Ecuadorian military monitored the events. Oil companies often call on the
military to ensure worker protection and ongoing production. The only other state presence was
the local, junta parroquial president, Doña Barbara, and municipal government representatives
from Coca. Their role was to merely witness the success of the project. The junta parroquial
operates on a budget of $30,000/year, which also pays salaries. With a much larger operating
budget, the company has funded and implemented projects through the junta parroquial, like a
potable water system in Pompeya.132
131

A pesar de que el cacao es su gran ingreso, hay una debilidad fuertísima en, en el manejo de ese producto,
entonces el producto que les da el …y no lo manejan, entonces primero mejorar eso y segundo acompañar se manejo
de buenas prácticas agrícolas, y que las buenas prácticas agrícolas les permitan a ellos alcanzar procesos socio
ambientales, o este, alcanzar normas, procesos de certificación socio ambientales, nosotros en general lo que
estamos tratando es en no presionarles a un modelo forzado de…. o tiene que ser….o tiene que ser ……lo que
hacemos es trabajar en la filosofía en guiar a la gente a que, a que atienda procesos sociales y ambientales
relacionados con su cultivo, su productividad,
132
The total amount of “social investments” Repsol-YPF made in Ecuador in 2008 is $667,449 (Annual Report
2009).
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Foundation funding has also included contributions to schools, sometimes in the form of
practical learning opportunities for the agricultural high school in Pompeya. In both cases,
funding was provided to initiate the project, and the state is expected to maintain the project. In
practice this is rarely successful; the water system is still not operational. These perceived
deficiencies in the community often do not correlate with indigenous concerns. Many in
Pompeya informed me that they have lived for years without potable water, and did not find it
necessary to have drinking water now. This despite knowing that many illnesses stem from
untreated water, the result of years of corporate operations. CSR programs rest on corporate
calculations and technical solutions, but these cannot address ongoing resource extraction that
continues to contaminate the environment and harm local people.
The water system emerged from data gathered on illnesses in the community, namely
parasites, a result of untreated water. With funds from the provincial government, a plan was put
in place to begin building a potable water system. The Foundation believed it could contribute
pieces of this project, and constructed a water tower and treatment facility for the community.
However, according to the director of the Foundation, the responsibility for maintaining this
project would fall to the community members themselves. She reiterates,
We left the idea, but if you want this to function, then it is absolutely necessary that you
make a small committee, or something, to manage and we will give the project, and there
it stays. This is our policy. I mean, one cannot afterward allow the people to get
accustomed to not only the giving of money, but now additional help...I mean, we spoke
very clearly with the community that the project has a beginning when we see that there
are no technical problems. And it was like this. Effectively, I got a lot of calls. The people
let me know that they are now with this project of sewage pipes, and that a truck hit one,
and broke the pipe. Our policy is that you, the community, will need to see how to fix it.
We don't want to create dependence. We believe that is very important. One constructs
one thing, does something perfectly, but you all need to see how to manage it,
administrate it - if it breaks, repair it, but not create dependence through the project. And,
moreover, we give them all the rest, and yes, I certainly know that it's not functioning,
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that effectively one of the channels broke, or that the one that brings the water from the
river broke, they have to see [how to fix it].133
Despite this language of the foundation, the water project never functioned during the months I
was in Pompeya. There was little motivation in Pompeya to fix the project, and the Foundation
refused to step in to take care of the process. Again, it went against company policy. Margo
acknowledges,
My policy is, well, until they show concern, interest, well why will I do it? I mean,
we don't want them...to continue to be poorly accustomed to what we're doing. We
think, we reflect...I understand that they [the junta parroquial] have budget
problems, but that is not a problem of budgets, to demonstrate interest - to
demonstrate I want this to return to functioning. It's not money, it's simply I want
it, or I don't. So, there we stay, and it will be like that, until they see that they also
have to do things.134
While the company aims to convert indigenous populations into modern subjects by informing
them of their deficiencies, technical solutions through CSR programs cannot fully “reconstitute”
indigenous subjects (Goldman 2004: 171). Again, despite the participatory strategy of CSR
programs that involve oil industry staff and NGOs operating at the local level, the patron-client
relationships of earlier decades are firmly entrenched (see Zalik 2004), and indeed, CSR

133

Nosotros nos dejamos la idea pero si ustedes quieren que esto funcione es absolutamente necesario que haya un,
una pequeña junta lo que sea que esté gestionando y nosotros entregamos el proyecto y ahí quedó, es nuestra
política, o sea no se puede luego, he, acostumbrar a la gente a que no solamente te di la plata sino que ahora te voy
ayudar, ha, se rompió...o sea se habló muy claramente con la comunidad el proyecto tiene un principio de entrega
cuando veamos que ya no hay problemas técnicos como así fue, efectivamente yo he recibido varias llamadas, gente
que me avisado de que he, están ahora con toda esta obra del alcantarillado que dicen se metió un camión para cavar
se rompió una tubería, nuestra política es, ustedes verán como, como arreglan, o sea nosotros, no crear dependencia,
eso creemos que es bien importante, se construyó una cosa, se hizo una cosa perfecto, pero ustedes ahora tienen que
gestionarlo, administrarlo, si se rompe reparar, pero no crear la dependencia de hicimos la obra y además les damos
haciendo todo el resto, y sí efectivamente yo se que, que no está funcionando, que efectivamente se rompió una de
las canalizaciones, o sea la que trae el agua del río se rompió, ellos tienen que ver ya.
134
mi política es, bueno hasta que no demuestren preocupación, interés pues por que voy hacerlo, o sea, no
queremos...seguir mal acostumbrando en nosotros hacemos, nosotros pensamos, nosotros reflexionamos no,
yo entiendo que ellos tienen problemas presupuestarios, pero eso no es un problema presupuestario el de
mostrar interés, el de mostrar preocupar, el demostrar quiero que esto vuelva a funcionar, no es plata, es
simplemente quiero o no quiero entonces y ahí queda y, y así será, o sea he, hasta que no vean que ellos
también tienen que hacer cosas
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programs exacerbate those tensions, while failing to focus on questions of social justice and
indigenous rights. Commenting on the presence of the company in Pompeya, Samuel agrees with
Margo's comments. Pompeya serves as the entrance to the block, and when the community
suggests that it is deserving of more, Samuel reminds them that no oil is actually extracted by
Repsol-YPF under its territory. He says,
And so...while the communities continue having this patronage mentality that depends on
what you give them, and to want only this politics, and not take on self-development
roles, roles of shared work, roles that take on the risk to begin to control other criteria
simply because they will be the first victims of the assisted politics that they prefer. And
this is not simply the fault of the company in this relationship - there are always two
parts. So this is the situation. In the case of Pompeya specifically, we cooperate with
them, not withstanding that we don't have more obligations than just securing our right to
pass through. In some occasions they are already there with their established discourse,
saying that you take our oil from here. But, you all already know that from here we don't
even take a single barrel of oil! But, well, this is where we are.135
Thus, despite the corporation's aim to return to traditional governance structures located at the
community level, corporate officers' access to power is typically greater than that of community
residents, and as a result their presence might reinforce the tendency to promote a paternalistic
development process (Zalik 2004). Indeed, Samuel confirms that the community's demands on
the company challenge its 'gift-giving' strategy, and this notion of community entitlement is
quickly dismissed as illegitimate. The top-down process of program implementation assumes
that indigenous populations have no knowledge of their environment or conservation, and CSR
programs fail to account for indigenous populations as those who have often made knowledge of
135

Entonces que va...cuando las comunidades he, he, mientras las comunidades sigan teniendo una mentalidad
clientelar de depender de lo que les den y querer únicamente esa política y no asumir, he, he, roles de autogestión,
roles de trabajo compartido, roles de asumir el riesgo, de, de manejarse con otros criterios simplemente ellos serán
los primeros víctimas de la política asistencialista que ellos prefirieron y que no es culpa simplemente de la empresa
en esta relación siempre hay dos partes, siempre hay dos partes, entonces esa es la, esa es la situación, pero en casi di
tu de, de Pompeya específicamente nosotros cooperamos con ellos no obstante que no tenemos obligaciones más allá
de la, del derecho de paso, en algunas ocasiones ellos como ya están con su discurso he, establecido, dicen si pero
de aquí se llevan nuestro petróleo, ustedes saben que nosotros no sacamos de su territorio ni un solo barril, pero
bueno eso es lo que estamos,
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the environment available in the first place (see Claudia's comments in the previous chapter). In
turn, certain knowledges are privileged, while others are de-legitimized and destabilized. Despite
claiming to want “participatory, non-hierarchical development”, the company's operations
suggest that its model relies on “long-standing social authority structures” rather than a modern
concept of 'empowerment' (Zalik 2004: 409; Bridge and Perreault 2009; Rajak 2011). In the next
section, I explore the relationship between the company and the state, to try and understand how
the corporation maintains its operations in communities.

Negotiating sovereignties
In this section of the chapter I explore relationships between the corporation and a
neoliberal state. Indeed, the hollowed-out state cannot take on the everyday tasks of
development, nor does it have constant visible presence in monitoring extraction. Instead, it
contracts this work to other institutions, including oil companies and their CSR programs. Even
in this process of state retrenchment, a rich literature has emerged to critique the state as a
monolithic institution, and focuses on the daily struggles that can challenge these conceptions
(see Mountz 2010, 2004; Herbert 1997; Gupta 1995; Mitchell 1991; Nelson 2009). The state,
then, is imagined and shared; it functions as a set of individuals connected through networks. A
variety of people are working across state institutions collaborating, colluding, and also
producing contradictions (Mountz 2010).
In my conversations with Samuel, though, he constructs the state in a monolithic way,
suggesting that the state is something mystical and elusive – that it is disembodied – lacking
ability to engage in the day-to-day practices of development (see Mountz 2010, 2004). I suggest
that the corporation cannot function without ensuring the state remains elusive, hollowed out,
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and disembodied. Thus, the company strategically operates to ensure that state power is hidden,
allowing the company to operate in its place. Yet, Repsol-YPF is also not a coherent, monolithic
institution, and as explored through the dissertation, the company relies on a series of networks
of NGOs, indigenous organizations, and even state employees, such as Doña Barbara to
implement projects. These networks also lead to contradictions reflected in corporate discourse
and practice.
In many of my conversations with Samuel, he took great pleasure in comparing the
company to the state, and acknowledging that it was the state's historic absence that led to a
greater role for the company in the region. Yet, Samuel's story hinged on critiquing the state's
total absence, and pointing to the role the company was forced to take on, and in turn the
company's ability to develop close ties with indigenous populations and monitor the region. The
company actually fails to acknowledge the strategic presences of the state. For example, the state
is still present in the context of education, and aspects of health care. State law requires that
companies implement CSR programs in certain infrastructural and development contexts, thus
companies are complying with state mandates that ensure oil will continue to be extracted.
Furthermore, it is state law that ensures Repsol-YPF’s access to oil, while the Ecuadorian
military guarantees the company’s security in extraction processes. Repsol-YPF’s story, then,
also stops short of suggesting the company should, or indeed is a viable substitute for the state.
Samuel’s careful crafting of the company's role protects the corporation from the responsibilities
of citizenship and rights for indigenous populations (cf. Bebbington 2010). Indeed, Rajak (2011:
232) argues that CSR programs allow the company to “negotiate, rather than supersede the
state.”
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Samuel became increasingly animated when discussing recent shifts in Ecuador that were
changing the rules of CSR operations. Explored through the previous chapter, the state has
started to increase control over foreign companies operating in the country. Samuel, though,
argued that this increased monitoring of corporate activities would only continue to impact
indigenous peoples negatively, because it would eliminate CSR programs and 'abandon' local
communities. He claimed the state could not do what the companies do – operating in the space
of indigenous communities and getting to know individuals by name. In other words, CSR
discourse and practice hinges on the company's ability to “converge with and incorporate
national processes of development” (Rajak 2011: 232). The following paragraphs discuss the
way in which Samuel defends the company's operations, arguing that CSR programs are in the
best interest of indigenous populations.
As Samuel continued our conversation, though, it seemed obvious that his monologue
was full of contradictions, and I am attentive to these contradictions as a possible way to
challenge CSR programs. Responding to a question I asked about the state's strategic presences
in the region, he says,
Exactly, exactly. You might say, it has characterized the Amazon region, the absence of
the state, the absence of the state. I mean, to say in terms of, a public ethic, the state
wouldn't have the ethic, a lack of ethic to challenge those who are doing something there,
because the state isn't there. That is the situation.136
Samuel's discourse of CSR programs turned on limited state monitoring of corporate activity,
arguing that this crafts the corporation's zone of influence. Much of what we know about the
company and its operations comes from the company itself. The companies submit reports of
their programs, but the state does not follow up. There is very little understanding of what goes
136

Exacto, exacto, o sea que a caracterizado a la Amazonía, la ausencia del estado, la ausencia del estado, es decir
en términos de, de una ética pública, el estado no tendría, carecería de ética hasta para cuestionar aquellos que hacen
algo allá por que el estado no está esa es la situación,
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on inside a corporation's oil compound, and by extension the company's 'zone of influence' (see
Auyero and Swistun 2009). The legal agreement between the state and company that mandates
CSR programs at the local level, also does not merit any further state monitoring. In turn, this
enables the ongoing implementation of CSR programs. Samuel says,
The state is absent. The state, the only thing it does through the Ministry of Mines and
Petroleum currently and with the Subsecretary of Environmental Production, is require an
annual report that also includes community relations, and a general report of activities.
But, it's not that the state is saying to you, send me this agreement, in certain terms, even
if they are required to coordinate. But, they are always absent. So, more so, it's the
positive disposition of the company to keep the authority informed, such that, for
example, we signed an agreement with NAWE, with the Waorani, saying that certain
activities we had shared, designed together with them. In doing so, in executing [the
projects] this year this allows me to remit the activities in a schedule and the budget is
determined so that [the state] can speak to, or follow up as necessary. But, that depends
on the authority. We are not able to impose an authority, or a particular authority, or a
particular management.137
Samuel constructs the state and its historic absence as a gap in monitoring indigenous
populations in the northern Amazon region. Instead, corporations have to move into this void of
the state's absence, and follow up with authorities, and the lack of state regulation allows the
company to monitor itself. However, as explored in earlier chapters, as well as this one, the state
is not entirely absent. It does construct roads, pays teachers, and of course the presence of the
local junta parroquial is more recent evidence of the state. Yet, Samuel’s story relies on the
state’s complete absence. This allows the company to operate freely, without critique, and
without responsibility to other institutions. Furthermore, CSR programs are discursively
137

El estado está ausente, el estado lo único que hace a través del Ministerio de Minas y Petróleo actual y de la
Subsecretaría de producción ambiental es de requerir el informe anual en el que consta también la parte de
relaciones comunitarias como parte del informe general de actividades, pero no es que la, no es que el estado te está
diciendo envíemela convenio, en que términos, aunque ellos tienen la obligación de coordinar, pero ellos siempre
están ausentes, entonces más es he, más es la disposición positiva de una compañía de tener informada a la
autoridad, no, de tal manera que por ejemplo nosotros firmamos un acuerdo con, con la NAHUE con los huahuranis
decimos tales actividades hemos compartido, hemos diseñado conjuntamente con ellos he, en hacerla, en ejecutar
este año me permito remitir las actividades, el cronograma y el presupuesto destinado para que usted se pronuncie o
usted haga el seguimiento que considere, pero hay ya depende de la autoridad, nosotros no podemos imponer a una
autoridad tal o cual gestión.

196

entrenched - Samuel suggests indigenous populations would be left with nothing, were it not for
the company. He acknowledges that early iterations of CSR programs in Ecuador had a more
functional purpose to ensure ongoing extraction, but more recently they have beneficial impacts
on peoples' daily lives. Samuel elaborates,
We still didn't have, not even the legislation for these activities. What happened was the
responsibility of the company that would see [what was needed]. The company was going
to execute policies and management through the guise of social responsibility, which is
also a recent paradigm. It was done also because it was functional, in terms of its
operating facilities... I mean, I assume these activities because they are functional for
what I'm going to do, because if I don't do this, if I don't assume these roles, I'm not going
to be able to operate either. So, it was also instrumental, but it's also become part of a
paradigm of social responsibility.138
The company points to CSR programs' roles in facilitating oil extraction, but also the production
of new forms of human behavior that are linked to the corporation, instead of the state (see
Escobar 1995; Stoler 1995), and interventions into indigenous peoples' relationships with their
territory. Samuel confirmed that CSR programs became more formal through the 1990s, which
was also when the state began to establish environmental laws. Samuel says,
[CSR] is not a requirement. The requirements, in social and environmental terms recently
began to be forged in a more developed way in the middle of the 1990s. But, in the
1980s, we had hardly isolated certain environmental dispositions, and at a certain point,
most recently in the 1990s, the Ministry of Environment was created, which also did not
exist before.139

138

No había todavía ni siquiera la legislación para estas actividades lo que, lo que había es la responsabilidad de la
empresa que veía que si bien iba a ejecutar políticas y gestiones dentro del marco de responsabilidad social que son
también paradigmas recientes, era, por, lo hacían también por que era funcional a su, a sus facilidades operativas...,
es decir yo asumo estas actividades por que también son funcionales para lo que voy hacer, por que si no hago esto
si no asumo estos roles tampoco voy a poder operar, entonces era también, era también instrumental, pero también
ha pasado a ser un paradigma de responsabilidad social.
139
No es una obligación, las obligaciones he, he, en términos sociales y ambientales recién comienzan a irse
forjando de manera más desarrollada a mediados de la década del noventa, pero en los años 80 no habían apenas
ciertas disposiciones ambientales aisladas, a tal punto que recién en los años 90 se crea el Ministerio del Ambiente
que tampoco existía.

197

CSR programs contributed to the regulation of resource extraction, and corporate operations
were a mandatory part of the state's resource extraction laws. CSR as a legal requirement
contributes to the corporation's process of managing indigenous populations to ensure
accumulation. Much of Samuel's confirmation of CSR programs and company presence at the
local level stems from the relationships he has established with local populations. He mentioned
to me the way in which daily lives were shared between the company and local peoples,
acknowledging this sense of inclusion that is forged between corporate and indigenous actors.
The corporation's ongoing presence in the region has also allowed the company to share in
everyday struggles, according to Samuel, and to get to know community residents on a daily
basis. Samuel suggested that this sort of relationship is impossible for the state. He told me,
The state is indifferent in this topic. If you see me at any moment answering a call from a
native, who says that he/she has a sick relative, who has to be evacuated. We do it. But, if
they call the state, they will not know the bureaucrat, the individual, and that individual
probably will say that it's not my problem. That's the difference with a company that
operates, and is working in the zone, in terms of a level of neighborly permanence. Daily
lives are shared, and this is really difficult with the state, really difficult with the state.140
The corporation imagines itself as a neighbor, albeit a powerful one, that can re-construct the
space of a community and its zone of influence through CSR programs. Thus, not only is it
critical that the corporation can judge local populations' needs and deficiencies, but it is the
corporation's presence in the region that prevents the formation of state institutions, in order to
ensure its ongoing presence. This is essential for the company's operations. The company's social
consent model prevents mobilization that might lead to the formation of state institutions (see
Bebbington 2010). Samuel criticized the state in terms of its inability to monitor the region and
140

El estado es indiferente a esta materia, si, si, si tu me ves cualquier momento contestando la llamada de un nativo
diciendo que tienen un enfermo y que tienen que evacuar eso lo hacemos nosotros pero si lo llaman al es, al estado
no sabrán a que funcionario, no sabrán a que personaje y ese personaje probablemente dirá ese no es mi problema,
esa es la diferencia entre una empresa que opera y que está en la zona trabajando en un nivel de vecindad
permanente, de cotidianidad compartida y eso es muy difícil con el estado, muy difícil con el estado.
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indigenous territory, both in the context of increasing colonization and conservation concerns, as
well as the state's inability to be present at the local level responding to community members'
needs. He said,
But, for us, the theme that is most important in Pompeya is control of colonization. We
want to know that in the moment in which we leave, we will go knowing that through this
port, not one colonist entered.141
Preventing colonization places the company on the side of indigenous populations, who
historically were opposed to internal colonization, and claimed rights to their territory. In the
following statement he notes the way in which local communities have rights to their territory,
but also the way in which the communities have signed agreements with the company to ensure
continued access. He says,
One of the most important things for our operation on the Napo River, is that the port of
entrance has to be the port that is most watched and protected, most of all because of the
theme of colonization. Since its design, the oil model that was in place, that we
conducted, it was identified that there was a point of risk, a key point, and consequently
we never thought of constructing a bridge. We only use river operations, so we have
canoes, boats, barges. You know that, and that it's a border that helps us a lot, in
preventing colonization. In Pompeya, there's no colonization, in Indillama there's no
colonization, and in Waorani territory, and the communities in the interior of the block,
there's no colonization. What there is, is extensive use of the land on the part of each
community. And here it's important that you, I don't know if you already have it, but that
you obtain an agreement signed by the communities of Pompeya, Indillama, Centro
Anañgu and others with the Ministry of Environment that gives them power to control
their territory, and therefore, additionally, to us in Pompeya and Indillama, we have
certain agreements, we also have agreements that were made the year before last, I don’t
know, two or three years when they were pressuring [us].142
141

Pero para nosotros los temas más importantes este momento en Pompeya son el control de colonización
queremos que el rato que nos vayamos irnos sabiendo que por esa puerta que nosotros abrimos no hay un solo
colono.
142
Una de las cosas más importantes para nuestra operación en el río Napo es que al ser la puerta de ingreso tiene
que ser la puerta más cuidada y protegida, sobre todo por el tema de colonización, desde el diseño del modelo
petrolero que iban, a, nosotros a ejecutar, se, se identificó que esa era, he, era un punto de riesgo y un punto clave
consecuentemente nunca se pensó en un puente, solo en operaciones he, he, fluviales, no, por eso tenemos las
canoas, tenemos los botes, tenemos las, las gabarras, tu conoces igual eso y eso es una frontera que nos ayuda
mucho, mucho a cuidar la colonización. En Pompeya no existe colonización, en Indillama no existe colonización y
en territorio huahurani en las comunidades del interior del bloque tampoco, lo que si hay es un uso extensivo del
suelo por parte de las propias comunidades. Y aquí es importante que tu, he, no se si ya lo tienes, pero te consigas el

199

In other words, oil’s spatial fix highlights the importance of ensuring indigenous populations also
desire the benefits of oil, and incorporating them into an “incentive structure” (Zalik 2004: 420).
Samuel continued to critique the state, saying that it was the state's absences that forced the
company to take greater control of the region, and that it is the state that should be there to
ensure ongoing development in communities. In other words, none of the project failures in
Pompeya or other communities in the corporation's zone of influence can be attributed to the
company. He says,
There's not harmonious development, sure, because there are too many actors in the zone.
The actor that should be there in a permanent way, providing a horizon toward where
they must develop themselves is the state. But, the state is not there, so we must be able
to control the colonization. But what happens when we are not controlling [colonization],
and not just that theme, [but considering in the case of] Pompeya, there's already another
road that has arrived [a second road was constructed in Pompeya, going against the
company's wishes].143
Similarly, the presence of Yasuní National Park in the region further complicates legal concerns
regarding corporate presence and oil drilling inside the park's boundaries (see Sawyer 2004).
Again, Samuel critiqued the lack of state institutions in the region that failed to monitor the park
and activities within its borders. Thus, the company is required to monitor activities inside the
park, and develops CSR programs to ensure limited impact on the park. Samuel said,
That is the worst attack, the worst attack, is to Yasuní National Park. However, there's
already a road there. Who approved that road? What state authority said do it? No one.
The prefecture said do it, and they did it. So, it is the weakness of the absence of
institutions. And, it's not only bad, not only bad for the Amazon region. The worst part of
convenio firmado por las comunidades de Pompeya, Indillama, Centroañango y otras con el Ministerio del
Ambiente, en el cual el Ministerio del Ambiente les da potestad para manejar su territorio, ya, entonces adicional a
que nosotros en Pompeya y en Indillama tenemos convenios puntuales, tenemos también un convenio que se hizo el
año antepasado, no se dos años o tres años cuando presionaba.
143
no hay un desarrollo armónico claro por que están algunos. De los actores que están en la zona, el actor que
debería estar de manera permanente dando el horizonte por donde deben desarrollarse es el estado pero el estado no
está, entonces, nosotros podemos ir controlando la colonización, pero que pasa cuando nosotros no estemos
controlando eso, y no solo ese tema, hacia Pompeya ya llegó otra carretera.
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the Amazon region is the absence of the state. The worst part of Ecuador is that the state
is a state with little coercive capacity to say these are the norms...that we follow. This is a
country in which they inaugurate a new constitution and... the first institution responsible
to ensure that the constitution stands is the first to violate it. That is Ecuador. A lot of
things depend on friendships, interpersonal relations and not just socially acceptable and
shared rules. That is the problem with Ecuador, and in the Amazon region this approach
is much more serious.144
The company generates a discourse of the state's 'averted gaze', which “feeds uncertainty and
confusion 'by its implacable opacity, its refusal to comprehend, and its inability to act
responsively to the human suffering that presents itself'” (Scheper-Hughes 1992: 294 quoted in
Auyero and Swistun 2009: 101). While Scheper-Hughes (1992) is writing in the context of infant
deaths in Brazilian shantytowns, and the state’s indifference replicated in women’s own attitudes
toward the deaths of their babies, which suggests infant death is a natural occurrence, I argue that
a similar process occurs in Ecuador in the context of daily lives in Pompeya. Indigenous
populations reflect the state’s patchwork, strategic presences in everyday processes, made all the
more ‘real’ by the company’s discourse that suggests the state has never been present, and
continues to be completely absent. Indeed, it is this understanding of the state, implicitly
transferred to indigenous populations through the material evidence of CSR programs that
contributes to the corporation's ongoing presence. While Foucault (1975) wrote about the hostile
gaze of the state, and its disciplinary practices of surveillance, Scheper-Hughes (1992) proposes
an averted gaze of the state, and the reflection of this aversion in local populations that becomes

144

Ya, ese es el peor atentado, el peor atentado a, al parque nacional Yasuní, sin embargo ya está la carretera ahí,
quien aprobó esa carretera, que autoridad del estado dijo háganlo, nadie, la prefecta dijo se hace y se hizo. Entonces
es la debilidad de la ausencia de instituciones, y no es solo malo, no es solo un mal de la Amazonía, el mal de la
Amazonía es la ausencia de estado. El mal del Ecuador es que el estado es un estado con poca capacidad coercitiva
para decir estas son las normas...que hay que, que cumplir, este es un país en el que se inaugura una nueva
constitución y el primer, la primera institución responsable de velar por la constitución...es la primera en violarla ese
es el Ecuador, muchas cosas dependen de la amistad, de la relación interpersonal y no de las reglas socialmente
aceptadas y compartidas ese es el problema del Ecuador, y en la, y en la Amazonía este enfoque es mucho más
grave.
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formalized in state institutions. Yet, in Ecuador in 2007, the state’s role started to shift, which
also highlighted the underlying contradictions in corporate operations.
The new governing practices in Ecuador initiated by President Correa's administration
forced the company to confront a newly engaged state. Samuel argued that the state seemed to be
attempting to monitor companies more closely. Thus, Samuel again confronts his own
contradictions, claiming that the relative absence of the state is the root of the problems in the
Amazon region, but also reacting to the state's aims to seize more control from the companies. I
suggest that the state's renewed interest exposes corporate operations for what they really are –
the pursuit of profit that hinges on incorporating indigenous populations into an incentive
structure – to desire the 'benefits of oil'. Furthermore, the shifts in regulation of companies, and
claiming the majority of windfall profits poses a contradictory process of profit maximization of
a private company, and a social consent model of development that requires stability.
CSR programs focus on solutions, rather than addressing political economic problems,
suggesting a “blurring of development and compensation” (Zalik 2004: 419; Rajak 2011).
The impacts and effects of oil extraction always seem to be someone else's responsibility
(Auyero and Swistun 2009). As the following quote suggests, Samuel seems to think that a
corporation can more effectively ensure democracy than the state through its processes of 'selfregulation'. He says,
I see, at this moment, there's the highest level of deinstitutionalization than ever before.
That a president with a high level of authoritarianism, a sort of clientelism that
determines that which he does, and does not do.145 That is not democracy. At the very
least, not for me...We have confronted problems [with indigenous communities], but for
us, we are interested in having a relationship in which we negotiate and discuss with the
authorities about what our role is, and what is the role for them. But not an imposed
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Of course, Samuel does not point to the corporation's own production of clientelism and patronage through
processes of gift-giving that leads to indigenous deference to power.
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position, in which they say whatever, and whoever does that is going to go to prison. No,
that's not democracy.146
Samuel started to comment on the new legal changes in governance of oil, critiquing the state for
its concern with maintaining profits in regulating oil extraction. He suggests that companies are
caught in the middle, and defends the failures in corporate practices by criticizing the state's
inability to monitor oil extraction in any sort of consistent way. Furthermore, the company's
attempts to intervene in the region are challenged by a renewed interest by the state. If a
company is left to its own devices, or if the state maintains laws that allow the company to
operate as it wishes, reflected in the company’s profit margins, the company will have more
success in terms of monitoring and controlling the region. He says,
Ecuador wants to have rules of the game for periods of prosperity, and rules of the game
for companies during periods of downturns. It punishes you when you are doing well,
when you are prosperous, and it pretends to look the other way when you are declining,
or it continues to punish you when you are in a bad situation, and these aren't the rules of
the game. So, in contexts like these, what is the situation? These are the concepts also of
social responsibility that must be equaled out and I wonder how to continue. Executing
social responsibility, when I am a subject that is feeling punished, and disrespected by the
same state where I am, if you would have stable rules of the game, you would also have a
politics of social responsibility that is stable. Does it make sense to have a foundation
when tomorrow we are leaving? This also depends on the vision of the company. I
believe that the companies have to prioritize their politics of social assistance, and that
social assistance is not just a response to a positive situation, but also one during difficult
times. It is for us, including within a 99% -1% split, that we continue doing we are doing.
The Foundation continues supporting what it can, with what it is able to do, and much
more. But, the legal insecurity places limits on you, and that is the situation. For example,
you will have heard in recent days that the Waorani pueblo made a declaration against the
state, so that the state would arrive at an agreement with Repsol, because if Repsol left
the country, they would be left with almost a situation of abandonment.147
146

Yo veo que este rato hay mayor nivel de desinstitucionalización que antes, que antes, eso de que un jefe
presidente con alto nivel de autoritarismo, de clientelismo ordene lo que se hace y lo que no se debe hacer eso no es
democracia, al menos para mi, no... nosotros hemos enfrentado problema, pero a nosotros nos interesa tener una
relación de, en que negociemos y discutimos, y discutamos con las autoridades cual es nuestro rol y cual es el rol de
ellos, pero no una posición impuesta en que digan cualquiera que hace eso se va preso, no, eso no es democracia.
147

el Ecuador quiere tener unas reglas de juego para la época de prosperidad y unas reglas de juego respecto a las
empresas para la época de limitaciones, te castigo cuando estás bien y me hago el de la vista gorda por último
cuando estás mal o te sigo cayendo cuando estás mal, y esas no son reglas de juego. Entonces en escenarios como
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As the above quote illustrates, the company is stymied by the state's return to legal forms of
control and monitoring. If limits are placed on its CSR programs, the company's 'social license to
operate' is also curbed. Samuel refers to the state's process whereby it started to push RepsolYPF out of the country, arguing that it had to adhere to a 99%-1% split in windfall profits. He
suggests that even through these unfair divisions of profits from extraction, a company is forced
to maintain its CSR programs. Thus, “partnership development is contradicted by the profit
maximizing logic of the private company” (Zalik 2004: 419; Rajak 2011). Yet, Samuel argues
that CSR is much more than just a responsibility to those communities where oil is extracted. For
him, his job is about creating personal ties, connections, with local people, and this relationship
validates the company's work. Indeed, he uses the word 'abandonment' to suggest the company is
necessary for indigenous populations' survival. He continues,
Not like a social responsibility. We take it on like a social responsibility in which we
leave effort. We do it with a lot of conviction, with a lot of commitment. But not all the
companies. In our case, because we have done it almost like a relation, an affiliation with
the people from there. That time I entered with Rodrigo from ENTRIX, and there was a
community leader who said to me, 'I saw in the news that Repsol was going', and she
started to cry. We also go into it establishing ties of empathy, and of affiliation, personal
affinity.148

estos cual es el tema, que los conceptos también de responsabilidad social se relativicen yo como seguir, he,
ejecutando políticas de, de cooperación social cuando el, es, cuando soy un sujeto que está siendo golpeado e
irrespetado por el propio estado donde yo estoy, si vos tendrías reglas de juego estables tendrías una política de
responsabilidad social también estable y uno se pregunta, tiene sentido tener una Fundación cuando mañana ya nos
vamos y eso también depende de la visión de la empresa, yo creo que las empresas, he, deben priorizar las políticas
de asistencia social no solamente como una contraparte de una buena situación sino también como una contraparte
incluso en épocas malas, es por eso que nosotros incluso con el 99-1 seguimos haciendo lo que hacemos, la
Fundación sigue aportando como lo hace, con lo que podríamos haber hecho y mucho más, pero la inseguridad
jurídica te pone límites, te impone límites esa es la situación, para no, por ejemplo, he, tu habrás escuchado que en
días recientes he, lo, el pueblo huahurani se pronunció, a, socio por que el estado ecuatoriano llegue a un acuerdo
con REPSOL, huahuranis se pronunciaron para que lleguen a un acuerdo con REPSOL por que si REPSOL se iba
ellos quedaban casi en un escenario de desamparo, desamparo.
148

No como una responsabilidad social, nosotros lo asumimos como una responsabilidad social en que dejamos
esfuerzo, he, lo hacemos con mucha convicción, con mucha entrega pero no todos, no todas las empresas, nuestro
caso por que hemos hecho casi una relación he, he, filial con la gente de ahí no, he, esa vez yo ingresé con [Rodrigo]
y había una dirigente que me dijo yo vi en las noticias que REPSOL se iba y, y comenzó a llorar, también van
estableciéndose lazos de empatía y de filiación personal, de afinidad personal.
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CSR is a commitment for Samuel. It reflects on the company as a good 'neighbor.' It is only right
that a company that is present in the region give back or take responsibility. He says,
There is another type of empathetic, personal relationship that is functional for what we
do. But, we don't view it from this perspective. We see it more from a perspective of a
pledge that we take on, and that we must be loyal and worthy of this commitment.
Afterward, because of our presence, [indigenous peoples] give through life stories and
care. Her husband was on the brink of dying [looking at a photo], and came to Quito. We
helped him, they operated and now he is back in his house. He's living. So all these cases
disrupt certain paradigms. We have a good relationship. Things stay with the people.
Many say that the indigenous pueblos are ungrateful. It's probably the case, but we have
seen everything.149
Essentially, Samuel argues that the company has the ability to perform tasks the state cannot,
suggesting that a state could never know individual citizens by name and is a monolithic,
nameless institution (see Mountz 2010 for a critique). CSR programs, then, are constructed by
the corporation with indigenous peoples' interests at heart, providing for a population that has
'suffered' at the hands of an ‘absent’ state. Yet, Samuel fails to acknowledge the ways in which
the corporation contributes to, and benefits from the state's strategic presences both in the context
of limited state monitoring, and the state’s approval of extraction through contracts with
Petroecuador, and military presence. Indeed, what this struggle between the state, indigenous
populations and corporation represents are political processes that are motivated by the desire to
gain access to oil rents. For Watts, these processes are subsumed under his term “oil complex”
defined by a “unity” of company, state, and community, a territorial process constituted by oil
concessions, and in which practices of oil companies challenge more customary forms of rule,

149

Sea hay otro tipo de relación de empatía personal que es funcional para lo que hacemos pero que nosotros no le
vemos desde esa perspectiva, lo vemos más de un, de una perspectiva de un compromiso que asumimos y que
debemos ser leales y dignos a ese compromiso, no, después y,y, no solamente, y no solamente se, se dan estos casos
por, por tu presencia se dan por los testimonios de vida y de asistencia, el esposo de ella estuvo al borde de morirse,
vino a Quito, le ayudamos, se operó ahora está de nuevo en su casa, está viviendo, entonces toda estas cosas rompen
ciertos paradigmas, rompen estos paradigmas y tenemos una buena relación, cosas quedan en la gente, muchos dicen
que los pueblos indígenas son ingratos, es probable, pero nosotros hemos visto de todo.
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such as ethnic and local state relations. Watts (2003: 54) writes that “petro-capitalism (as a
dynamic set of forces) refigure differing sorts of governable spaces in which contrasting
identities, and forms of rule come into play.” In turn, the oil complex as a “static institution”
linked to the dynamic processes of petro-capitalism can reconfigure governable spaces through
which different identities, and different forms of rule emerge. Indigenous subjects within the
corporation's zone of influence reflect the compensatory nature, and the materiality of CSR
projects. Oil's spatial boundedness highlights the state's control over the formation of subjects of
the oil state, but that this subject formation requires conditioning subjects to desire the 'benefits'
of cheap oil, incorporating them into an incentive structure, and these modes of regulation often
contradict one another (Zalik 2004; Rajak 2011). It is in these contradictory processes that
indigenous populations must continue to insert themselves into debates about resource access
and control.

Conclusion
“Rendering contentious issues technical is a routine practice for experts, I insist that this
operation should be seen as a project, not a secure accomplishment” (Li 2007: 10). This
statement by Li (2007) suggests that there are points of intervention in practices of rule. Indeed,
the company is not a monolithic institution, and it does produce contradictory outcomes, despite
doing all it can to ensure its ongoing presence by depoliticizing its operations. In turn, by
assuming, or concluding that depoliticization is an effective outcome, we run the risk of
overlooking and excluding questions that will not go away, including historic and political
economic questions. If we explore CSR programs on their own terms, as development projects
rooted in neoliberal forms of post-Fordist capitalist production, we can also point to the way that
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these projects, rather than promoting the self-help rhetoric of neoliberalism, instead lead to
ongoing paternalism and patron-client relationships of earlier decades. My dissertation, and this
chapter in particular, aims to specifically highlight the corporation's move toward expert
“closure” through CSR programs that avoids analysis of corporate operations. Following Li
(2007), it is precisely these underlying aims of development projects that should draw our
attention.
In the second part of the chapter, I attempted to examine the competing interests between
state and corporate control of the region. I argued that ongoing CSR programs actually prevent
the formation of state and indigenous institutions that might lead to different development and
governance outcomes. The corporation reflects a discourse, and the material practices of CSR
programs contribute to the company's attempts to paint the state in neoliberal, hollowed-out,
uncaring terms. Indeed, the company builds on the historic, only patchwork presences of the
state as a strategic maneuver to ensure its ongoing presence. Yet, rather than ensuring rights for
indigenous peoples, the company is more interested in its own presence in Ecuador, as a
powerful actor that is engaged in the 'conduct of conduct' of indigenous populations. Indeed, my
discussion with Samuel seemed to highlight the impacts from additional state control over
corporations, rather than the possibilities that increased presence of the state might have on
indigenous rights and citizenship in Ecuador. In turn, the ambivalence and confusion of the state
in regulating oil extraction, and the corporation's 'expert' discourse is reflected in indigenous
subjectivities. Thus, this chapter is also an exploration of competing sovereignties as both state
and corporation seek control over a territory and oil wealth, which ultimately hinges on the
population within that territory.
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Yet, I argue that the competition that ensues between the corporation and state also opens
the space for additional indigenous control over their own development. If we explore the
contradictory practices in development, both through the company and the hollowed out state, as
well as the participation of indigenous organizations and leaders we can see the ways in which
these actors at times support, and at other times challenge the processes that might lead to
alternative outcomes, and additional control over resources for indigenous populations (cf.
Mountz 2010; Wolford 2006, 2010). Indeed, if we consider CSR programs as daily practices, this
allows us to investigate these different pathways to confront corporate operations. Resistance,
then, does not always come from the outside (see Gupta 1995; Moore 2005, 2000). My
dissertation presents an exploration of alternative narratives, or “counter-discourses” (AbuLughod: 263) that are sometimes suppressed, or normalized as culturally acceptable, i.e. the state
as facilitator of capital flows for investment and economic growth, that can “expose
inconsistencies in [Ecuador's] self-imaginings” (Mountz 2010: xxv). I explore these spaces of
ambivalence in the next chapter, the conclusion.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions

We began our fieldwork with the specter of collective action in mind, and we ended up
with extensive notes that register its absence. (Auyero and Swistun 2009: 136)
If the state is simultaneously confused, neglectful, and bold, why should we expect
otherwise from sick and weak neighbors? (Auyero and Swistun 2009: 101)
Introduction
In recent months, indigenous populations across Ecuador took to the streets participating
in a march organized by CONAIE, walking from the Amazon region to Quito protesting the
state's push to open the southern Amazon region to copper mining. In an attempt to diversify its
economic reliance on oil extraction, the Correa administration is moving forward with largescale mining projects. The protest began in the province of Zamora Chinchipe, in the southern
Amazon region, the location of these new mines, on International Women's Day on March 8, and
ended in Quito on March 22, World Water Day. It was designed to call attention to the social and
environmental impacts of mining, in particular the impacts on water resources, and indigenous
rights and participation in resource governance decisions. On March 5th, 2012, President Correa
signed a $1.4 billion contract with the Chinese owned company Ecuacorriente to begin a copper
strip-mining project, the largest ever in Ecuador. The country plans to take 52% of the profits, or
$4.5 billion over 25 years. Other negotiations are underway with Canadian companies, and a
second project with Ecuacorriente. The contracts stipulate that 10% of royalties should fund
projects in communities impacted by the mine, and the current contract with Ecuacorriente
includes $100 million for social and environmental projects in the province of Zamora Chinchipe
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(Becker 2012). In other words, despite the state's aims to take back control of resource extraction
from multinationals, CSR programs will continue in Ecuador.
This dissertation, therefore, serves as a timely investigation into the social dynamics of
resource extraction and environmental governance, and multinationals' roles therein, a process
that only continues to intensify in Ecuador. Furthermore, it points to the role of CSR programs as
development projects in communities that bear the brunt of resource extraction, and the
entangled relationships between a state, its citizens, and multinational corporations.
I argue that CSR programs can facilitate the expansion of global capitalism by linking a
corporation's goals to a national development project, blurring the boundaries between
marginalized citizens and a state. In turn, my project aims to investigate CSR programs on their
own terms, as development projects. I uncover the way in which CSR programs, premised on
neoliberal tenets of self-help, and grassroots development, instead present a return to the
clientelism and patronage of earlier decades (see Li 2007; Rajak 2010, 2011; Zalik 2004).
Furthermore, the ambivalence and uncertainty of indigenous subjects allowed the corporation to
manipulate populations, but also points to challenges to corporate operations, as well as to state
sovereignty.
I explore the relationships between the state, company and indigenous populations to
examine how indigenous subjects are produced through CSR programs. In turn, by
conceptualizing CSR programs as institutions, I uncover the way in which corporations and CSR
programs discipline indigenous populations in the space of extraction in Ecuador’s northern
Amazon region. Following Watts (2003, 2004,b) and Moore (2005), I examine overlapping
spaces of governance, linked by ongoing oil extraction. The particular historical context of the
roll-out of neoliberal policies and practices that could facilitate oil extraction, and the ongoing
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retrenchment of the state in the northern Amazon region, combined with indigenous social
movements through the 1990s is overshadowed by CSR programs in the space of Pompeya. In
turn, corporate programs emphasize development projects and indigenous deficiencies,
producing and relying on indigenous uncertainty and ambivalence.
CSR programs define deficient subjects, targeting indigenous populations as those in
need of development. In turn, discourse at the point of extraction revolves around participation in
the nation-state linked to an extractive industry, and indigenous rights and representation are
secured through this participation. Thus, while CSR programs depoliticize resource extraction,
my dissertation aims to highlight the politicization of CSR programs that rely on the production
of particular indigenous subjectivities. Ethnographic analysis, and the exploration of the daily
practices of CSR programs illuminate the relationships of power that both manipulate and
present a coherent framework of extraction.
While resources continue to be extracted in Ecuador, CSR programs resulted in
challenging state sovereignty. The corporation is often engaged in the day-to-day practices of
indigenous populations, leading to dependence on corporate operations. In other words, the
corporation intervenes in processes of government, leading to new territories of rule, which
shape people’s belonging in the nation-state. My dissertation points to the role of indigenous
subjects in relation to the state, and sovereign power. In turn, as the state continues to base
development and modernization processes in resource extraction, the role of indigenous peoples
in these processes will continue to be crucial to state’s sovereign control over its territory. The
continued delegitimization of indigenous rights, and the ability of CSR programs to squash
protest, highlights the state’s failure to equitably distribute resources. In other words, CSR
programs in Ecuador acutely highlight the resource curse and its effects (cf. Bebbington 2010).
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In this conclusion I focus on productive processes of ambivalence. While the current
emphasis on large-scale mining in Ecuador has prompted nation-wide protests, organized
indigenous collective action is less evident in the spaces of oil extraction in the northern Amazon
region. I argued through the dissertation that the uncertainty and ambivalence in indigenous
subjectivities I uncovered contributes to this inaction, and challenges a collective indigenous
identity. However, I also want to suggest that this ambivalence can highlight possible spaces for
calling attention to power relations produced through corporate programs, and the state's ongoing
attempts to dismiss indigenous claims to resources and membership in the nation-state.
My dissertation is a story of the state, and its relationship to some of its most
marginalized citizens, indigenous peoples. It is also a story of environmental governance, and the
interventions of a powerful multinational oil company that shifts relationships at the point of
extraction leading to unintended and unanticipated outcomes, exacerbating relationships of
power that result in challenges to state sovereignty and indigenous collective action. By
exploring relationships between the state, a private multinational, and indigenous populations
that form through CSR programs, I aimed to uncover alternative narratives that might begin to
challenge those dominant discourses and practices that continue to marginalize indigenous
populations.
Throughout the period of my research, I was frustrated by the uncertainty in indigenous
responses to CSR programs I encountered in Pompeya, which I mistook as apathy toward me,
and my project. Eventually, though, my work focused on how this ambivalent response was
produced. What were the power relationships that led to this outcome? In turn, how do the
relationships produced through CSR programs contribute to a lack of collective action in
indigenous communities and organizations, and influence indigenous rights and representation in

212

the state? The spaces of ambivalence become productive spaces for exploring tensions and
complexities in processes of resistance and challenging dominant power structures (cf. Bondi
2004)

Spaces of ambivalence
I analyzed the production of both CSR programs, and indigenous subjectivities to explore
overlapping spaces of governance, formed through social relations between the state, indigenous
peoples, and the company. I drew on Foucault's (1991) governmentality framework to
investigate how CSR programs produce competing sovereignties tied to access and control over
oil wealth, and the production of particular indigenous subjects. In other words, I examined not
just subject formation that is the result of particular technologies of rule, but also how those
technologies operate to produce subjects (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Rajak 2011). I
explored the way in which sovereignty is linked to subject formation, and how subjects can
challenge sovereignty, or become subject to sovereign power (Li 2007; Moore 2005; Valdivia
2008). I designed my dissertation so that each chapter might address an overlapping space of
governance in the northern Amazon region: community, nation-state, and corporate 'zone of
influence' (Moore 2005; N. Rose 1999; Watts 2003, 2004).
In turn, I argue that indigenous ambivalence and uncertainty is produced in these
different spaces, which leads to particular forms of governing oil extraction, challenges state and
indigenous sovereignty, and contributes to ongoing corporate presence. In other words, corporate
practices sought to discipline the space of oil extraction, shaping the conduct of indigenous
residents. More recent attempts by the state to regain control over the space of extraction,
following years of outsider presence, reflect the state's loss of profits from oil extraction and loss
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of control over indigenous subjects. My analysis of CSR programs can emphasize the
contradictory processes of extending neoliberalism into the farthest corners of the state,
undermining local state control, while simultaneously emphasizing ensuring state control from
afar (see Nightingale 2005). In turn, my project emphasizes the contradictory processes of a
locatable government in offices and agencies in Ecuador, and the more hidden processes of the
state. Indigenous uncertainty and ambivalence emerge through these competing claims of state
and corporate control to oil wealth, but also produce the space for indigenous subjects to
strategically use their agency and highlight their own politics and control over territory.
In this conclusion I call attention to the possibilities of using this ambivalence and
uncertainty as creating a space to productively explore the tensions and contradictions I
uncovered in my research. I suggest that by placing indigenous subjects alongside more powerful
actors, alternative narratives might emerge to challenge dominant discourses and practices.
While CSR programs could be reduced to corporate policy, I argue that by exploring CSR
programs as a set of daily practices, I can uncover the everyday social relationships in which
they are embedded (Mountz 2010). Thus, my dissertation points to the epistemological
distinctions in institutional analysis that have emerged historically. Arguing that the institution
emerges out of social relationships, rather than existing as something to be penetrated allows a
focus on the way in which different groups and individuals are engaged in the formation of CSR
programs. My dissertation contributes to ethnographies of development (King 2009; Bebbington
et al. 2004; Perreault 2003a,b) that challenge the depoliticization of development practices
(Escobar 1999; Ferguson 2004), and highlight the micro-practices and politics of development
processes that emerge through daily practices (see Mountz 2007, 2010). I aim to uncover the
central contradictions or inconsistencies in resource governance through CSR programs (Mountz
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2007, 2010; Watts 2003, 2004). An IE can point to these contradictions, or the cracks in the
façade of CSR programs (Mountz 2007).

Contributions
Ecuador relies on oil for 50% of its economic revenues (EIA 2010), yet the economic
wealth from this extraction has flowed to major cities in Ecuador, leaving the Amazon region
with few of the benefits of resource extraction. Instead the region continues to be devastated
socially and environmentally, and protests that have included the region's indigenous
populations, along with other activists have called attention to these atrocities (Kimmerling
1996; Sawyer 2004). While the marches through the 1990s highlighted indigenous rights and
representation in the state, including rights to territory, the state still maintained its rights to the
sub-surface resources below indigenous territory. Furthermore, the neoliberalization of the oil
industry's operations through the 1990s, including privatization of resource extraction, removed
control over multinationals from the state. CSR programs emerged in Ecuador during this period
of indigenous protests and neoliberal reforms, mandated by the state as part of company
operations (Benalcázar 2006; Fontaine 2005; Veintimilla 2006). Corporations represent a long
line of outsiders in the region, continuing the relationships of power that contribute to the
marginalization of indigenous populations in the state.
In Ecuador, the alternative manifestations of the state in the Amazon region left
indigenous communities to negotiate directly with outsiders – rubber barons, missionaries, and
private multinationals – which set up a long history of patron-client relationships, reflected in
relationships with corporations today (Macdonald 1999; Muratorio 1991; Whitten 1976). The
state's strategic presences also contributed to Repsol-YPF and its CSR programs' confirmation as
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a leading example of grassroots development. In other words, these outside institutions establish
particular forms of government, and following Foucault, challenge state sovereignty, discipline
and government. My dissertation, then, highlights the particular contradictions that confirm the
entrenchment of neoliberal policies and programs at the local level, while undermining local
state control. It does so by employing a Foucauldian approach rooted in governmentality to
address the power relationships that contribute to government, sovereignty and discipline that
emerge through institutional analysis of CSR programs. This approach offers a complementary
methodological and epistemological frame to other studies that have investigated neoliberal
processes of resource governance and political economy (see, for example, Moore 2000;
Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia 2008), and explores the production of sovereignty and
subjectivity through CSR programs.
Furthermore, my dissertation offers an ethnography of CSR programs, contributing to a
small, but growing body of literature within the academy. On a global scale, we see the
emergence of CSR programs and a series of voluntary reporting standards for corporations
engaged in CSR initiatives (Porter and Kramer 2006; The Economist 2008; Rajak 2011). In turn,
CSR programs and corporations undermine, and hence fill in spaces where the state is ‘absent’,
yet these voluntary standards cannot take the place of more formal rules and regulations,
including state institutions that might regulate resource extraction, and often prevent their
formation (Bebbington 2010; The Economist 2008; Frynas 2005). While discussions of CSR
programs, and their possible benefits, have emerged in popular literature, more critical studies
have also developed in academic literature. The Niger Delta and Shell Oil's CSR programs have
provided numerous case studies (Livesey and Kearins 2002; Zalik 2004). These critical analyses
have sometimes taken the form of ethnographic research (Himley 2010; Welker 2009), focusing
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on the corporation's goals of 'consent based regulation' (Zalik 2004), and the prevention of state
institutions that might better distribute resources, contributing to the resource curse (Bebbington
2010). Indeed, CSR programs are often faulted for their inclusionary and participatory nature
that cannot address questions of resource distribution and social justice (Zalik 2004). My
dissertation offers a first look at these unequal outcomes that emerge through ethnographies of
CSR programs questioning indigenous subject formation in the space of the Ecuadorian nationstate.
My study of CSR programs as development projects premised on a notion of gift giving,
despite corporate discourse to the contrary, focuses on the contradictory processes of CSR
programs through institutional relationships. I argued through the dissertation that corporations
operated as trustees in Ecuador (see Cowen and Shenton 1998; Li 2007), diagnosing deficiencies
and providing technical solutions that fail to address political economic problems. CSR programs
are not merely about facilitating capital's expansion, but also about the maneuvering of social
relationships that lead to additional resource extraction. I explore the production of an
ambivalent indigenous subjectivity through CSR programs. I aimed to uncover the way in which
CSR programs lead to social relationships that challenge state sovereignty and the ways in which
CSR programs are designed to coerce indigenous peoples into resource extraction regimes
through the company’s ‘zone of influence’. To do so, my project investigates the operation of
CSR programs as institutions that engage in the governance of resources by shifting indigenous
subjectivity.

217

Contradictions in overlapping spaces of governance
My investigation begins from the point of institutional analysis, developed in Chapter 2. I
argue that conceptualizing institutions through social relationships develops an approach that can
explore the various networks and connections within CSR programs, and also beyond the
‘boundaries’ of the institution itself. These networks often extend outside the official discourse
and practice of the corporation. Furthermore, my analysis is attentive to the role of the researcher
herself within institutional dynamics, and argues that institutional formation through social
relationships must also address the role of the researcher. My dissertation, therefore, explores the
ways in which I was bound up in corporate discourse and practice, and the challenges of
extricating myself from institutional processes.
I argue that this approach to institutions is different from other institutional analyses in
geography that often see the institution in its a priori manifestation, as something to be
penetrated. Furthermore, my dissertation uses institutional ethnography to address social
relationships within and produced through CSR programs. My analysis is grounded in Dorothy
Smith’s (1987) use of IE to examine how subjects emerge through the institution and vice-versa.
Indeed, other development ethnographies have not necessarily drawn on Smith’s definition of IE,
reflecting epistemological differences in institutional conceptualization. However, my analysis
also lends itself to a critique of Smith’s institutional approach, arguing for a more spatialized
conceptualization of the institution, exploring differences between the institution’s centers and
margins, for example. This analysis serves as the basis for my dissertation that is attentive to
subject formation through CSR programs, and the ambivalence of indigenous peoples in the
presence of corporate and state operations.
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Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between subject formation and long histories of
local state absences, and ongoing strategic state presences manifest in their geographical distance
from the region. In turn, the formation of patron-client relationships between the company and
indigenous populations, contributes to indigenous doubts in the state's efficacy as a sovereign.
The contradictory, uncertain relationships at the community level are “mediated by the many
appropriations, denials and distortions carried out by existing institutions” (Auyero and Swistun
2009: 157). Indeed, the way in which the state has used and misused oil wealth, the
implementation of CSR programs, and oil's ongoing contamination of Ecuador contributes to
indigenous populations' own uncertainty, and a lack of collective action. This uncertainty, on the
one hand, produces indigenous powerlessness and the ongoing social and environmental impacts
of resource extraction (see Auyero and Swistun 2009). Furthermore, indigenous cultural norms
dictate that more powerful actors should distribute wealth to those with less power. Yet, on the
other hand, in the space of Pompeya, certain residents are also challenging the role of
multinationals and CSR programs, pointing to the way in which development through CSR
programs is premised on gift-giving, rooted in long histories of outsider presence in the region.
The argument I craft in Chapter 3 suggests that by placing politics alongside
development, we can uncover inconsistencies and uncertainties in CSR programs which also
place additional power in the hands of indigenous populations (Li 2007; Wolford 2010).
Following Doña Barbara, by juxtaposing gift-giving with a discourse of entitlement, the
community might challenge corporate power and control in the space of the community, and call
on both state and corporate actors for development. In other words, Doña Barbara attempted to
“shape how subjects would be governed” (Moore 2005: 254). In turn, the ambivalent indigenous
subject is produced through the institutional relationships of CSR programs. Furthermore,

219

indigenous sovereignty is tied to notions of CSR programs and corporate presence
acknowledging and challenging indigenous histories of sovereignty and territory in the
Ecuadorian nation-state.
In Chapter 4, I explore relationships between the capitalist state and its political body
(Coronil 1997; Valdivia 2008). I argue that the recent shifts in governance following the election
of President Correa expose the duplicitous processes of the petro-state (cf. Nelson 2009). In turn,
I use Bakhtin’s carnival to uncover possible openings in governance processes and examine
shifts in governance strategies reflected in neoliberal/post-neoliberal transitions. I argue that
while the post-neoliberal moment offers an opening for new forms of governance, subject
formation and sovereignty produced through corporate programs exacerbates these new
possibilities. Indeed, as the carnival promises, these are moments to try on new identities, but
these new moments cannot happen without some contemplation of the institutional disciplining
to which subjects are accustomed. Thus, the carnival is appealing, and yet dangerous at the same
time.
I examine the duplicitous nature of the state in the context of territorial sovereignty linked
to the state’s sub-surface rights to oil, or la Patria. For Sawyer (2004), la Patria is about the
right of conquest, by a white, male elite. In Ecuador, indigenous protests through the 1990s
presented alternative ways of understanding the nation, and challenged discourses of la Patria by
using symbolic claims of nation and plurinacionalidad forcing the state to consider nation as
separate from state. Scholarship has linked la Patria to natural resources, including oil, and
struggles over territoriality and membership in the nation are also rooted in struggles over
resources (Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia 2008).
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If we consider the histories of indigenous political organizing, tied to alternative notions
of nation-building, neoliberalism through the 1990s opened the space for indigenous political
claims to control over territory, but also contained the movement through additional
development of natural resource extraction and privatization of oil operations (cf. Hale 2011).
CSR programs emerged, in part, as a way for the state to control indigenous protests, imposing
its will, rather than following indigenous peoples' (see Moore 2005). I argue that this process of
containment also presents certain contradictions that call into question the state's sovereignty.
When these ‘duping’ processes are exposed – incorporating indigenous peoples into the
sovereign state through coercive practices, only to marginalize them further – we might start to
question the carnival of the state’s practices. What continues to be indigenous territory is coopted
by state discourses of oil production for the good of the nation, and engagement in CSR
programs to ‘develop’ indigenous populations. Thus, state practices serve to regulate the multiple
bodies of the state – the rich and the poor, the natural and the political – through engagement in
neoliberal programs and practices and the disciplinary processes of CSR programs. By
incorporating indigenous subjects into neoliberal reforms through CSR programs, the state
extended neoliberal policies and programs into the farthest corners of its territory.
Simultaneously, though, it undermines local state presence, while strengthening state control
from afar.
I conducted my research at a period when Ecuador started to pull away from neoliberal
policies in an effort to gain more of the windfall profits from oil extraction. Those profits had
historically accrued to private multinationals, leaving the state with little and also representing a
material and symbolic challenge to state sovereignty tied to oil wealth. With the election of
President Correa in 2007, who threatened to kick Repsol-YPF out of the country over contract
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disputes, the state initiated a process to seek out new ways to control multinational operations,
and perhaps reclaim its sovereign right to oil resources. Linked to these new changes to
Ecuador's hydrocarbon laws, the state also called for an end to CSR operations.
This shift in resource governance was a catalyst for indigenous organizations, as
recipients of CSR projects to highlight CSR programs and claim rights to the material wealth of
oil extraction. Yet, these claims also marked indigenous organizations’ entanglements in
corporate capital and neoliberal programs. The state's removal of CSR programs refocuses
attention on the state, and discussions of political and economic relationships within petro-states.
I argue that the state cannot be made up of just two bodies – the political and the economic.
Instead, I explore the ways in which multiple bodies of indigenous, state, and corporate
individuals emerge through relationships within the institutions of CSR programs, reshaping
state processes of governance. The state’s sovereignty is extended to its subterranean territory,
and subjects are formed through these subsoil resources. In the case of indigenous peoples,
however, the state’s subsurface resources make indigenous bodies sick. CSR programs can cover
up these illnesses, but do not eliminate them. These political networks, however, have come to
define the course of the state. Relationships within CSR programs could erase the boundaries
between the economic body of the state and its political body, including incorporating
indigenous peoples into state processes of sovereignty and control over territory, easing the
tensions that developed in the 1990s. Yet, at the same time, this conjuncture also calls into
question state sovereignty, as indigenous subjects embody the duplicitous nature of the state, and
yet refuse to be duped by the state’s maneuverings to claim more wealth from oil. It is these
conflicting, coercive relationships that serve to produce challenges to state sovereignty, and
indigenous membership in Ecuador.
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Chapter 5, then, is an exploration of how CSR programs operate as technology of rule. I
argue through the chapter that corporate operations are premised on defining those who fall
within the company's zone of influence, and those who are excluded. Furthermore, the company
defines its zone of influence by including those populations directly influenced by resource
extraction who are inside Repsol-YPF's oil block, as well as a much wider swathe of the northern
Amazon region, incorporating those communities that are also marked by the state's strategic
presences. The corporation operates as a trustee, and claims to know what is best for indigenous
populations, which, cautions Li (2007), is also a claim to power.
Repsol-YPF defines certain deficiencies in indigenous communities, those that have
technical solutions, eliminating the political economic questions it cannot answer. As a result,
CSR programs tend to exacerbate processes of resource access and distribution. In conversations
with corporate officers, the company produces a discourse that ensures that the state is
constructed as a monolithic institution and absent from the Amazon region entirely. Therefore,
the proposed shifts in regulation of oil in Ecuador challenge corporate operations, and point to
the way in which the company maintains its presence through regulation from afar. Yet, the
state's reliance on oil requires that indigenous populations are incorporated into CSR programs
that can also make them amenable to ongoing extraction. Thus, indigenous subjects come to
reflect the compensatory projects of CSR programs, rather than membership in the nation-state
that ultimately undermines the state's control over its subjects. My dissertation, therefore, is an
examination of subject formation in the corporate zone of influence. Governmentality can
uncover the disciplining practices of theses spaces of corporate regulation and rule, and corporate
‘territory’ that is produced through relationships with indigenous subjects. Furthermore,
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indigenous subject formation in the space of corporate rule reflects broader processes of
neoliberal subjectivity.

A story of the state
CSR programs can “fix” indigenous subjects in a particular ruling regime, regulating
them, clearing up confusion, and calculating distribution (Foucault 1991; Moore 2005). The
ambivalence and uncertainty of indigenous subjects, however, calls into question this process of
disciplining through CSR programs, challenging state aims to fix populations in certain places
and territories. By turning over control of the space of extraction to corporations, the state is
confronted by the unintended outcomes and effects, and the uncertainty of contested
micropractices of rule. Indeed, a discourse of inclusion and exclusion is repeated through the
dissertation, in the context of indigenous membership in the nation-state, as well as in the
inclusionary practices of CSR programs. While the period of the 1990s highlighted indigenous
attempts to gain full rights and membership in the nation-state as indigenous citizens, the
implementation of CSR programs diffused indigenous collective action rooted in an indigenous
political identity. Today, inclusion in CSR programs underscores indigenous subjectivity in the
northern Amazon region, but also calls into question environmental and social justice and rights
for indigenous peoples as citizens, and their ongoing exclusion from the state.
On the one hand, we might consider problems of “distributional justice” where the
spatially fixed process of oil extraction rooted in the region has left behind social and
environmental harms. On the other hand, the complexity of CSR programs also reflects a process
that calls into question “procedural equity” as indigenous populations' ambivalence leaves them
uncertain about political participation and citizenship claims in Ecuador. Thus, actors like Doña
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Barbara and Claudia remain key representatives of communities like Pompeya, pointing to not
only the disproportionate exposure of the community to ongoing oil extraction, but also a process
of “deliberate exclusion” from political decisions that lead to risk and threats to indigenous rights
(Carruthers 2008: 8; Perreault 2006).
This is a story of the way in which the dominated reflect the dominant (Auyero and
Swistun 2009). The uncertainty and ambivalence, and duplicity that has marked the state's
regulation of resource extraction, and its strategic presence in the Amazon region, is mirrored in
indigenous subjects today. Furthermore, the incorporation of indigenous populations into CSR
programs allows resource extraction to continue, but also calls into question the state's sovereign
power. Indeed, while the organized collective action by indigenous peoples and others through
the 1990s threatened the state's ongoing economic wealth from oil extraction, it also occurred
during a period of implementation of neoliberal policies including privatization of oil extraction
and CSR programs. The neoliberal entanglements I explore through the dissertation reflect the
state's attempts to 'erase' indigenous difference in the name of securing wealth and membership
in the nation-state. In other words, la Patria would be strengthened by ignoring the rights and
collective difference of indigenous peoples. In turn, CSR programs that aimed to contain an
indigenous movement, also serve to highlight ongoing indigenous difference and rights and
access to resources, predicated on membership in the nation-state.
Thus, despite the state's new push to control multinationals, and undo the impacts of
neoliberal policies of the 1990s by seeking additional control over resource extraction, it still
confronts challenges within indigenous populations. The removal of CSR programs, something
mandated by state law, but not yet happening in practice at the local level, suggests the space for
a new political strategy rooted in indigenous territory. The state's ability to control the territory
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of the nation-state, and base its development in ongoing resource extraction will also necessitate
creating the space for indigenous subjects to claim and earn rights and access to resources. In
other words, the implementation of CSR programs called into question the state's
(in)effectiveness as a sovereign, and a powerful symbol of modernity (cf. Watts 2004a). This
conjuncture of state, corporate and indigenous relationships highlights the links between
distribution of wealth, indigenous difference and social marginalization, and the state's ability to
act in pursuit of the collective interest in securing a common citizenship.

226

Abbreviations
AMWAE
CEDOC
CEPE
CERES
CODENPE
COICE
CONAIE
CONFENAIE
CONICE
CSR
CyD
DINEIB
ECUARUNARI
FCUNAE
FEI
FENOC
FEPOCAN
FEPP
FOIN
GRI
ICSID
IE
IERAC
ILO
NAWE
NGO
OCP
ONHAE
OPIP
OXY
PRODEPINE
SENPLADES
SOTE
WCS
WEF

Associación de Mujeres Waorani de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana
Ecuadorian Center for Class-based Organizations
Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies
Council for the Development of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador
Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana
Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas y Negras de la Costa Ecuatoriana
Corporate Social Responsibility
Conservación y Desarollo
Directorate for Intercultural Bilingual Education
Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui
Federación de Comunas Unión de Nativos de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana
Ecuadorian Federation of Indians
National Federation of Campesino Organizations
Provincial Federation of Peasant Organizations of Napo
Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio
Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas del Napo
Global Reporting Initiative
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Institutional Ethnography
Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian and Colonization Reform
International Labor Organization
Nacionalidad Waorani del Ecuador
Non-governmental Organization
Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados
Huaorani Nationalities of Amazonian Ecuador
Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza
Occidental
Project for the Development of Indigenous and Black Peoples of Ecuador
Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarollo
Sistema de Oleoducto Transecuatoriano
Wildlife Conservation Society
World Economic Forum
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